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Abstract 
 
The development of genetically modified (GM) seeds has been followed by the rapid 
production of GM crops.  Many insightful contributions have been made in the academic 
literature on the emergence of agricultural biotechnology, however, some gaps remain.  
First, there is a lack of emphasis on capitalist development in relation to agricultural 
biotechnology.  Second, the capitalist character of the state is underemphasized.  Third, 
there is little discussion about the interests underlying pro-GM crops discourses.  
Fourth, economic studies on GM crops rely on data and mathematical models to reach 
conclusions but do not explain them. 
The problematic for this research is: how are capitalist social relations manifested 
in and supported by the development, adoption, and production of GM crops?  The 
development of agricultural biotechnology is the result of capitalist social relations that 
demand innovation.  This is enabled by a conjunction of social actors and scientific 
practices.  The outcome is a research and development (R&D) structure that broadly 
accommodates capital by promoting the patenting of life forms in agriculture, 
concentration and centralization among multinational GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations, and the global production of GM crops. 
In the Canadian case, an attempt is made by the state to secure the agricultural 
biotechnology industry through the procurement of R&D, legislation, and regulation and 
by the state countering civil society organizations that challenge such outcomes.  In 
addition, the state and sections of civil society, government scientists and bureaucrats, 
corporations, and industry supported websites and NGOs play an important role in the 
construction of a pro-GM crops discourse that serves to control the discursive norms 
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and institutional contexts that surround agricultural biotechnology.  This seeks to 
represent the interest of capitalist accumulation and those of individual capitals as the 
general interests of the Canadian public and farming communities.  Lastly, the 
restructuring of the agricultural sector encompasses different conditions among which 
has been greater concentration and centralization of multinational GM seed and 
agrochemical corporations and the increase in the production of GM crops.  The 
consequences for Canadian farmers include stagnant net farm income despite 
increasing yields and gross income, higher farm expenses and debt, and stringent 
patent laws.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
From the time that human crop cultivation began, farming communities have attempted 
to improve the genetic makeup of plants.  The histories and geographies of these 
endeavours have evolved over centuries.  Initially, farming communities developed well-
performing varieties through breeding.  Breeding involves the selection of certain 
genetic variants from a few chosen plant species according to their suitability as edible 
or non-edible resources.  Novel genetic variations in wild populations arise from a 
relatively slow process of naturally occurring mutation and the mixing of genomes that 
occurs with sexual reproduction (Thieman and Palladino, 2012). 
Over the past century, however, plant breeding has developed incrementally by 
harnessing advances in plant biology, supplemented at times by traditional empirical 
knowledge (lore), and informed by the principles of Mendelian genetics.  Gregor Johann 
Mendel’s early 20th century experiments with peas determined the way genetic traits are 
passed on to a plant’s progeny.  James Watson’s and Francis Crick’s work in the early 
1950s on the structure of DNA set the stage for the conceptual advances that fostered 
the expansion of the biological sciences.  In the 1960s, Marshal Nirenberg and Heinrich 
Matthaei determined that messenger ribonucleic acid transcribe genetic information 
from DNA by directing the assembly of amino acids into complex proteins.  Paul Berg’s 
successful experiments with the genetic modification (also referred to as genetic 
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engineering, recombinant DNA technology or gene splicing) of molecules occurred in 
the early 1970s and initiated the modern field of biotechnology.  Biotechnology refers to 
“any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use” (UN, 
1992, 3).  Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen advanced Berg’s initial findings in 
significant ways by employing genetic engineering techniques to transfer genetic 
material into a bacterium allowing the imported material to be reproduced.  These 
discoveries, among others, formed the basis for much of the R&D that followed in the 
field of agricultural biotechnology (Thieman and Palladino, 2012). 
GM seeds were first created in the early 1980s by four groups of researchers 
working independently at Monsanto and Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri; 
University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin; and the University of Groningen in 
Ghent, Belgium (Werhane et al., 2004).  GM crops are developed by a process of 
genetic engineering which allows individual genes from related or unrelated species to 
be inserted from one organism into another to enhance or supress specific traits.  The 
most common GM crops have genes conferring resistance to insects (Lepidoptera, 
Coleoptera, nematodes), pathogens (viruses, bacteria, and fungi), herbicides 
(gluphosinate, glyphosate, phosphinotricin), abiotic stresses (frost, salt, heat, and 
drought), or improved quality traits (vitamin content, oil composition, protein quality, and 
altered growth and development).  The key difference between a GM crop variety and 
an improved variety created by conventional plant breeding is that the genes are 
transferred without sexual crossing.  In addition, with conventional breeding the specific 
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genes controlling a trait cannot be identified, whereas with genetic engineering well-
characterized genes are transferred in a targeted manner (FAO, 2005). 
Throughout the 1980s, there was a surge of investment in the development of 
agricultural biotechnology, initially by start-up companies financed by venture capital 
followed by multinational corporations.  Although many of the multinational corporations 
had no scientific expertise in either biotechnology or plant breeding, they recruited 
scientists and engineers and acquired seed companies with experience in plant 
breeding and the commercialization of seeds.  For example, Monsanto is one of the 
largest agricultural biotechnology companies in the world.  Founded in 1901, it initially 
produced saccharin (artificial sweetener), industrial chemicals, toxic chemicals 
(polychlorinated biphenyl), herbicide orange (Agent Orange) a defoliant used by the US 
military in the Vietnam War), and plastics (AstroTurf brand).  Later, in the 1980s, it 
shifted its focus to agricultural biotechnology and began investing heavily in R&D and 
acquiring seed companies (Tokar, 1999).  Also, in the 1980s and 1990s intellectual 
property (IP) laws in the form of patents began to enter plant breeding.  IP laws have 
allowed the private seed industry to recoup investment through royalty collection and 
foster further research, organizational capability, and growth (Stein, 2005). 
Massive investments in agricultural biotechnology R&D combined with newly 
emerging IP rights regimes have resulted in significant developments in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry.  The first GM crop field trials were conducted in France and the 
US in 1986 using herb-resistant tobacco.  By 1995, the two leading countries to conduct 
field trials were the US (1,952 field trials accounting for 54% of global) and Canada (486 
field trials accounting for 13% of global).  By the end of 1995, 35 applications or 
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petitions were granted to commercially grow 9 GM crops, involving 8 traits in 6 countries 
and the EU, with most of the approvals in the US (20) and Canada (8) which together 
accounted for 80% of the number of approvals worldwide.  Commercialization began in 
China in 1992 with a virus-resistant tobacco.  In the US, the first GM crop was released 
in 1994, a tomato genetically engineered to delay rotting.  In Canada, the first GM crops 
were released in 1996: herb-resistant canola, insect-resistant corn, and insect-resistant 
potato (James and Krattiger, 1996).  By 1997, commercially grown GM crops reached 
1.7 million hectares globally and continued rising to a record 179.7 million hectares 
(approximately 10% of global cropland) in 2015 of mostly maize, cotton, canola, and 
soybean, making GM crops the fastest adopted crop technology in the modern era 
(James, 2016) (see Map 1.1). 
Map 1.1: Global Area in Millions of Hectares of GM Crops by Country 
 
Note and source: special thanks to Asutosha Acharya for creating this map, (James, 
2016). 
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Despite such adoption rates, however, the genetic modification of agriculture has 
resulted in dramatic conflicts.  By the late 1990s, countries in Western Europe outright 
rejected the adoption of GM crops, and opposition emerged in many regions around the 
world: field trial crops were burned, experimental stations were attacked, and the global 
power of multinational corporations controlling GMOs was contested (Herring, 2007).  
Moreover, widespread disagreement continues among scientists, activists, regulators, 
and the general public about how to understand genetic modification in agriculture and 
what the possible positive or negative outcomes may be from the adoption of GM crops.  
Variously positioned social movement groups in diverse geographical locations have 
emphasized different concerns including the moral imperatives of ‘playing god’ or 
patenting life forms, the safety of foods derived from genetic modification, the ecological 
impacts of introducing novel plants into the environment, the loss of the ability of 
farmers to save seeds, ‘biopiracy’ through patent laws, and the control that multinational 
corporations are gaining over agriculture, science, and regulatory apparatuses (Eaton, 
2013).  Despite this extremely wide-ranging set of issues, public and academic debate 
tends to coalesce around either pro- or anti-GM crops discourses.  Such controversies 
have given rise to a globally contentious politics and unprecedented policy dilemmas. 
 
1.2 Gaps in the Academic Literature and Formulation of the Problematic 
Given the complexity of these issues, various perspectives have been advanced in the 
academic literature that examine the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops.  In general, there are three overlapping and interrelated perspectives: 
developmental, political-economic, and civil society, that respectively bring into focus 
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economic growth and improving welfare, the relations of production and exchange, and 
interventions by social groups.  The academic literature that examines the development 
of agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops provides 
many insightful theoretical and empirical contributions that leading scholars have made, 
however, some gaps remain.  First, there is a lack of emphasis on the development of 
capitalism as it relates to the agro-food system including agriculture and agricultural 
biotechnology.  Second, the role of the state, in terms of its capitalist character, has 
been underemphasized.  Third, there is little discussion about the interests underlying 
the construction of pro-GM crops discourses.  Fourth, studies that examine the 
economic effects of the production of GM crops rely on data and mathematical models 
to reach conclusions but do not explain them.  Given the gaps in the literature, the 
problematic for this research is: how are capitalist social relations manifested in and 
supported by the development, adoption, and production of GM crops? 
 
1.3 Case Study: The Emergence of Agricultural Biotechnology in Canada 
The history and geography of the development of agricultural biotechnology in Canada 
may be traced initially to the technological innovations in the canola sector.  According 
to Phillips and Khachatourians (2001, 23), “Canola is a product of innovation.  From the 
very beginning, the development of rapeseed into a new plant variety, the products of 
which were suited to human and animal feeding purposes, was a science-driven 
process”.  Also, Gray et al. (2001, 90) asserted, “In Canada, canola is probably the most 
recent and pronounced example of how R&D can result in the rapid ascent of a crop to 
a multi-billion dollar status from humble origins”.  The invention, innovation, and 
7 
investment in the development of canola varieties initially occurred in Canada and has 
been a defining feature of the canola sector since the 1940s. 
During the Second World War, Canada experienced shortages of oil imports 
(rapeseed oil and other oils) from Asia and Europe.  Although rapeseed was cultivated 
in some Asian countries to produce vegetable oil for human consumption, it was not 
considered suitable for human consumption in Canada due to its high concentration of 
erucic acid.  Instead, rapeseed oil was used in Canada for industrial purposes such as 
machine and engine lubricant.  The geopolitical context of blocked oil imports during the 
Second World War led policy-makers to perceive Canada’s dependence on foreign oil 
for both industrial and dietary purposes as a national weakness.  Self-sufficiency in oil 
became a concern of the Canadian Defense Board and the modification of industrial 
rapeseed oil into edible oil emerged as a priority (Busch and Juska, 1997).  It was soon 
discovered that rapeseed grew well in parts of Ontario and the prairies, and in 1943 the 
Forage Crop Division of the Canada Department of Agriculture imported 18,640 
kilograms from the US and distributed it to Canadian farmers (Kneen, 1992).  These 
events ultimately initiated the development of the rapeseed industry in Canada. 
Following the Second World War, rapeseed was not established as an 
economically viable product by the private sector because there were no significant 
returns from its production to justify R&D investment and no legal protections of IP 
rights in plant breeding to protect innovation.  These two factors left the rapeseed sector 
entirely in the control of the public sector where for the next two decades rapeseed 
research was conducted by Agricultural Canada, the National Research Council (NRC), 
a number of Canadian universities (e.g., University of Manitoba), and a few small 
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Canadian companies (e.g., Edible Oils, Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Canada 
Packers).  As a result of this arrangement, research agendas were driven by 
government actions and priorities, and research findings moved around freely between 
all parties (McLeod, 1974). 
In the 1950s, public sector scientists in Canada made important advancements in 
seed breeding.  The first breakthrough occurred at the NRC Prairie Regional Laboratory 
which allowed the laborious testing of the oil composition of rapeseed to be reduced 
from a two-week process to a 15 minute period by using gas-liquid chromatography 
(GLC) analysis.  The NRC assisted scientists at the Dominion Forage Lab of 
Agricultural Canada and the University of Manitoba with acquiring and using GLC 
analysis.  GLC analysis was further refined by Keith Downey and a team of scientists at 
the Dominion Forage Lab by developing a technique of cutting a single seed in half to 
allow the remaining half to germinate and produce a new plant.  Using GLC analysis 
and the half-seed method allowed scientists to test thousands of seeds in order to 
identify a seed for breeding with a low concentration of erucic acid (selective breeding).  
In 1963, one rapeseed was identified with no measurable quantities of erucic acid which 
was planted and yielded five whole seeds.  These seeds ultimately formed the basis for 
the development of low-erucic rapeseed (Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001). 
By the late 1960s, public sector R&D development of rapeseed oil reached a 
threshold.  There was no single private or public institution with the means or incentive 
to invest in product development and market structures (e.g., extension and foreign 
market development).  This prompted the federal government to inaugurate the 
Rapeseed Association of Canada (RAC) and the Rapeseed Utilization Assistance 
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Program (RUAP) to deal with market development and product research and extension.  
The RAC and RUAP were successful until the mid-1980s in mobilizing financial 
resources from industry and government to support R&D efforts.  In addition, a 
significant development in this period were the efforts by rapeseed farmers to begin 
formulating separate provincial associations to mobilize producers to have a say in the 
development of the sector.  Associations in the late 1960s were formulated in 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, followed by Alberta in the 1970s, and Ontario in the 
1980s.  Although initially small with limited resources that came from membership fees, 
these associations began to focus on agronomy, policy development, and extension in 
order to accelerate the development of the sector (Gray et al., 2001). 
With greater efforts and resources dedicated to R&D, the first low-erucic Brassica 
rapa variety was released in 1971, followed by the first low-erucic and low-glucosinolate 
Brassica napus in 1974, and the first double-zero (≤ 5% erucic acid of the total 
composition of the fatty acids and ≤ 3 mg glucosinolate) Brassica rapa in 1978.  In order 
to effectively market the transformations that occurred to rapeseed, the RAC 
trademarked the name ‘canola’ (a contraction of Canadian oil and low acid) in 1978 to 
differentiate the superior nutritional properties of its new product.  In 1979, more than 
3.4 million hectares of canola were cultivated globally.  During the 1978-1979 crop year, 
Japanese imports of canola seed exceeded 1 million tonnes for the first time (CCC, 
2014). 
Heading into the 1980s, significant developments occurred inside the canola 
industry and outside of it.  In 1980, the RAC formally completed its shift to canola when 
it changed its name to the Canola Council of Canada (CCC).  While R&D efforts 
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continued to improve the nutritional properties of canola, so that by 1986 the erucic acid 
content was decreased further to less than 2% of the total composition of the fatty acids 
and the glucosinolate to less than 30 µmol/g (Dupont et al., 1989), there was a shift in 
focus to R&D that would increase yields and extend the effective planting range.  This 
was much more in line with improving production and the market for the product as 
stated in the by-laws of the CCC, “to explore potential markets and to conduct 
promotional and servicing activities of any kind conducive to the extension of markets 
throughout the world for the canola industry of Canada” (quoted in Gray et al., 2001, 94-
95).  Given these new priorities, private companies began to increase their contribution 
to the CCC’s R&D efforts and the balance in the organization began to shift toward 
private companies, especially those associated with agricultural inputs and processing, 
which were beginning to be acquired by international players.  The outcome was a 
tightly coordinated R&D program between the private industry, public institutions, and 
the CCC.  By 1988, approximately 3.7 million hectares of canola were cultivated in 
western Canada and canola earned regulatory approval and market acceptance as a 
premium oil in all the major export markets (Gray et al., 2001). 
In addition to the developments that were taking place in the canola industry, in 
the early 1980s the Government of Canada began to aggressively promote 
biotechnology R&D development as part of a strategy to foster economic growth in an 
era of competitive innovation in high-technology industries, economic recession, and 
lagging manufacturing industries.  The Science Council of Canada advised the federal 
government of the need to achieve ‘technological sovereignty’, which placed greater 
emphasis on integrating technological innovation into modern industrial processes.  This 
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required economic restructuring based on expanded cooperation between the public 
and private sectors and specialization in a limited number of critical technologies 
(engineering, information and computer technology, and biotechnology) that would 
strengthen Canada’s domestic technological innovation and capacity.  The Ministry of 
State for Science and Technology (MOSST) published a policy document entitled 
Biotechnology in Canada which articulated the federal government’s framework for 
promoting and developing biotechnology.  Moreover, MOSST created the private sector 
Task Force on Biotechnology which recommended a ten-year development project 
designed to stimulate R&D and investment in the biotechnology industrial sector.  
Incentives to private industry included: government funding and tax relief; expansion of 
the scientific base; increase in international collaborations; and attention to the 
Canadian regulatory framework so as to not disadvantage Canada in relation to other 
international competitors (Task Force on Biotechnology, 1981). 
The work of MOSST and the Task Force on Biotechnology resulted in the 
Government of Canada adopting the National Biotechnology Strategy (NBS) in 1983 
which primarily focused on developing R&D capacity ($22 million dollars were allocated 
to develop the strategy and an additional $100 million to fund national research centres) 
and a favourable investment climate.  In addition, the National Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee was established under the auspices of the NBS to advise the minister of 
industry on the industrial aspects of biotechnology.  In 1988, MOSST published the first 
policy document entitled Biotechnology Regulations: A User’s Guide.  This document 
stipulated that the regulation of genetically engineered seeds and plant varieties would 
fall under the provisions of the Seeds Act, as administered by Agriculture Canada.  In 
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general, the policy document developed a framework to introduce biotechnology 
products into the market that minimize environmental and health risks and foster 
competitiveness (Peekhaus, 2013). 
With greater emphasis throughout the 1980s on biotechnology R&D and 
products for fostering competitiveness, several developments occurred in the 1990s 
which further consolidated the biotechnology industry in Canada.  The decision by the 
US Patents and Trademarks Office to grant patents for whole plants in 1985, and the 
introduction of canola hybrid technologies and the first hybrid variety in 1989, prompted 
the Government of Canada to pass the Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) act in 1990 which 
provided “a form of intellectual property rights by which plant breeders can protect their 
new varieties in the same way an inventor protects a new invention with a patent” 
(CFIA, 2015a).  IP rights are considered vital, not only as an instrument by which to spur 
domestic innovation, but also as a means to gain entrance into world markets of 
innovation by facilitating the transfer of knowledge from institutions of higher education 
to the private sector.  The PBR strengthened private control over IP in the breeding and 
seed business.  This has resulted in significantly greater use of contracts, often 
involving a web of relationships that link research units with seed companies, other 
input providers, farming communities, processors, and marketers.  The private growth in 
breeding and seed business was increasingly encouraged by the federal and provincial 
governments.  Public sector research agencies refocused their efforts to complement 
private sector interests (Gray et al., 2001). 
In addition to the development of IP laws in the US and Canada, a concerted 
campaign based on aggressive corporate mergers and acquisitions as well as 
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partnerships among the largest multinational corporations in agricultural biotechnology 
was taking place.  In 1996, the top 11 seed companies (Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, 
Groupe Limagrain, Land O’Lakes, KWS SAAT SE, Dow, Sakata, DLF-Trifolium, Takii) 
accounted for 37% of the world’s seed market.  Moreover, within a short decade since 
its shift to agricultural biotechnology in the 1980s, Monsanto emerged as the largest 
player in the industry (Peekhaus, 2013).  Following vigorous marketing in Canada of 
GM canola, soybean, and corn (the three largest GM crops cultivated in Canada), 
Monsanto received regulatory approval from Health Canada to market glyphosate 
tolerant canola for food use in 1994.  Glyphosate tolerant canola was developed 
through a specific genetic modification of Brassica napus to be resistant to the activity of 
glyphosate herbicides (Health Canada, 1999), which brought together previous 
innovations in the development of rapeseed/canola with more recent innovations from 
Monsanto.  Monsanto’s glyphosate tolerant soybean received regulatory approval from 
Health Canada to market for food use in 1996.  The glyphosate tolerant seeds, 
marketed as ‘Roundup Ready’, are genetically engineered to produce crops capable of 
surviving post-emergent applications of ‘Roundup’, a broad-spectrum non selective 
systemic herbicide that is sprayed and absorbed through the leaves of the plants 
(Health Canada, 2000).  Monsanto’s insect resistant corn received regulatory approval 
from Health Canada to market for food use in 1997.  Insect resistant corn is genetically 
engineered to contain a gene derived from the naturally occurring soil bacterium 
Bacillus thuringiensis (crops containing this gene are commonly referred to with the 
prefix Bt, for example, Bt-corn).  The bacterium produces a crystal protein that destroys 
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the digestive tract of certain insects when ingested and mixed with stomach acids 
(Health Canada, 1997). 
Given these developments in the agricultural biotechnology industry, by the mid-
1990s the Government of Canada adopted a shift in science and technology policy that 
identified the need for mechanisms to improve the management of science and 
technology resources more strategically across the federal government’s science 
departments and universities, further enhancing the R&D structure for the development 
of biotechnology.  Underpinning this strategy were substantive federal investments 
made to enhance capacity building at universities and develop networks to integrate 
academic research with industry priorities to commercialize new inventions.  
Government mechanisms to improve public and private relationships and science 
investment efficiency resulted in the creation of the Canadian Foundation for Innovation 
and the Canadian Research Chairs at universities.  This transformed model of science 
policy is anticipated not only to help leverage R&D resources from across the federal 
government’s science departments, but to address national science priorities and take 
advantage of the basic science infrastructure in the university system.  These 
institutional changes have resulted in the restructuring of the federal government’s 
science departments to improve the governance of innovation policies and address 
economic, social, and environmental priorities.  For example, Agriculture and Agri-food 
Canada (AAFC) has implemented the Agricultural Policy Framework to coordinate 
research and innovation efforts across provincial governments, industry, and public 
research institutions, and to maximize the return on science investments in priority 
research areas (Carew, 2005). 
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With the R&D structure and IP laws well established, the Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy Task Force (CBS) was inaugurated in 1997 to review and 
further develop the NBS.  The newly formed task force consulted with provincial 
officials, industry, non-government organizations (NGOs), scientists, academics, and 
other relevant stakeholders about the visions, goals, and principles of renewed national 
biotechnology strategy as well as its impact on biotechnology R&D.  The formation of 
the CBS was followed by the establishment of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee (CBAC) in 1999.  The CBAC identified five research areas: the regulation of 
GM foods; IP related issues in biotechnology; novel uses of biotechnology such as stem 
cells; the integration of ethical and social issues into biotechnology; and the 
consequences for privacy that emerges surrounding biotechnology (Government of 
Canada, 2004).  According to Peekhaus (2013, 25), “Although the CBS and the CBAC 
documents articulate the importance of social and ethical dimensions in informing 
biotechnology policy development, the overall tone of both the federal biotechnology 
strategy and the various reports published by the CBAC leave the reader with the 
unmistakable conclusion that the commercialization of this science and its resulting 
technological applications is the driving motivation”. 
Heading into the 2000s, the Government of Canada had clearly positioned itself 
as a world leader in biotechnology R&D and commercialization.  This has been 
substantiated by significant levels of public funding.  For the fiscal years from 1997-
1998 to 2008-2009, the federal government’s biotechnology expenditures for R&D and 
related scientific activities was nearly $8 billion (Statistics Canada, 2001, 2005, 2010).  
In addition, Canada’s Growing Forward strategic framework, which encompasses the 
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policies and programs put in place to support the Canadian agriculture and agro-food 
sector, committed $1.3 billion for the fiscal years from 2009-2010 to 2012-2013 in order 
to “Accelerate the pace of innovation and facilitate the adoption of new technologies” 
(Miller, 2012, 2).  Other public funding came from different sources: the Industrial 
Research Assistance Program invested $60 million between 1998 and 2006; 
Technology Partnerships Canada invested $293 million between 2001 and 2006; the 
Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Incentive Program provided 
over $3 billion in tax relief to Canadian businesses in 2006; and the Business 
Development Bank of Canada committed to $191 million for the fiscal years from 2006-
2007 to 2009-2010 (Peekhaus, 2013, 2-3).  More specific to agricultural biotechnology, 
the Canadian Crop Genomic Initiative, which is a major departmental biotechnology 
project aimed at identifying the structure and function of key crop genes, is helping to 
develop Canadian crops, specifically corn, soybean, canola, and wheat, to improve 
disease and insect resistance, cold and drought tolerance, and yield and quality 
attributes (Government of Canada, 2003). 
Also in the 2000s, further consolidations were taking place among multinational 
seed corporations.  In 2009, the top three seed companies in the world, Monsanto, 
DuPont, and Syngenta, accounted for 23%, 14%, and 8% respectively totaling 45% of 
the global proprietary seed market, and seed revenues of approximately US$7.3 billion, 
US$4.6 billion, and US$2.5 billion respectively totaling US$14.4 billion (Peekhaus, 
2013, 44).  In terms of Canadian companies, there has been a surge of small to medium 
size firms, from 358 in 1999 to 532 in 2005, an increase of nearly 50%.  Medical 
biotechnology firms represented 58.3% of the total biotechnology firms, followed by 
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20.1% agricultural biotechnology firms, and 18.6% industrial biotechnology firms; 
however, 50% of biotechnology companies have less than 20 employees, and 80% 
have less than 100 employees and are located in Ontario, British Columbia, or Quebec.  
In 2005, 13,433 employees worked in biotechnology firms, up from 7,749 in 1999, an 
increase of 73.4%.  Medical biotechnology firms accounted for 80.9% of the total 
biotechnology related employment, followed by 9.8% in agricultural biotechnology, and 
8.6% in industrial biotechnology.  Private biotechnology R&D expenditures increased at 
an average annual rate of 12.7% during the 1999-2005 period, from $831 million in 
1999 to $1.7 billion in 2005.  Medical biotechnology R&D represented 87.3% of the total 
biotechnology R&D in 2005, while agricultural biotechnology R&D and industrial 
biotechnology R&D accounted for 9.2% and 2.8% respectively.  Nominal biotechnology 
revenues increased at an average annual rate of 13.7% during the 1999-2005 period, 
from $1.95 billion in 1999 to $4.20 billion in 2005.  Medical biotechnology was 
responsible for 70.6% of total biotechnology revenues, followed by 24.6% from 
agricultural biotechnology and 4.3% from industrial biotechnology (de Avillez, 2011).  
Canada’s biotechnology economy has reached nearly $78 billion per annum, or 6.4% of 
Canada’s GDP (Pellerin and Wayne, 2008).  Canada represents approximately 4% of 
the global biotechnology industry revenues, but only 1.8% of the global economy (World 
Bank, 2011).  According to the Conference Board of Canada, biotechnology is a critical 
technology platform essential to Canada’s ongoing prosperity (Conference Board of 
Canada, 2005). 
Despite such remarkable developments in biotechnology in general and 
agricultural biotechnology in particular in the Canadian context, resistance has not 
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abated.  Among the many opponents of GM crops are three main groups in Canada that 
are involved in the resistance movement against agricultural biotechnology: 
Greenpeace Canada, Canadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN), and the 
Canadian National Farmers Union (NFU).  In general, there are three interconnected 
issues that these groups address: health and environment, ‘anti-globalization’, and 
consumer/consumption.  Greenpeace is a global organization based in Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands with offices in more than 40 countries.  Greenpeace focuses on many 
different environmental issues including “Campaigning for sustainable agriculture by 
rejecting genetically engineered organisms, protecting biodiversity and encouraging 
socially responsible farming” (Greenpeace Canada, 2015a).  In Canada, Greenpeace 
Canada has been a proponent of mandatory labeling of genetically engineered foods 
and took part in the coalition against GM wheat (Eaton, 2013).  Greenpeace Canada is 
known for its work among civil society organizations with more than 90,000 supporters 
in Canada and 2.9 million members worldwide.  Dissemination is done through door-to-
door canvassing including signature collection on various issues, telephone calling, and 
extensive mailing and e-mailing of a monthly magazine to members (Greenpeace 
Canada, 2015a).  Beyond the Canadian context, Greenpeace along with Friends of the 
Earth played an instrumental role in challenging the EU’s relatively permissive and 
supportive biotechnology strategy resulting in a sea change between 1996 and 1999 
which ended with the EU turning against the adoption of GM products (Tiberghien, 
2007). 
Another prominent group in Canada is the CBAN, which is composed of various 
environmental, social justice, and consumer groups.  The stated mission reads, “To 
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promote food sovereignty and democratic decision-making on science and technology 
issues in order to protect the integrity of the environment, health, food, and the 
livelihoods of people in Canada and around the world by facilitating, informing and 
organizing civil society action, researching, and providing information to government for 
policy development” (CBAN, 2015a).  Although the CBAN was formed in 2006, informal 
collaborations prior involved campaigns which stopped the regulatory approval of 
Monsanto’s bovine growth hormone for dairy cows and pressuring Monsanto into 
abandoning its plans to introduce GM wheat into the Canadian market.  Part of the 
CBAN’s resistance to biotechnology has included engaging with broader political-
economic issues including the current phase of the neo-liberal form of capitalism in 
which biotechnology is being developed.  The group has highlighted some of the 
deficiencies in Canada’s regulatory system and the need for public involvement in 
parliamentary debates.  One of the goals has been to democratize decision-making 
processes around genetic engineering.  Dissemination is done through public lectures 
on a range of topics including: scientific, social, economic, and political issues from 
prominent speakers; film viewings (e.g., The World According to Monsanto); and cross-
Canada speaking tours about the global impacts of biofuels on food, farmers, and 
human rights.  One of the challenges that has been highlighted by the CBAN in the 
debate over GM technology is the importance of explaining a complex subject matter in 
a way that is accessible to a general audience.  Accordingly, the CBAN has produced a 
number of publications on its website that not only raise issues but spur readers to take 
action. 
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The NFU is a direct-membership voluntary organization formed to unite provincial 
farmers’ unions (excluding Quebec) around issues that focus on agricultural and social 
policies that preserve and promote family farming as a basic food production unit in 
Canada.  The NFU has conducted a number of successful campaigns around GM 
wheat, GM seeds, and plant breeders’ rights, among others.  The NFU works in 
collaboration with other NGOs, environmentalists, and social justice activists interested 
in food and food policy issues (NFU, 2015).  Dissemination is done through a monthly 
newsletter, social media, public meetings, membership discussions, cooperation with 
receptive parliamentarians and parties, and engagement in parliamentary committee 
meetings. 
While resistance from opponents of GM crops has been pronounced, proponents 
have waged their own struggle.  One of the most prominent organizations in this regard 
is the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA).  The 
ISAAA is a “not-for-profit international organization that shares the benefits of crop 
biotechnology to various stakeholders, particularly resource-poor farmers in developing 
countries, through knowledge sharing initiatives and the transfer and delivery of 
proprietary biotechnology applications” (ISAAA, 2015a).  The organization has three 
centers: AfriCenter in Nairobi, Kenya; AmeriCenter, Ithaca, New York (hosted by Cornell 
University); and the SEAsiaCenter in Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines.  The ISAAA has 
a multi-million dollar budget and receives funding from multinational corporations such 
as Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, and Pioneer as well as the UK’s Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences Research Council (a publicly funded body for research and training 
in the ‘non-medical life sciences’, and one of the seven Research Councils sponsored 
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through the UK Government's Office of Science and Technology).  The organization’s 
high-profile board members, past and present, include: Robert Fraley, Executive Vice 
President and Chief Technology Officer at Monsanto and two-time (1998, 1999) 
recipient of the National Medal of Technology from then President Bill Clinton; Canadian 
inventor Wallace Beversdorf from the University of Guelph known for the OAC Bayfield 
soybean, which has been in commercial use for more than 20 years; Gabrielle Persley, 
Research Project Director at the Crawford Fund Australia, and advisor to the World 
Bank; and Ronald L. Phillips, awarded the Wolf Prize in Agriculture along with Michel A. 
J. Georges of the University of Liège for discoveries in genetics and genomics that laid 
the foundations for improvements in crop and livestock breeding, and important 
advances in plant and animal sciences (ISAAA, 2015b). 
The ISAAA’s chairman, Clive James, is the main author of the annual reports 
Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, which are commissioned by the 
GM crops industry and widely reported in the media.  These reports provide 
comprehensive information and data on the global adoption patterns and production of 
GM crops.  James has been influential in promoting the adoption of GM crops in several 
countries in the Global South, often meeting with heads of states and business leaders.  
GM crops are touted as part of the solution to alleviating poverty in the global South and 
benefiting small-scale resource-poor farmers.  Support projects have been implemented 
that are geared towards “diversifying the biotech products in the market, in enhancing 
the public’s awareness on the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology, and 
in improving farm productivity and income through the sharing and exchange of 
knowledge and technologies” (ISAAA, 2015b) and technology transfer projects that 
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facilitate “the transfer of proprietary technologies from the private sector in industrial 
countries for the benefit of subsistence farmers and the poor…[through]…exchange of 
technology, skills and experience between developing countries for their mutual benefit” 
(ISAAA, 2015b). 
In addition, the ISAAA produces a wide variety of publications, videos, and an e-
newsletter in several languages as part of their knowledge sharing initiative “on all 
aspects of crop biotechnology for all stakeholders, including consumers, farmers, policy 
makers, scientists, and the media” (ISAAA, 2015b) targeted at audiences of all ages, 
including children.  Among the many publications have been extensive economic and 
environmental impact assessments of the global adoption of GM crops.  These involve 
“estimating the economic, social, and environmental impacts of crop 
biotechnology.  Impact studies usually employ scientific methods drawn from economics 
and the social sciences providing metrics of welfare effects of crop biotechnology 
adoption to include economic surplus, farm-level productivity and income, indices of 
health and nutrition, and indices of environmental footprints” (ISAAA, 2015b). 
More specific to the Canadian context has been the national industry association 
BIOTECanada “with nearly 250 members located nationwide, reflecting the diverse 
nature of Canada’s health, industrial and agricultural biotechnology sectors” 
(BIOTECanada, 2015).  The Industrial & Agricultural Committee is focused on the 
development of policy, advocacy, and investment that enable the biotechnology industry 
to penetrate traditional agricultural and industrial domestic and global markets with 
biotechnology products and seek solutions to environmental challenges.  Specifically, 
the committee works on issues related to capital formation, regulatory environment, and 
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market awareness and demand.  The over 40 committee members represent leading 
organizations in industrial and agricultural biotechnology (BIOTECanada, 2015). 
BIOTECanada has been directly involved in eliminating ‘zero-tolerance’ policies 
to ensure the continued adoption of agricultural biotechnology globally and to continue 
to have products of agricultural biotechnology bring value to the marketplace.  
BIOTECanada supports actions that facilitate the flow of goods in commerce and 
minimize trade disruptions.  The National Biotech Accord aligns regional and national 
organizations leading the development of the Canadian bio-economy.  Representing all 
facets of the technology, these organizations forge a national entity working to secure 
the long term sustainability for Canadian biotechnology-based companies and 
organizations (BIOTECanada, 2015). 
 
1.4 Objectives and Researchable Questions 
Based on the problematic for this research (how are capitalist social relations 
manifested in and supported by the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops?), the theoretical foundation (political-economy of (bio) technology), and the 
substantive issues (the development, adoption, and production of GM crops in the 
Canadian context), four objectives and related researchable questions are defined. 
Objective 1.  To examine the historical and geographical development of agricultural 
biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops. 
1.1 What role have public and private institutions played in the development of 
agricultural biotechnology? 
1.2 How did changes in IP rights affect access to and use of genetic resources? 
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1.3 How has public and private investment in agricultural R&D affected the 
development of GM crops? 
1.4 What are the effects of greater concentration and centralization among GM 
seed and agrochemical corporations? 
1.5 To what extent have GM crops been adopted and produced globally? 
Objective 2.  To investigate the role of the state and civil society organizations in 
relation to the development, adoption, and production of GM crops at local and national 
scales. 
2.1 In what ways has the federal government of Canada supported R&D and 
innovation? 
2.2 What are the objectives of the Canadian biotechnology strategy and policies? 
2.3 How have the federal government of Canada’s biotechnology regulatory 
practices supported industry initiatives and addressed public concerns? 
2.4 What effect have the federal government of Canada’s biotechnology policies 
and regulatory practices had on the adoption and production of GM crops? 
2.5. How does resistance by various civil society organizations affect the 
expansion of the market for biotechnology products? 
2.6 Why do various government agencies continue to promote the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops despite on-going public resistance? 
Objective 3.  To understand how discourses about biotechnology, GM crops, scientific 
progress, and economic development are employed to sustain and legitimate the use of 
GM crops. 
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3.1. How has the federal government of Canada and industry constructed and 
sustained a pro-GM crops discourse? 
3.2. In what ways has the pro-GM crops discourse been narrowly conceived? 
3.3. What are the purported benefits of GM crops for adopting countries in the 
Global North and South? 
3.4 In what ways and how effective has been the dissemination of the pro-GM 
crops discourse? 
Objective 4.  To assess the economic implications of the production of GM crops for 
farmers. 
4.1 To what extent has agricultural restructuring affected farmers in Canada? 
4.2 Why has the federal government of Canada and the industry aggressively 
promoted the adoption and production of GM crops? 
4.3 What effect has the adoption of GM seeds and associated technology use 
agreements had on farming practices? 
4.4 Does the production of GM crops result in higher income for farmers?   
4.5 How are the economic implications manifested over time, in terms of 
production, subsidies, and trade export?   
 
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
The conceptual logic of enquiry in this research is based on a realist approach to 
abstraction, structure, and causation (see, for example, Bhaskar, 1975; Brown et al. 
2001; Cox, 2013; Sayer, 1992, 2000).  Following Bhaskar (1975), Sayer (1992) argued 
that knowledge must consciously devise methods for individuating objects, their 
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attributes and relationships.  Abstraction is the isolation in thought of a one-sided or 
partial aspect of a concrete object constituted by many aspects, elements, and forces. 
One must abstract from the many conditions and properties of an object to focus on 
those without which the object will not be what it is.  The idea behind this is to take into 
consideration each concrete determination abstractly, in order to form concepts about 
them, before returning to the concrete with a rich array of theoretical understandings 
(Marx, 1993). 
Objects are embedded in relations that are external or contingent and internal or 
necessary.  Internally related objects or practices are structures.  Social structures have 
positions associated with roles independent of the individuals occupying them.  They 
are (re)produced together with associated resources, constraints, or rules, to determine 
events.  Structures, however, may be invisible to common sense thinking. 
The synchronic notion of abstraction allows only indirect reference to diachronic 
processes of change.  The latter require causal analysis.  The cause of something is 
what makes it happen, what produces or determines it.  In the realist view, causality is 
not a relationship between discrete causes and effects; it is not about explaining 
patterns of events, but concerns instead the causal powers (or liabilities) of objects, 
their ways of acting, or mechanisms.  The nature of an object and its causal powers are 
internally or necessarily related, but whether or not the powers are activated, and their 
effects when they are, depends on conditions whose configurations are external or 
contingent (Sayer, 1992). 
In realism, the discovery of empirical regularities generates a series of questions 
into causal systems.  For empirical regularities to be produced, the object possessing 
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causal power must operate consistently (‘intrinsic’ condition for closure) and the 
relations between the causal mechanisms and external conditions must be constant 
(‘extrinsic’ condition for closure) resulting in a ‘closed’ system.  Most systems, however, 
violate these conditions and are ‘open’ systems.  The social sciences deal with such 
systems because humans interpret conditions, respond, and modify the configuration of 
a system.  Whereas conventionally scientific laws are confirmed statements about 
empirical regularities, in the realist view laws refer to the necessary causal mechanisms 
and not to the contingent conditions in which mechanisms produce realities.  Realist 
science attempts to make ‘rational abstractions’ which isolate significant elements 
having unity and autonomous force, as with structures.  Theories in this view make their 
claims at the abstract level about internal relations, causal powers, and necessity in the 
world.  By comparison, the form of contingent relations must always remain an empirical 
question, answered by observing actual cases (Sayer, 1992). 
By drawing on a realist approach to abstraction, structure, and causation I 
address my problematic, objectives, and researchable questions using a combination of 
“extensive” and “intensive” concrete research designs (Sayer, 1992, 242-251, 2000).  
Extensive research primarily focuses on discovering common properties and general 
patterns as a whole.  Extensive research uses descriptive and inferential statistics and 
numerical analysis.  The focus is mainly on taxonomic groups that share similar formal 
attributes, but need not connect or interact with each other.  The criteria by which 
samples are drawn are decided beforehand and adhered to in order to ensure 
representativeness.  Testing in extensive research determines how general the 
particular findings are in the wider population (replication). 
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Intensive research primarily focuses on how structural or causal processes work 
out in a particular case or a limited number of cases.  Intensive research uses mainly 
qualitative methods such as structural or causal analysis, participant observation, and/or 
interactive interviews.  The focus is mainly on groups whose members may be either 
similar or different, but relate to each other structurally or causally.  Identifiable 
individuals are of interest in terms of their properties and their mode of connection to 
others.  Individuals may be selected one by one as the research proceeds.  In this 
sense, intensive research is exploratory; as learning from one contact leads to others 
with whom s/he is linked, the causal group is built up.  Testing in intensive research 
determines if the results apply to those individuals studied (corroboration). 
According to Sayer (1992), intensive and extensive research designs may be 
employed in a complementary manner.  Extensive research into empirical regularities, 
either in the form of correlations, trends over time, segregation or other indices of 
localization, can help give direction to more intensive forms of research.  Having 
established some regularity or departures from it, intensive research helps to shed light 
on why that is the case.  Much of this depends on the degree to which the quantitative 
analysis is informed by a careful conceptualization of the relations, including the 
structural or causal ones that are being evaluated.  Care must be taken, therefore, when 
moving from regularity to an explanatory account. 
The combination of extensive research for understanding macro-level dynamics 
combined with intensive research for understanding micro-level dynamics in this 
research provided me with a comprehensive understanding of the general patterns and 
causal processes at work in the development, adoption, and production of GM crops.  
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Quantitative analysis of secondary data at multiple scales helped me to understand the 
regularities, trends, and patterns of the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops.  Qualitative analysis of primary data helped me to understand the complex and 
multi-contextual relationships between individuals (e.g., farmers, government scientists, 
NGO activists) and institutions (e.g., farmers’ union, corporations, government, NGOs) 
outside conventional categories and across multiple localities.  Qualitative analysis 
brings out the specific contexts in which individuals find themselves (e.g., Canadian GM 
crops sector) and how such contexts causally determine complex outcomes (e.g., 
relations between individuals and institutions, capital flows and concentrations, 
technological development, economic effects on farmers) across multiple geographic 
spaces. 
The qualitative research method that I chose was interviewing.  Interviewing is a 
complex social interaction in which the researcher and respondent bring expectations to 
the interview.  This requires a high level of interpersonal skills on the part of the 
researcher so that the respondent will feel at ease.  A rapport must be established with 
the respondent so that a trusting relationship is developed.  Interviewing is suited for 
describing both program processes and outcomes from the perspective of the target 
audience or key stakeholder.  The goal of the interview is to deeply explore a 
respondent’s point of view, feelings, and perspectives.  This allows the researcher to 
have discussions with respondents that explain issues, complexities, and contradictions 
in order to produce rich and varied data (Kitchin and Tate, 2000; Valentine, 2005). 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews are a less formal, less standardized, and 
more interactive method of interviewing that gives the researcher an effective manner of 
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learning from the respondents what is significant in each of their circumstances.  This 
enables the researcher to build upon and refer to knowledge gained about the specific 
characteristics of various respondents.  A meaningful communication is established by 
adapting the questions and ideas in the interview to what is relevant to the respondents, 
and by being willing to discuss as well as to evoke answers.  If the researcher’s 
questions and emphasis is disputed by the respondents, this gives the researcher an 
opportunity to learn something about his or her own preconceptions or those of the 
respondents (Sayer, 1992). 
 Some caveats, however, should be noted with respect to interviewing.  The 
epistemological premise of interviewing (i.e., that respondents are competent reporters 
of past and present events, experiences, attitudes, beliefs, behaviours, relationships, 
interactions, and so on) has been contested (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992).  
Respondents are influenced in all sorts of ways that affect how they interpret and 
account for events and experiences to a probing researcher.  Respondents may have 
cultural or strategic reasons for presenting information about themselves and others in a 
particular light and may leave out or distort some information (Weiss, 1994). 
The process of reflecting on who I am and how my identity will shape the 
interactions that I have with contacts and respondents while in the field has been 
described as recognizing one’s positionality and being reflexive.  According to Kim 
England, reflexivity is a “self-critical sympathetic introspection and self-conscious 
analytical scrutiny of the self as a researcher” (England, 1994, 82).  The task here is to 
think about how my social class, gender, race, nationality, theoretical orientation, 
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politics, history, experiences, and so on, shape my research and interpretation of data 
(Schoenberger, 1992). 
Several events have been instrumental in shaping who I am.  I began to develop 
my geographical imagination by taking courses at York University’s Department of 
Geography.  These courses introduced me to many influential geographers that 
broadened my understanding of the significance of place, space, landscape, and 
nature.  I met professors who were passionate about their work, exhibiting high 
standards in scholarship, yet expressed a genuine interest in students and encouraged 
an ‘open door policy’ in terms of their availability and willingness to speak to students.  
One of the professors that I connected with was Raju J. Das.  Raju introduced me to the 
Marxist perspective in geographic thought.  The Marxist approach appealed to me 
intellectually and became the theoretical approach that I would adopt in my academic 
work in general and my current research specifically. 
For many years I have been involved in various community service opportunities 
that raised my political awareness.  I volunteered for two years in the Yonge Street 
Mission Evergreen program (drop-in for street youth); I volunteered for one year in the 
Out of the Cold program (provides safe refuge, hospitality, and emergency shelter for 
homeless); I developed and volunteered for eight years in the Youth Drop-In Centre (the 
program provides support for at-risk youth).  Currently, I am the vice-president of the 
Students for Social Equality at York University group (a political group that raises 
awareness about contemporary social, economic, and political issues);  and the Critical 
Geography Reading Group in York University’s Geography Department.  These 
experiences have been instrumental in shaping my social, economic, and political 
32 
perspective while interacting with respondents including: farmers, government scientists 
and bureaucrats, other academics, and activists. 
I strived to understand the positions of my respondents in relation to myself as a 
researcher.  I paid special attention to how respondents present their opinions and 
practices to me as a researcher who is situated differently from others with whom they 
interact on a daily basis.  I took the position that not all explanations are equally 
compelling and that as a researcher I have a duty to differentiate among them.  When I 
heard a similar explanation from a wide variety of respondents while conducting 
interviews (corroboration), I knew that that explanation was likely to have relevance.  I 
strived to present the most coherent interpretations possible by taking multiple sources 
into account and considering the varied perspectives of my respondents.  I employed an 
iterative process, moving back and forth between interview data, quantitative data, and 
established academic and non-academic (e.g., press releases, policy statements, farm 
newspaper articles) literature in order to develop a coherent account while keeping in 
mind the context under which different data were produced.  I reflected on who I am and 
how my identity shaped the interactions I had with respondents.  Through this process, I 
became more aware of the different power relations that exist between myself as a 
researcher and the respondents I interviewed and how such differences affect our 
interactions and the data produced by all parties. 
I employed a sampling method referred to as “snowballing” (Valentine, 2005, 
117), where a researcher relies on one or more contact(s) to recruit respondents.  As 
this process gains momentum, the researcher builds up a sample of respondents.  
There are three reasons I chose this sampling method: first, given the controversial 
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aspect of this research and the highly charged public opinions for and against GM 
crops, recruiting willing respondents was especially challenging.  Initially, I relied on 
contacts (e.g., other researchers, academics) to refer me to potential respondents.  This 
allowed me to begin identifying respondents that were engaged in different kinds of 
activities related to GM crops (e.g., farmers using GM crops, farmer union 
representatives).  Second, this sampling method allowed me to establish trust and 
rapport with contacts and respondents by mentioning the name(s) of previous contacts 
and respondents.  This facilitated the process of building a network of contacts and 
respondents.  Third, this sampling method is exploratory and less stringent, allowing the 
researcher to make adjustments according to situational demands.  For example, my 
initial contacts were researchers and academics, which led to contacts with farmers, 
followed by farmer union representatives, and so on.  As the research progressed, the 
network of contacts and the number of respondents grew.  This process was not 
planned; rather, it emerged out of situational demands that I faced in the field. 
Snowballing sampling method and intensive research design raise issues 
regarding representativeness.  Some authors argued that snowballing sampling method 
lacks the statistical accuracy and precision that underlies a probability based sampling 
design (Singleton and Strait, 1999).  Accordingly, careful consideration should be taken 
to make the selected sample as representative as it can be of the population.  One way 
that I addressed this issue was by examining documents on GM crops from different 
sources (e.g., academics, Government of Canada, NGOs, Statistics Canada), to 
determine the most effective method of selecting geographical areas (e.g., cities, 
provinces) and significant groups (e.g., farmer groups, NGOs, corporations, government 
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institutions) that are relevant to the research.  Moreover, according to Sayer (1992, 
249), “intensive research fails to produce ‘objective’ results because its result are not 
representative (i.e. not replicable elsewhere).  But providing there is no pretence that 
the whole population is ‘represented’, there is no reason why an intensive study should 
be less ‘objective’ (i.e. uncorroborated) about its particular subject matter than an 
extensive study”.  At the concrete level, the findings of this research may be unique and 
in this sense not ‘representative’; however, in so far as intensive methods identify 
structures into which individuals are inserted and their mechanisms, the abstract 
knowledge of these may be more generally applicable.  The findings provide an 
explanation about how the context in which the development, adoption, and production 
of GM crops is structured, and how the key agents under study fit into it, interact with it, 
and constitute it. 
 
1.6 Secondary Data and Interviewing 
Extensive research at the international and national scales provided me with an 
understanding of the indicators and processes behind the development, adoption, and 
production of GM crops globally and in relation to Canada.  This allowed me to estimate 
the explanatory causality between factors and the variation among selected indicators 
on the perceived outcomes of the GM crops sector at a macro level.  I analyzed 
secondary data from several international and national sources including: the World 
Bank; the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR); the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); the ISAAA; the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
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(IAASTD); the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); Statistics Canada; 
Health Canada; AAFC; and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). 
While every effort was made to access statistical data on GM crops from a 
variety of sources, this has been challenging.  Global data on the adoption and 
production of GM crops, including country specific information such as the number of 
farmers cultivating GM crops, crop type, number of hectares, and so on, has largely 
come from one source, the ISAAA, with little to no comprehensive data from any other 
sources.  The data from the ISAAA reports is used by international and national 
organizations such as the FAO, the CGIAR, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the Government of Canada, among others.  
According to Peekhaus (2013), the accuracy of the ISAAA data has been questioned by 
NGOs and academics.  For example, LobbyWatch claimed that in the 1998 Global 
Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops “a figure of 12% was given by American 
farmers for GM soy yield improvements.  However, a review of the results of over 8,200 
university-based controlled varietal trials in 1998 showed an almost 7% average yield 
reduction in the case of the GM soy” (LobbyWatch, 2015).  In the Canadian case, 
Peekhaus (2013) claimed that the 2011 Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM 
Crops reported that 10.4 million hectares of land were planted with GM crops, but 
according to Statistics Canada data approximately 9.2 million hectares of GM crops 
were planted in 2011. 
Moreover, tracking data on GM crops in Canada from a variety of sources has 
been challenging.  I contacted AAFC, the CFIA, and Statistics Canada and discovered 
that comprehensive disaggregate data according to conventional and GM crops are not 
36 
available.  Canadian agricultural statistics, for the most part, do not differentiate 
between conventional and GM crops and in cases where this is done the information is 
not comprehensive.  For example, although GM corn and GM soybean have been 
cultivated since 1996 and 1997 respectively, initially in Ontario and Quebec and later in 
Manitoba, Statistics Canada began disaggregating statistics according to conventional 
and GM crops in 2006 for corn and soybean in Ontario and Quebec, but not in 
Manitoba.  In the case of GM canola, the only comprehensive data comes from the 
CCC, while data on GM sugar beet is very limited (Peekhaus, 2013). 
The extensive research provided me with insights about the empirical regularities 
of the adoption and production of GM crops and gave me direction for the intensive 
research.  I familiarized myself with the issues surrounding GM crops in the Canadian 
context by reading academic literature, newspaper articles, information on pro- and anti-
GMO websites, and watching YouTube videos and films.  It became increasingly clear 
that there was a pronounced divide between opponents and proponents of GM crops.  
This is demonstrated by the plethora of information available for and against GM crops 
inside academia and outside of it, with very few people towing a moderate line.  Also, I 
attended some anti-GMO rallies and met activists who tried to convince me of their 
positions of opposition.  These rallies awakened me to how passionate people are 
about issues surrounding food, given that genetic modification in other areas such as 
pharmaceuticals has received less attention and has been less controversial. 
Particular care and attention to ethical issues was taken into consideration in this 
research.  An ethical review was conducted through York University and approval was 
granted to conduct interviews from 14 November 2014 to 14 November 2015.  Also, the 
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ethical review included the approval of an Informed Consent Form (see Appendix A) 
which stated the purpose of the research, the intended uses of the findings, and the 
legal rights of the respondents.  This form was provided to all respondents prior to 
conducting interviews.  The intensive research included 39 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews that were conducted between January and August 2015.  During the 
interviewing process, I followed a sample of interview questions (see Appendix B) which 
were formulated prior to going into the field and developed significantly as the fieldwork 
proceeded and as I gained more information and insights into particular issues from the 
respondents. 
I began by interviewing farmers that were cultivating GM crops and farm union 
members.  While interviewing farmers, it became clear that there was a divide inside 
farming communities between adopters and non-adopters of GM crops.  In some cases, 
those who adopted GM crops were viewed as ‘selling out’ and as threatening the 
livelihood of conventional farmers.  Non-adopters were viewed as ‘behind the times’ and 
holding on to some nostalgic ideas about farming.  All the farmers that I interviewed 
were very passionate about their work and the economic viability of farming in 
increasingly competitive markets. 
Based on the insights that I gained from these interviews I began to identify a 
number of potential respondents from a variety of state and civil society organizations.  
This lead to expanding the field of research to include interviews with government 
employees, scientists, and anti-GMO activists.  This stage of the interviewing process 
gave me a first-hand experience of just how controversial issues surrounding GM crops 
had become in the Canadian context.  When I attempted to arrange interviews with 
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Government of Canada employees and scientists most of my telephone and e-mail 
communications were not responded to.  In cases where I did get a response, I was 
often told by employees and scientists that they were not willing to provide any 
comments about GM crops.  In some cases where I did secure an interview, 
respondents were required to receive approval from their supervisors prior to giving an 
interview.  This often meant scrutinizing the Informed Consent Form, during which I felt I 
was the one being interviewed.  In other cases, respondents did not want to sign the 
Informed Consent Form or allow me to record the interview.  It became clear to me 
throughout these interviews that no one in the Government of Canada was willing to be 
critical of biotechnology agendas. 
The interviews with farmers and the state and civil society actors in addition to 
newspaper articles, information on GMO websites, and watching YouTube videos and 
films allowed me to begin understanding the ways biotechnology and biotechnological 
information are constructed and how the state and industry have been complicit in 
sustaining the discourses that make a given technology acceptable.  The whirlwind of 
information that members of the public on all sides of this debates face is simply 
astonishing.  The information comes from different sources including: scientists, 
government employees, media personnel, multinational corporations, commercial 
leaders, and so on.  On the one hand, GM crops are compared to the greatest of human 
achievements, on the other hand, they are viewed as part and parcel of the coming 
demise of humanity.  These factors are indicative of the plethora of social, cultural, 
political, economic, and environmental implications as certain renditions about GM 
crops and their attending values are evaluated over others. 
39 
1.7 Data Organization and Analytical Procedures 
The interviews that were recorded were transcribed.  The transcribed notes and the 
handwritten notes from all the interviews were analysed using a general operational 
framework that was created to correspond with the objectives and researchable 
questions of this research.  A thorough analysis of the primary qualitative data that was 
collected is provided in the following chapters.  The secondary quantitative data 
collected from published sources were tabulated and organized around themes related 
to the substantive issues of this research using maps, tables, and figures.  The results 
of this research will contribute towards an understanding of the causal dynamics and 
mechanisms associated with the development, adoption, and production of GM crops 
and the specific outcomes for farmers in particular and Canadian agriculture in general.  
The critical analysis presented in these chapters will contribute to the academic 
literature in three areas: the political-economy of (bio) technology, the GM crops 
industry in Canada, and economic geography. 
 
1.8 Chapter Outlines 
The dissertation is organized in the following way.  In the second chapter (The 
Political-Economy of Science and (Bio) Technology) I present a theoretical 
framework for understanding the concrete historical and geographical development of 
science and (bio) technology.  In section 2.2 From Agricultural Geography to 
Agricultural Biotechnology I examine the relevant academic literature from 
agricultural geography (section 2.2.1 Agricultural Geography) which provides the 
general background of the theoretical debates and concrete understandings out of 
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which much of the agricultural biotechnology literature has emerged (section 2.2.2 
Agricultural Biotechnology).  Having reviewed the literature, I identify some gaps 
(section 2.2.3 Gaps in the Academic Literature).  Given the gaps in the literature, I 
present an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the development of 
science and (bio) technology (section 2.3 An Alternative Theoretical Framework for 
Understanding the Development of Science and (Bio) Technology).  I engage some 
of the debates concerning the contradiction between the social relations of production 
and the productive forces (section 2.3.1 The Social Relations of Production and the 
Productive Forces); the competition that impels capitalism towards perpetual 
revolutions in the productive forces (section 2.3.2 Competition and Technical 
Change); the dynamics of historical periods in the uneven development of capitalism 
that incorporate revolutions in technology (section 2.3.3 Cycles and Technical 
Change); and the geographically uneven character of technical change (section 2.3.4 
Geography and Technical Change).  These contributions provide the basis for an 
understanding of the development of agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and 
production of GM crops (section 2.4 The Development, Adoption, and Production of 
GM Crops).  In the Canadian context, I examine the role of the state and civil society 
(section 2.4.1 The State and Civil Society); the construction of a pro-GM crops 
discourse (section 2.4.2 Agricultural Biotechnology Discourse); and the economic 
implications of the production of GM crops for farmers (section 2.4.3 Economic Effects 
of GM Crops Production on Farmers).  In section 2.5 Conclusion I summarize the 
elements comprising the alternative theoretical framework. 
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In the third chapter (Historical and Geographical Macro-Empirical Analysis of 
Agricultural Biotechnology) I present a macro-empirical analysis of the development 
of agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops.  In section 
3.2 The Emergence of Agricultural Biotechnology I examine the shift from public to 
private ownership of germplasm (section 3.2.1 From Public to Private Ownership of 
Germplasm); the ensuing IP rights in plant genetic resources (section 3.2.2 Intellectual 
Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources); the investments in agricultural R&D 
(section 3.2.3 Agricultural Research and Development Investment); and the 
increasing concentration and centralization of GM seed and agrochemical corporations 
(section 3.2.4 Concentration and Centralization in the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Industry).  In section 3.3 The Global Adoption of GM Crops I explore the number of 
GM crops field trials conducted (section 3.3.1 GM Crop Field Trials); the adoption of 
GM crops by country and crop (section 3.3.2 GM Crops by Country and Crop); the 
economic impacts of adopting GM crops (section 3.3.3 Economic Impacts of 
Adopting GM Crops); and the specific cases of the US and Canada (section 3.3.4 US 
Leads and Canada Follows).  In section 3.4 Conclusion I provide a summary of the 
findings and draw out some conceptual implications and the contribution of the chapter 
to the academic literature. 
In the fourth chapter (The State, Civil Society, and the Canadian Agricultural 
Biotechnology Industry) I examine the role of the state and civil society organizations 
in relation to the development, adoption, and production of GM crops.  I bring into focus 
Canada’s biotechnology R&D initiatives (section 4.2 Canadian Research and 
Development and Innovation), strategy, policy (section 4.2.1 Canadian 
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Biotechnology Strategy and Policy), and regulatory framework (section 4.2.2 
Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation), and their economic impact on the 
biotechnology industry (section 4.3 Market Impact of the Canadian Agricultural 
Biotechnology Industry).  Moreover, I highlight some of the rising contestations from 
civil society organizations (section 4.4 Rising Contestations).  In the conclusion 
(section 4.5 Conclusion) I provide a summary of the findings, draw out some 
conceptual implications, and situate the contribution of the chapter in the broader 
academic literature. 
In the fifth chapter (Science, Technology, and Agricultural Biotechnology 
Discourse) I examine how discourses about biotechnology, GM crops, scientific 
progress, and economic development are employed to sustain and legitimate the 
development of agricultural biotechnology.  In section 5.2 Constructing a Pro-GM 
Crops Discourse I examine the ways ‘sound science’, the ‘authority’ of scientists 
(section 5.2.1 ‘Sound Science’ and the ‘Authority’ of Scientists), and the appeal to 
science (section 5.2.2 An Appeal to Science) are employed to sustain and legitimate 
the adoption and production of GM crops.  In section 5.3 Disseminating the Pro-GM 
Crops Discourse I scrutinize the various methods through which the pro-GM crops 
discourse is disseminated.  In section 5.4 Conclusion I provide a summary of the 
findings, draw out some conceptual implications, and situate the contribution of the 
chapter in the broader academic literature. 
In the sixth chapter (Economic Implications of the Production of GM Crops 
for Farmers) I assess the economic implications of the production of GM crops for 
Canadian farmers.  In section 6.2 Agricultural Restructuring in Canada I provide an 
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overview of agricultural restructuring and the effects on Canadian farmers (section 6.2.1 
Effects of Agricultural Restructuring on Canadian Farmers).  In section 6.3 Biotech 
Farming in Canada I examine the R&D investment in agricultural biotechnology, the 
impact of multinational agribusiness corporations; the introduction of GM canola, GM 
corn, and GM soybean into Canadian agriculture; and the implications for farmers.  In 
section 6.4 Farm Level Economic Impact of GM Crops Production I examine the 
effects of GM seed contractual agreements on farmers (section 6.4.1 Commercial 
Seeds and Technology Use Agreements), the claims regarding GM crops and higher 
yields (section 6.4.2 GM Crops and Yields), and the impact on farm level income 
(section 6.4.3 GM Crops and Farm Level Income).  In section 6.5 Conclusion I draw 
out some conceptual implications and the contribution of the chapter to the academic 
literature.  In the seventh chapter (Conclusion) I provide a summary of the research 
findings (section 7.2 Research Findings), outline the contribution of the dissertation to 
the academic literature (section 7.3 Contribution to the Academic Literature), and 
briefly chart an agenda for further research (section 7.4 Further Research).  
44 
Chapter Two 
 
The Political-Economy of Science and (Bio) Technology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to the rise of capitalism in Europe, the body of scientific knowledge in the West 
was that of the ancient Greeks as preserved by Arab scholarship in medieval 
monasteries.  It was this body of knowledge during the era of scientific advance in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which supplied some of the conditions for the 
Industrial Revolution, but the connection was indirect, general, and diffuse, not only 
because science was not yet structured by capitalism and dominated by capitalist 
institutions, but also because technique developed in advance of, and as a prerequisite 
for, science.  Science did not systematically lead the way for industry, but often lagged 
behind and grew out of industrial developments.  Instead of formulating new techniques, 
science in its beginnings under capitalism more often formulated its generalizations in 
accordance with, or as a result of, technological development (Braverman, 1988, 107-
116). 
This may be contrasted with the manner in which science has been employed at 
the cutting edge of industrial change in the 21st century.  Today, the social basis for 
large numbers of scientists in the colleges and universities, industries, and governments 
has been firmly established ushering in an era of unprecedented scientific and 
technological developments.  The planned progress of technology has been 
accomplished by means of the transformation of science into a commodity bought and 
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sold like other implements of production.  Science and technological developments 
cannot be understood simply in terms of specific innovations, but must be understood in 
relation to a totalizing mode of production into which such developments have been 
integrated as part of ordinary functioning (Loeppky, 2005). 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical framework informed by a 
Marxist political-economy approach for understanding the concrete historical and 
geographical development of science and (bio) technology.  I specify the theoretical 
foundation and justification for my research project by situating the development of 
agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops in the 
progression of capitalism globally and in the Canadian context.  Accordingly, I further 
our understanding of the critical role of science and (bio) technology in capitalist 
economy. 
The chapter is organized in the following way.  In section 2.2 From Agricultural 
Geography to Agricultural Biotechnology I examine the relevant academic literature 
from agricultural geography (section 2.2.1 Agricultural Geography) which provides the 
general background of the theoretical debates and concrete understandings out of 
which much of the agricultural biotechnology literature has emerged (section 2.2.2 
Agricultural Biotechnology).  Having reviewed the literature, I identify some gaps 
(section 2.2.3 Gaps in the Academic Literature).  Given the gaps in the literature, I 
present an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the development of 
science and (bio) technology (section 2.3 An Alternative Theoretical Framework for 
Understanding the Development of Science and (Bio) Technology) which may be 
illustrated in the following way (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: An Alternative Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Development 
of Science and (Bio) Technology 
 
I engage some of the debates concerning the contradiction between the social 
relations of production and the productive forces (section 2.3.1 The Social Relations of 
Production and the Productive Forces); the competition that impels capitalism 
towards perpetual revolutions in the productive forces (section 2.3.2 Competition and 
Technical Change); the dynamics of historical periods in the uneven development of 
capitalism that incorporate revolutions in technology (section 2.3.3 Cycles and 
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Technical Change); and the geographically uneven character of technical change 
(section 2.3.4 Geography and Technical Change).  These contributions provide the 
basis for an understanding of the development of agricultural biotechnology and the 
adoption and production of GM crops (section 2.4 The Development, Adoption, and 
Production of GM Crops).  In the Canadian context, I examine the role of the state and 
civil society (section 2.4.1 The State and Civil Society); the construction of a pro-GM 
crops discourse (section 2.4.2 Agricultural Biotechnology Discourse); and the 
economic implications of the production of GM crops for farmers (section 2.4.3 
Economic Effects of GM Crops Production on Farmers).  In section 2.5 Conclusion 
I summarize the elements comprising the alternative theoretical framework. 
 
2.2 From Agricultural Geography to Agricultural Biotechnology 
 
2.2.1 Agricultural Geography 
The introduction of political-economy approaches to the study of agricultural placed 
emphasis on the social relations of production and exchange and their determination of 
the nature of land use.  Among the most significant in the Canadian context is Fowke’s 
(1946) Canadian Agricultural Policy in which he provided an interpretation of Canadian 
agriculture policy and the place of agriculture in the broader framework of the economic 
and political life of Canada.  Fowke viewed Canadian agriculture as a means for the 
defense of territory and trade routes, a provider of staple trades, and opportunities for 
investment (Phillips, 1978).  More recent political-economic approaches to the study of 
agriculture acknowledged the farm as part of a broader agro-food system, embedded in 
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a web of economic, social, cultural, and political dimensions (see, for example, Bowler 
and Ilbery, 1987; Cloke et al., 1990; Marsden, 1988; Marsden et al., 1986; Page, 2003; 
Wallace, 1985).   The initial work on agriculture from a political-economy perspective 
was criticised for its emphasis on structural processes in agricultural production (macro-
economic factors) that render farmers to the role of insignificant decision-makers, 
overlooks farm- and farm-household dynamics, and neglects certain institutional and 
technical arrangements of farming (Buttel, 1996; Whatmore et al., 1987).  In addition, 
there was the re-emergence of the agrarian debates, which drew parallels between the 
changes affecting agriculture in the 1890s (see, for example, Kautsky, 1988; Lenin, 
1967) and those occurring a century later (see, for example, Byers, 1982; Goodman 
and Redclift, 1981; Watts, 1996; Watts and Goodman, 1997).  This work, however, 
tended to neglect factors external to the agricultural system: the role of the state, 
politics, and culture.  The shortcomings of the early work in political-economy and on 
agrarian change were addressed by injecting frameworks such as food regimes and 
regulation theory that encompass global markets, geopolitics, and international regimes 
(Robinson, 2004). 
The introduction of the concept of food regimes into agricultural geography 
represented a shift beyond the concern for production on farms to one dealing with the 
geography of food.  Researchers began to consider the entire food system from 
upstream supply to farms through farm-based production to downstream manufacture, 
marketing, and distribution (see, for example, Friedmann, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1993; 
Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Goodman and Redclift, 1991; Lawrence and 
McMichael, 2012; McMichael, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013; McMichael and Myhre, 1991).  
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Geographers have focused on several research areas.  The relationship between 
international food regimes and agricultural structures and the consequences of the new 
international divisions of labour in which transnational corporations have developed 
production facilities in the global South (Jarosz, 1996; Sayer, 1995; Sayer and Walker, 
1992); and the linking of accumulation strategies to employment and consumption 
norms, types of state regulation and legislation, and household livelihood and 
consumption practices (Gorton et al., 2011; Horlings and Marsden, 2011; Katz, 2001; 
Young, 1997).  The concept of food regimes has been criticized on different grounds.  
Some authors claim that the concept is of little value in terms of explaining the dynamics 
of agricultural change in specific countries (Moran et al., 1996), and neglects the role of 
human agency in affecting changes in the global food system (Goodman and Watts, 
1994). 
A related approach to food regimes is that of regulation theory (Aglietta, 1974; 
Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1992).  The central concept in regulation theory is the regime of 
accumulation, a historically distinctive and relatively long-lived form of capitalist 
accumulation based on a particular nexus of a production/consumption mode of 
regulation.  With respect to the agro-food system, it has been argued that there was a 
movement away from one era to another that is symbolized by the changing nature of 
the regulations governing production.  One example was the move from productivism to 
post-productivism, which had distinct parallels with the move from Fordism to post-
Fordism in that it implies a move to different work/production practices, different 
relations of production, and changes in the regulations governing production.  Although 
there are still regulations encouraging farmers to maximize production, and others 
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dealing with agricultural over-production vis-à-vis demand, these exist alongside ones 
linking over-production and support for the environment, competing claims on land use, 
and issues of food quality, purity, and taste (see, for example, Flyn and Marsden, 1992; 
Guthman, 1998; Marsden, 1992, 2013; Pritchard, 1999).  Some authors have been 
critical of this perspective arguing that rather than witnessing a shift towards post-
productivist agriculture, the dominant framing is in favour of a neoliberal regime of 
market productivism, leading to the further integration of large parts of international and 
European agriculture into the agro-food circuits of capital (Potter and Tilzey, 2005).  
More generally, other authors claim that the regulation approach is too reductionist in 
that it relates economic growth and decline to the development of institutions governing 
the relationship between wages and labour and associated balances of class power, 
questioning the extent to which different reactions of national institutions to 
developments of the world economy can be combined into a generalized model 
(Brenner and Glick, 1991). 
More recent years have seen the emergence of perspectives that have 
challenged the approaches that fall under the broad category of political-economy.  
Authors emphasized the way farmers develop locally based strategies, agro-ecological 
approaches, and household resources to adapt to changing economic circumstances 
(see, for example, Bell, 2004; Jarosz, 2011; Morgan et al., 2010; Tornaghi, 2014; 
Winter, 2005).  Moreover, approaches that operate in a system or network framework, 
such as actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1993; Whatmore, 2002) were introduced in 
the 1990s.  ANT defines an actor-network as the interaction between a set of human 
‘actors’ and the circulation of non-human ‘intermediaries’ in a network.  ANT has been 
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applied to understanding the dynamics of the agro-food system by focusing on the 
multiple sets of contingent relations in the operation of different actor-networks.  Some 
of these studies construct rural areas as an actor-network in which farming activities are 
connected not only to individuals, agencies, institutions, corporations, and governments, 
but also to non-human intermediaries such as scientific technologies and material forms 
(see, for example, Higgins, 2006; Juntti, 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Manzungu and 
Dzingirai, 2012; Tanaka and Juska, 2010; Wood, 2007).  Geographers using actor-
network theory have posited non-humans as potential agents (see, for example, 
Whatmore, 2002).  Agency is regarded as relational and arises out of the interactions or 
associations of a plurality of humans and non-humans.  Accordingly, it becomes just as 
important to attend to such things as microbes, technologies, and corporeality as it does 
to institutions and capitalists.  In this respect neither nature nor society has ontological 
priority. 
Other authors have been critical of agro-food studies that adopt an ANT 
approach claiming that general social processes that condition the concrete are 
substituted with a voluntarism that is shaped by the narratives of specific groups 
therefore reinforcing a form of structural determinism of the power of the groups that 
project them (Buttel, 1998).  This raises the question of how political and economic 
social forms of power are being generated in the different types of actor- (food) 
networks now emerging.  At the very least, what is required is a more systematic 
conceptual and empirical focus, which continues to critically analyze both the state and 
food governance more generally, and key privately organized actors (Marsden, 2000). 
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2.2.2 Agricultural Biotechnology 
Drawing on the insights from agricultural geography various perspectives have been 
advanced in the academic literature that examine the development, adoption, and 
production of GM crops.  These contributions may be divided into three broad themes 
that are overlapping and interrelated: the first theme revolves around political-economic 
perspectives.  Employing the food regime and regulation theory approaches to 
understanding the historical development of agriculture and the formation of the agro-
food system, some authors have argued that the legal and regulatory framework 
associated with the introduction of agricultural biotechnology is being used as a new 
form of capital accumulation; one that expropriates farmers’ control over the production 
process and shifts it to the corporations that are the technology’s developers.  This 
accumulation strategy has important local and global implications given the high 
salience that agriculture has for both farmers and for a public concerned with food 
access (Burrows and Kloppenburg, 1996; Dowd-Uribe, 2014; Essex, 2016; Otero, 2008, 
2012; Otero et al., 2013; Otero and Lapegna, 2016; Roff, 2008).  In particular, authors 
have drawn on and developed conceptual tools such as appropriationism (the 
replacement of elements of the production process with industrial ones) and 
substitutionism (the replacement of agricultural end products with industrial ones) 
introduced by Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson (1987) to provide an analytical framework 
through which many historical and current developments in agriculture can be viewed.  
Genetic modification in agriculture, it is argued, greatly expands the number of traits that 
can be introduced into plants and consequently opens up new possibilities for 
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appropriationism and substitutionism (Friedmann, 1993; Pechlaner, 2010; 
Ramachandra and Ravishankar, 2000). 
Other authors, following a similar line of argument, have examined the effects 
that the technology’s associated proprietary framework has on capital accumulation 
strategies.  Agricultural biotechnology has heralded a major breakthrough in 
privatization strategies around the ‘seed’ evidenced in patents, contracts, and related 
legislation.  It has been argued that interrelated developments in science and 
technology, agricultural biotechnology, neoliberal ideology, and IP rights have 
successfully overcome the seed’s inherent obstacles to capitalist accumulation (Goto, 
2013; Kloppenburg, 2004; Kuyek, 2007; Mascarenhas and Busch, 2006).  The 
privatization of germplasm provides an exemplar of capital’s struggle to accumulate in 
agriculture, given the natural limitation of the seed’s reproducibility, and of the 
technology’s seemingly decisive role in this struggle (Kloppenburg, 2004; Peekhaus, 
2013; Prudham, 2007; Prudham and Morris, 2006; Ramey, 2010).  In the US and 
Canada, for example, support for IP rights has been demonstrated through a regulatory 
reluctance towards articulating limits to such rights with respect to the new category of 
self-propagating inventions.  The granting of general utility patents on plants and/or 
components of plants was not a forgone conclusion, but required extensive effort on the 
part of industry, and a supportive national (and international) regulatory environment. 
The second theme in the academic literature revolves around developmental 
perspectives on the development, adoption, and production of GM crops.  This includes 
international reports from organizations such as the CGIAR, the FAO, the IAASTD, the 
OECD, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the 
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European Commission.  These studies assess a wide range of issues including: the 
importance of agricultural biotechnology for addressing population growth and poverty; 
the development of science and technology in agriculture in developed and developing 
countries; the economic effects of the adoption of GM crops on farm income; GM crop 
technology adoption levels; production effects of specific GM crops; trade regimes and 
related issues; health and environmental impacts; GM crops and food safety and 
security; related emerging technologies such as biomaterials and biofuels; risk 
assessment and management; and policy development, support, and communication 
(see, for example, Barrows et al., 2014; Brookes and Barfoot, 2013; CGIAR, 2000; 
European Commission, 2010; FAO, 2004, 2005, 2011; IAASTD, 2009; James, 2015; 
Mannion and Morse, 2012; OECD, 2009; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2007).  In general, 
these studies claim that the adoption of GM crops has resulted in improved productivity 
and profitability for millions of farmers in both developed and developing countries.  
Also, agricultural biotechnology applications make a significant contribution to the 
alleviation of poverty and hunger and to the doubling of food, feed, and fibre production 
in developing countries.  Finally, GM crops are considered part of the solution to 
preventing additional food crises and major social disruptions. 
Other authors have been more skeptical about such findings.  The idea that 
science and technology can easily be transferred from one context to another to wipe 
away complex conditions that give rise to poverty and environmental degradation has 
been widely challenged from a variety of different perspectives (see, for example, Altieri 
and Rosset, 1999; Chataway, 2005; Das, 1999, 2002; Dibden et al., 2013; Keeley and 
Scoones, 2003).  The incentives and institutional relations of the structure of GM crop 
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research, it has been argued, requires a vastly more advanced infrastructure, expertise, 
and expense than do earlier methods of crop improvement.  Most of the basic research 
and innovation needed to create functional GM crops has been done in the academic 
institutions of developed countries (Etzkowitz, 1997; Freidberg and Horowitz, 2004).  
Moreover, IP laws combine with incentive structures among academic researchers, 
universities, and corporations with devastating effects for resource-poor small-scale 
farmers (DeVries and Toenniessen, 2001).  One example of such effects is the complex 
relationship between Bt cotton and farmer desperation in the high suicide area in 
Andhra Pradesh, India.  The unrecognizability and frenetic change in the cotton seed 
market wreaked havoc on the agricultural practices, livelihood, and well-being of small-
scale resource-poor farmers.  It is precisely the most vulnerable people who are at risk 
(Stone, 2007).  Lastly, some authors claimed that biotechnology enables new potential 
for monopoly control of seeds and global bio-piracy that plunders genetic resources of 
indigenous peoples and poor nations to make corporate property (Shiva et al., 2000).  
Poor farmers, according to this view, will be crushed by bondage to multinational 
monopolists, re-subordinating poor nations to neo-colonial control.  The most excoriated 
mechanism has been the so-called ‘terminator technology’, widely (but falsely) charged 
to Monsanto, the primary target of global protest.  Critics also see the poor as 
threatened by environmental degradation, unsafe foods introduced through foreign aid 
and public distribution systems, or allergenicity from novel proteins (Herring, 2007; 
Shiva, 2000; Stone and Glover, 2011).  In contrast to such views, some authors have 
pressed the case that GM crops are especially suited for small-scale resource-poor 
farmers because the technology is self-contained and could aid cultivation without 
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altering agricultural practices or even being understood by the farmer (Byerlee and 
Fischer, 2002; Wambugu, 1999). 
The third theme in the academic literature revolves around civil society 
perspectives on the development, adoption, and production of GM crops.  This work has 
included authors that examine anti-GMO social movements (see, for example, Andrée, 
2011; Eaton, 2009; Hall and Moran, 2006; Harsh, 2014; Heller, 2006; Magnan, 2007; 
Muller, 2006; Purdue, 2000; Reisner, 2001; Roff, 2007; Schurman, 2004; Schurman and 
Munro, 2006).  Much of this work focuses on movements in the global North where 
resistance has achieved a level of success, for example, by pressuring sub-national, 
national and European levels of authority to implement moratoria on the production 
and/or importation of GM crops and foods.  In addition, a growing literature exists about 
producer attitudes to GMOs, the incentives to adopt GM crops, and the economic costs 
and benefits of adoption (see, for example, Berwald et al., 2006; Bullock and Nitsi, 
2001; Fulton and Keyowski, 1999; Goldsmith, 2001; Hall, 2008).  Producers are thus 
recognized as actors that can influence the commercial success of GM crops.  In the 
Canadian case, the strong opposition to the adoption of GM wheat, it has been argued, 
has illustrated the historical, political, and cultural significance of wheat farming in the 
Canadian prairies, and its role in crop rotation, seed saving, and the economic viability 
of farmers.  Farmers and consumers voiced concerns about environmental implications, 
international market opposition, and the lack of transparency in the formulation of 
policies and regulation of GM crops (Andrée, 2011; Eaton, 2007, 2013; Magnan, 2006; 
Marcoux and Létourneau, 2013; Prudham, 2007). 
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Attention has also been given to consumer demands in relation to GM crops.  
Geographers studying food and agriculture suggest that consumers (especially in the 
global North) are demanding foods with qualities such as local, organic, ecological, 
slow, fair, and ethical because of the failures of the industrial food systems to provide 
food safety, environmental sustainability, and public accountability (Marsden and Smith, 
2005; Renting et al., 2003).  These dynamics, it has been argued, are being shaped by 
broader economic shifts away from regimes of accumulation based on mass production 
and consumption to a more quality based production (the so-called shift from (quantity) 
productivist to (quality) post-productivist).  This turn to quality food has opened up 
spaces for a politics of consumption that challenge the adoption and production of GM 
crops. 
In addition has been a body of work that examines the politically charged 
disputes over GM crops which depend on various discourses about biotechnology in 
general and GM crops more specifically.  These discourses establish knowledge claims 
that simultaneously undermine the case for GM crops as potential contributors to 
development and motivate opposition to GMOs.  The diffusion of such claims has been 
made possible at the junctures of transnational networks, enabling the screening, 
weighting, theorizing, and disseminating of contentious empirical accounts.  The 
academic literature on the topic is vast and includes opposing narratives. Some authors 
attribute opposition to ignorance including problems of symbolism, quaint attitudes, and 
pagan beliefs (Bond, 1999; Braun, 2002; Gusterson, 2005; Herring, 2007, 2009) while 
other authors challenge such perspectives (Bonny, 2003; Bryan, 2001; Jasanoff, 2005).  
Other authors have traced such debates in the media coverage.  These studies focus 
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on the way varying attitudes play out in public perception, consumer choice, and 
discourse and language about GM crops (Cook, 2004; Gusterson, 2005; 
Kalaitzandonakes et al., 2004; Nelson, 2005; Priest, 2001). 
 
2.2.3 Gaps in the Academic Literature 
The academic literature that examines the development of agricultural biotechnology 
and the adoption and production of GM crops provides many insightful theoretical and 
empirical contributions that leading scholars have made, however, some gaps remain.  
First, there is a lack of emphasis on the development of capitalism as it relates to the 
agro-food system including agriculture and agricultural biotechnology.  Accordingly, 
technology is considered an exogenous and socially neutral force in the development of 
capitalism.  The focus is primarily on how it impacts production and society.  
Technological development then appears as a technical issue or a relationship between 
inputs and outputs; an autonomous process divorced from its origins in capitalist 
competition and class relations.  This determinist and indeed reified conception of 
technology obscures the social relations that affect its development (Bowring, 2003; 
Liodakis, 2003; Smith, 1997). 
Second, the role of the state, in terms of its capitalist character, has been 
underemphasized.  Here the state is considered an autonomous actor; an institutional 
ensemble that is independent of society.  Accordingly, the state may formulate and 
pursue goals (e.g., agricultural biotechnology strategy, policy, and regulatory 
framework) that do not reflect the interests of specific social groups or classes.  Such 
studies unduly separate the state and society therefore denying their interdependence 
and interpenetration and the existence of classes and class struggle inside the state 
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and outside of it.  This perspective problematically renders the intersection of the 
development of agricultural biotechnology with corporate interests a by-product, rather 
than a motivating force, of these processes.  State action in relation to the development 
of agricultural biotechnology is regarded as ‘neutral’ or incidental to the capitalist 
accumulation process. 
Third, there is little discussion about the interests underlying the construction of 
pro-GM crops discourses.  The advent of GM crops is depicted as a technological 
phenomenon which originates from scientific progress the result of which is to either 
eradicate various societal ills (pro-GM crops discourses) or to merely propagate them 
(anti-GM crops discourses).  While these studies stress the importance of the social 
elements and the actors responsible for the construction of various discourses 
surrounding GM crops, they supply neither a method to differentiate the most crucial 
associations nor a way to ascertain why they occur.  As such, their explanatory capacity 
goes no further than the allusion to complexity among an endless array of social and 
scientific factors. 
Fourth, studies that examine the economic effects of the production of GM crops 
rely on data and mathematical models to reach conclusions but do not explain them.  In 
cases where some explanation is provided the analysis revolves around the 
conjunctions of events to make claims about causation with a tendency to obfuscate the 
unobservable social relations that might account or give the necessary conditions for 
those correlations.  The result is a positivist and empiricist approach to understanding 
the economic effects of the adoption and production of GM crops. 
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2.3 An Alternative Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Development of 
Science and (Bio) Technology 
In setting out an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the development of 
science and (bio) technology in the context of capitalism (see Figure 2.1), my emphasis 
is on a set of wider social processes (i.e., the predominant set of social relations that 
underlie production and exchange in capitalist societies) that condition the direction and 
character of the development of science and (bio) technology.  I begin with an 
examination of two fundamental aspects of capitalist society: the social relations of 
production and the productive forces.  The social relations of production refer to the 
relations of ownership and control over productive resources.  The productive forces 
include technological implements such as mechanical (e.g., tractors) and biological 
(e.g., GM seeds and agrochemicals).  My focus is on intra-class relations of competition 
as they relate to the technological aspect of the productive forces while abstracting from 
the capital-labour relation as a contributor to technical change.  Competition impels 
capitalism towards perpetual revolutions in the productive forces.  This occurs in 
different sectors of the capitalist economy, including the agricultural sector.  Since 
farmers’ income is remaining stagnant and in order for them to be competitive both 
nationally and internationally and produce crops at a low price, farmers seek new 
technologies such as GM seeds and associated agrochemicals (technological fix) since 
they cannot move their production sight to areas with lower production costs (spatial 
fix).  Also, agribusiness corporations compete with each other in order to meet this 
demand by producing new technologies such as GM seeds and associated 
agrochemicals.  Both of these commercial producers compete in their respective 
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industries by either using a new technology (e.g., farmers producing GM crops) or 
producing a new technology (e.g., corporations producing GM seeds).  These economic 
processes, however, are not automatic, but are mediated by the state, civil society, and 
discursive mechanisms and occur in specific historical and geographical contexts. 
Technical change occurs during specific historical periods characterized by long 
cycles in the uneven development of capitalism and is fragmented into discrete 
geographical locations.  Moreover, the capitalist state, which generally operates in the 
interests of capitalists, creates conditions for capitalist accumulation.  The state does 
things which capitalists left to themselves are not able to do, for example, the 
procurement of costly R&D infrastructure that requires significant capital outlays.  Also, 
sections of civil society aim to resist the expansion of the market for agricultural 
biotechnology.  Lastly, discourses about agricultural biotechnology, scientific progress, 
and economic development are employed to sustain and legitimate the sale and use of 
GM crops.  The result is unequal class outcomes when we compare how farmers have 
fared relative to agribusiness companies. 
 
2.3.1 The Social Relations of Production and the Productive Forces 
The contradiction between the productive forces and the social relations of production 
accounts for the historical development of a succession of modes of production, a 
development which is fundamentally based on the growth of human productive power 
and forms of society rise and fall as they enable or impede that growth.  The 
contradiction between the productive forces and the social relations of production was 
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articulated most succinctly by Marx (1970, 20) in the Preface to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into 
definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their 
material forces of production.  The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on 
which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond 
definite forms of social consciousness. 
 
Some authors give primacy to the productive forces over the social relations of 
production (see, for example, Cohen, 2001; Roemer, 1988; Shaw, 1978).  One of the 
most influential proponents of this perspective was Gerald A. Cohen.  According to 
Cohen (2001), the economic structure consists of the social relations of production 
alone, with the productive forces forming no part of it.  Moreover, a productive force is 
not a social relation, “It is not something which holds between objects, but rather a 
property of an object…an object bearing that property, an object having productive 
power, and such an object is also not a relation” (2001, 28).  The social relations of 
production correspond to the productive forces at a certain stage of the development of 
the latter.  This implies that the productive forces have explanatory primacy over the 
social relations of production and therefore propound a technological interpretation of 
historical materialism. 
For Cohen (2001, 32-55), the productive forces consist of the means of 
production and labour-power.  The means of production include: the instruments of 
production (tools, machines such as mechanical and biological implements, premises in 
which production proceeds, and instrumental materials that producers work with); raw 
materials (what producers work on); and spaces (a particular volume of space in 
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abstraction from whatever it contains).  The development of the productive forces is 
largely the growth in the knowledge of how to control and transform nature, which is the 
development of labour-power (the productive faculties of producing agents including 
strength, skill, (scientific) knowledge, inventiveness, and so on).  The social relations of 
production are either relations of ownership over persons and productive forces or 
relations presupposing such relations of ownership.  By ownership, Cohen meant a 
relationship of effective control rather than a legal relationship.  Since the social 
relations of production constitute the economic structure of a society, that structure is 
determined by the distribution in it of (effective) ownership rights over persons or 
productive forces.  Also, Cohen claimed that along with the productive forces, persons 
are excluded from the economic structure.  This is consistent only if the terms that bind 
the social relations of production do not belong to the structure that they constitute.  
Cohen (2001, 36) stated, “a description of an economic structure employs variables in 
places of expressions denoting persons and productive forces.  It contains no names or 
descriptions designating particular persons and productive forces”. 
The primacy of the productive forces may be understood using two thesis: first, 
“the nature of a set of production relations is explained by the level of development of 
the productive forces embraced by it (to a far greater extent than vice versa)” (Cohen 
2001, 134, italics in original) and second, “The productive forces tend to develop 
throughout history (the Development Thesis)…The nature of the production relations of 
a society is explained by the level of the development of its productive forces (the 
Primacy Thesis proper)” (Cohen 2001, 134).  Although Cohen recognized the many 
ways in which the social relations of production condition the productive forces (see 
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Cohen 2001, 160-166), and the bearing this has on the primacy thesis, he claimed that 
Marx’s general statements always awarded priority to the productive forces. 
In sum, within a mode of production there is a correspondence between the 
productive forces and the social relations of production, and as a result, between the 
social relations of production and the political, legal, ideological, and other social 
relations (the second correspondence being one between the economic structure and 
the superstructure).  The productive forces are given primacy.  The social relations of 
production are determined by the productive forces, and they in turn determine the 
superstructure.  These respective positions of the three elements in the causal chain 
acquire significance from their implications for historical development.  Thus, the 
development of the productive forces leads to a contradiction with the social relations of 
production (which turn into their fetters, that is, restricts the use and development of the 
productive forces), and the intensification of this contradiction leads to the breakdown of 
the existing mode of production and its superstructure (see Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2: Gerald A. Cohen's (2001) Perspective on the Contradiction between the 
Productive Forces and the Social Relations of Production 
Productive Forces 
Means of production (instruments of production – includes 
mechanical and biological, raw materials, and spaces) 
Labour-power (in its various qualitative aspects) 
 
Social Relations of Production 
(Economic structure and superstructure) 
 
Historical Development 
Cohen’s interpretation, and others following a similar line of argument, have been 
the subject of considerable criticism (see, for example, Brenner, 1986; Harvey, 2006, 
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2010; Loeppky, 2005; Levin and Wright, 1980; Wood, 2007).  An important 
consideration for some authors are the political implications of this perspective.  It has 
been argued that Joseph Stalin’s policy of rapid industrialization with its forced 
collectivization and political repression stemmed from his conception of the primacy of 
the productive forces, so that if the productive forces in the former Soviet Union became 
those of modern industry, the socialist relations of production would have had their 
proper basis (Levin and Wright, 1980). 
Wood (2007) argued that the guiding principle of historical materialist analysis 
should be to prioritize historical process over technological determinism.  The relations 
between producers and appropriators in the materialist explanation of historical 
movement may be understood using two broad categories of Marxist explanation: “The 
first situates production relations and class within a larger, trans-historical context of 
technological development.  The other seeks specific principles of motion in every social 
form and its dominant social property relations” (Wood, 2007, 110).  The distinction 
made here is not simply between Marxist theories that give primacy to the productive 
forces and those that give primacy to the social relations of production; rather, the 
emphasis is between theories that posit some general, trans-historical and universal law 
of development (which invariably means some kind of technological determinism), and 
those that stress the historical specificity of every social form (which generally means an 
exploration of the specific ‘laws of motion’ set in by the prevailing social relations 
between producers and appropriators). 
Accordingly, Wood is critical of perspectives which understand historical change 
as a function of scientific and technological change.  This is not to deny that scientific 
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and technological change is associated with historical process; rather, it is to question 
whether or not particular trends in scientific and technological development constitute 
“the dynamic force that motivated historical change – either (causally) before or 
(‘functionally’) after the fact” (Wood, 2007, 132).  Alternatively, in keeping with Marx’s 
understanding of the functions of science and technology in the specific social form of 
capitalism, Wood (2007) provided an explanation which does not assume an inherently 
innovative historical development, but instead, understood innovation in the specific 
social form of capitalism.  If a case can be made for the historical specificity of capitalist 
social relations of production, then it is reasonable to infer that there exists a historical 
specificity of the scientific and technological development that occurs under the 
auspices of those social relations (see Figure 2.3). 
Figure 2.3: Ellen Wood’s (2007) Perspective on the Contradiction between the 
Productive Forces and the Social Relations of Production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, it is not tenable to dismiss any autonomy in scientific practice.  One 
cannot assume that the entire history of science, much of which occurred outside the 
boundaries of capitalist social relations, is simply the result of capitalism; however, for 
Marx, science and technology take on a special significance under developed capitalist 
industry.  The critical moment “is completed in large-scale industry, which makes 
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science a potentiality for production which is distinct from labour and presses it into the 
service of capital” (Marx, 1977, 482).  The difference between pre-capitalist social forms 
and industrial capital is that the technologies circumscribed by human limits become an 
active agent with mechanical laws that surpass these limits.  Marx (1977, 590) noted, 
“The principle of machine production, namely the division of the production process into 
its constituent phases, and the solution of the problems arising from this by the 
application of mechanics, chemistry, and the whole range of natural sciences, now 
plays the determining role everywhere”.  The production of scientific and technology 
itself becomes necessarily integrated into the dynamics of capitalism. 
According to Harvey (2006), the productive forces in Capital are integrated into 
Marx's argument only when they are understood as a social relation specifically 
embedded in the capitalist mode of production.  The flow of Marx’s argument is “geared 
to unravelling the dialectical interpenetration of productive forces and social relations as 
the locus of contradictions which push capitalism perpetually into new configurations” 
(Harvey, 2006, 99).  By productive force Marx meant "the sheer power to transform 
nature" (2006, 99).  By social relations of production he meant "the social organization 
and the social implications of the what, how and why of production" (Harvey, 2006, 99).  
Marx considered the labour process in terms of both the productive forces and the 
social relations of production.  Productive forces are integrated into political-economy as 
the power to create surplus-value for capital through commodity production.  The social 
relations of production are the class relations that permeate production, exchange, 
distribution, and consumption. 
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Technology may be directly described in terms of “the tools and machines used, 
the physical design of production processes, the technical division of labour, the actual 
deployment of labour powers (both quantities and qualities), the levels of co-operation, 
the chains of command and hierarchies of authority, and the particular methods of co-
ordination and control used” (Harvey, 2006, 99).  Marx viewed technology as the 
“concrete form taken by an actual labour process...the observable way in which 
particular use-values are produced” (Harvey, 2006, 99).  The task then is to understand 
why particular labour processes take on specific technological forms.  Harvey (2006, 
100) does not equate the productive forces with technology, rather "technology is the 
material form of the labour process through which the underlying forces and relations of 
production are expressed" (see Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.4: David Harvey’s (2006) Perspective on the Contradiction between the 
Productive Forces and the Social Relations of Production 
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history of technology not only as a means to discerning radical technological shifts in 
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production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of the 
social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from those relations".  
Here Harvey (2010, 192) identified several concepts that are linked together in a 
configuration which provides a general framework for dialectical and historical 
materialism: technology, the relation to nature, the process of production, the production 
and reproduction of daily life, social relations, and mental conceptions.  Technology and 
organizational forms internalize a certain relation to nature, the labour process, daily life, 
social relations, and mental conceptions.  As a result of this internalization, a study of 
technology will reveal or disclose a great deal about each of those elements.  
Conversely, each of those elements also internalize something about technology.  For 
example, a detailed study of daily life under capitalism will reveal or disclose a great 
deal about technology, the relation to nature, the labour process, social relations, and 
mental conceptions.  All these elements constitute a totality and must be understood in 
their mutual interactions (see Figure 2.5).   
Figure 2.5: The Interrelation between the Relation to Nature, Technology, Modes of 
Production, Social Relations, Reproduction of Daily Life, and Mental Conceptions 
 
 
Source: Harvey, 2010, 195 
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The danger for social theory is to see one of these elements as a determinant of all the 
others, which inevitably leads to technological determinism, environmental determinism, 
labour process determinism, and so on. 
Harvey links these relations back to Marx’s (1970) base-superstructure model 
from the Preface of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.  He claimed that 
this formulation is at times erroneously interpreted in a causal or deterministic way: the 
economic base causes or determines the legal and political superstructure.  Marx 
intended that the base-superstructure model operate dialectically.  The way things are 
worked out in the realm of legal and political means of the superstructure are not 
ineffectual in relation to the deep concept of the circulation of value as capital.  The 
purpose of the scientific method is to identify those elements that explain why certain 
things happen in society the way they do.  In terms of our understanding of relative 
surplus-value, which explains why capitalism has to be technologically dynamic, firms 
have little choice over whether or not to invent because that is what the deep structure 
of capitalism mandates.  The interesting question then is, how is growth going to occur 
and with what kinds of technological change?  This forces us to think about the 
implications for those six elements. 
In summary, the contradiction between the productive forces (i.e., the power to 
transform and appropriate nature through human labour augmented by the use of 
various instruments of labour such as mechanical implements including tools and 
machinery and biological implements including GM seeds and agrochemicals, raw 
materials, and spaces that form the means of production and constitute the necessary 
basis for productive labour) and the social relations of production (i.e., the historically 
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evolving and geographically occurring social processes that shape the actual 
technology employed in the labour process and necessarily reflects the social 
relationships between human beings as they combine and cooperate in fundamental 
tasks of production) which accounts for the historical development of a succession of 
modes of production is applied to understand the dynamics of capitalism.  While Marx 
abstracted from the specific details of actual technological changes, he nonetheless 
incorporated his conceptualization of technology by way of the abstract concepts 
productive forces and social relations of production in the concrete materiality of the 
labour process.  The on-going quest by capitalists to appropriate surplus-value impels 
perpetual revolutions in the productive forces.  Such revolutions, however, create 
conditions that are inconsistent with the further accumulation of capital and the 
reproduction of class relations.  This results in an unstable and crisis prone capitalist 
system, though each crisis may be resolved through a restructuring of the productive 
forces and social relations of production, the underlying source of conflict is never 
eliminated. 
 
2.3.2 Competition and Technical Change 
To make the assertion that capitalist society has exhibited an extraordinary degree of 
technical change and organizational dynamism is self-evident.  One of the challenges 
that remains is to explain how such technical change and organizational dynamism are 
intertwined in capitalist society rather than treating these dynamics as exogenous and 
autonomous.  In this regard, several authors have examined the interrelationship of 
competition and technical change (see, for example, Elster, 1983; Fine, 1980, chapters 
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two and six; Harvey, 2006, 119-125; Laibman, 1983, 1987/1988; Saad-Filho, 2002, 
chapter five; Smith, 1997, 2010; Stanislaw, 1990). 
Competition impels capitalism towards perpetual revolutions in the productive 
forces.  This occurs in the sphere of production and exchange.  In the sphere of 
production, capitalists attempt to lower the costs of production in order to earn the 
profits necessary for the accumulation of capital that ensures their survival.   
Accordingly, there is a necessary tendency in capitalist production to introduce 
technology that: (1) decreases necessary labour time and increase surplus labour time; 
(2) allows a less skilled, less expensive, workforce to be employed; (3) lessens the 
‘pores’ in the working day, therefore increasing the intensity of labour; (4) enhances 
capital’s control over the production process; (5) reduces the turnover time of capital; (6) 
reduces the costs of constant capital; (7) generates a drive to appropriate surplus profits 
from highly productive units of capital in a sector and product innovations (Smith, 1997).  
The ways that these tendencies interact in a given socio-historical context is complex 
and contingent. 
Regarding the sphere of exchange, Marx (1977, 1991) distinguished between 
two different types of competition in capitalism: intra-sectoral competition (in the first 
volume of Capital), which occurs between capitals in the same branch of industry 
producing identical use-values, and inter-sectoral competition (in the third volume of 
Capital), which occurs between capitals in different branches of industry producing 
distinct use-values.  Marx argued that the conflicting forces of competition within and 
between sectors operate at different levels, with the former being more abstract and 
relatively more important than the latter. 
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Intra-sectoral competition explains the sources of technical change, the tendency 
toward the differentiation of the profit rate of capitals producing similar goods with 
distinct technologies, and the possibility of crisis of disproportion and overproduction.  
When firms compete and produce similar products, above average profits may be 
obtained only by attempting to become more efficient than other firms producing the 
same products, therefore reducing unit costs.  This requires discipline and control in the 
labour process, mechanization, and the introduction of more productive technologies 
and economies of scale.  These dynamics create a situation of competitive 
accumulation for all capitalists.  Competitors will innovate as well as adopt every 
available technical improvement, eroding the advantage of innovating firms while 
preserving the incentive for further technical progress.  This results in increases in 
economic efficiency and cheaper products in different sectors across the economy.  
There is also a tendency for larger capitals to benefit because of their ability to invest 
larger sums of money for longer periods, select among a broader range of production 
techniques, and hire the best workers.  Although this may result in the elimination of 
weaker competitors, important counter-tendencies are the diffusion of technical 
innovations among competing firms, the ability of smaller capitals to undermine the 
existing technologies through invention and experimentation, and foreign competition 
(Fine, 1980; Saad-Filho, 2002). 
The imperative of rapid accumulation for survival impels capitalists to search for 
high short-run conjunctural profits (Laibman, 1983).  Their short time horizon, therefore, 
is not a historical accident or mere institutional datum; rather, it is a structural necessity.  
This, in turn, comes to dominate the engineering culture of a capitalist society, so that, 
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quite apart from conscious directives, engineers who generate the menu of technical 
change-choices available in a given period will be constrained by the entire 
accumulated weight of past engineering practice, with a bias toward rapid 
mechanization in the interest of high short-term productivity gains and against the 
longer-term concerns of science (Laibman, 1987/1988). 
Marx placed the interactions between individual capital (micro) and capital as a 
whole (macro) at the foreground of dynamics.  In the competitive struggle to innovate 
and grow, each individual capital must act in terms of the immediately given situation, 
regardless of whether or not it is capable of foreseeing an outcome in which the 
parameters change owing to the combined impact of many capitals acting for self-
preservation and growth.  Pursuit of the maximum rate of profit associated with a new 
technique is a key element in establishing the dissonance between micro-intentions and 
macro-results that may impart an ‘irrational’ bias to the path of technical change, as well 
as other aspects of the long-term dynamics of the capitalist economy (Laibman, 
1987/1988). 
 
2.3.3 Cycles and Technical Change 
The theory of the long cycles of economic development was initiated by Marxist 
economists at the beginning of the 20th century, but became primarily associated with 
the contributions of Nikolai Kondratiev and Joseph Schumpeter.  Kondratiev identified 
three economic cycles of approximately 50 years duration: the first cycle witnessed a 
long wave of expansion from 1789 to 1809 followed by a long wave of relative 
stagnation from 1809 to 1849.  The second cycle began with an expanding wave in 
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1849 that lasted until 1873, followed by a declining wave until 1896.  The third cycle 
began with an expanding wave in 1896 which lasted until the economic crisis of 1920-
1921 (Barnett, 2005).  Kondratiev claimed that the economic crisis of 1920-1921 
resulted from a disruption of equilibrium in the distribution of world markets and 
productive forces.  He argued that the crisis was neither unique nor exceptional; its 
historical function was not to herald the imminent collapse of capitalism, but to facilitate 
the restoration of equilibrium.  The concept of long cycles was invoked in order to put 
the problem into its proper perspective and thus to substantiate this conclusion (Day, 
1976). 
Trotsky (1973) challenged Kondratiev’s assumptions by presenting a stylized 
diagram of capitalist economic growth based on the graph of English foreign trade (see 
Figure 2.6). 
Figure 2.6: The Curve of Capitalist Development 
 
Source: Trotsky, 1973, 278 
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Trotsky saw capitalism’s ‘moving equilibrium’ periodically interrupted at clearly defined 
turning-points which altered its slope and rejected the concept of long cycles on the 
grounds that Kondratiev had obscured the difference between periodical cycles and 
separate historical periods.  Trotsky (1973, 276-277) noted, 
The periodic recurrence of minor cycles is conditioned by the internal 
dynamics of capitalist forces, and manifests itself always and everywhere 
once the market comes into existence.  As regards the large segments of 
the capitalist curve of development (fifty years) which Professor 
Kondratiev incautiously proposes to designate also as cycles, their 
character and duration are determined not by the internal interplay of 
capitalist forces but by those external conditions through whose channel 
capitalist development flows. 
 
Trotsky sought to demonstrate that ‘external conditions’ and the relative autonomy of 
‘superstructural’ phenomena precluded any automatic periodicity of long cycles. 
Mandel (1978, 1995) made a systematic effort to reconcile Kondratiev’s 
conclusions with the Marxist tradition in general, and with the views of Trotsky in 
particular.  He claimed that Trotsky distinguished between ‘long cycles’ and ‘long 
waves’.  The concept of the long cycle implies a movement similar to that of the normal 
business cycle.  The slump generates forces leading to the boom, in the same way as 
the boom generates forces leading to the slump.  Mandel argued there is an asymmetry 
between the movements from an expansive long cycle into a depressive long cycle on 
the one hand, and the movement from a depressive long wave into an expansive long 
wave on the other hand.  The former is more or less automatic and endogenous, and 
the latter is not automatic and requires exogenous system shocks: a radical change in 
the average rate of profit (and of surplus-value) as a result of wars and revolutions, a 
radical broadening of the market, and so on.  For this reason a long wave’s average 
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duration may vary between 25 and 35 years.  The prime movers of a long wave are the 
average rate of profit and the dimension of the world market.  Only when both expand 
more or less simultaneously can the effects of a technological revolution come into their 
own. 
Mandel (1978) substantiated this perspective by examining the peculiar inner 
dynamic to the succession of industrial cycles over longer periods of time.  He claimed 
that capitalism has experienced three general revolutions in technology: first, the 
machine production of steam-driven motors since 1848; second, the machine 
production of electric and combustion motors since the 1890s; and third, the machine 
production of electronic and nuclear-powered apparatuses since the 1940s.  Each 
technological revolution, he claimed, had been preceded by an over-accumulation of 
capital, or a situation in which a portion of the accumulated capital can only be invested 
at an inadequate rate of profit, and increasingly only at a diminishing rate of interest.  
Once the required capital had been accumulated, each technological revolution had 
been initiated by a combination of ‘triggering factors’ which raised the rate of profit, 
brought the new processes into production, and thus generated a long wave of rising 
investment and economic activity. 
Mandel (1978) combined the analysis by W. Rupert Maclaurin and Gerhard 
Mensch to devise successive conditions for technological revolutions: (1) the propensity 
to develop pure science; (2) the development of current inventions capable of changing 
the whole basic technology of production; (3) the propensity to radical innovations; (4) 
the modification in the general conditions of capital accumulation that justify outlays for 
radical innovations; (5) the combined effect of: implemented radical innovation, rising 
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profit rate, and accelerated economic growth, that launch the technological revolution.  
Technological innovations are centered on a specific form of labour organization in the 
labour process.  During an expansionary long wave, when there is a rise in the profit 
rate, the reorganization of labour is less urgent because of the need for huge capital 
outlays to be depreciated and valorized.  Conversely, toward the end of the 
expansionary long wave and a large part of the subsequent depressive long wave, 
when the decline of the profit rate is pronounced, there is an incentive to increase the 
rate of surplus value.  This demands a profound change in the labour process, during 
which there is a general intensification of class struggle.  Revolutions in the organization 
of labour, made possible through successive technological revolutions, historically grew 
out of conscious attempts by employers to break down the resistance of the working 
class and further increase the rate of exploitation. 
Mandel’s attempt at reinforcing Kondratiev’s conclusions with more orthodox 
Marxist explanations has been criticized.  For example, Day (1976) claimed that 
Mandel’s description of the ‘internal dynamic’ of technological revolutions suggests that 
some degree of rhythm is present; yet Mandel also agreed with Trotsky that social and 
political factors prevent the long cycles from exhibiting ‘natural necessity’.  To overcome 
this difficulty Mandel avoids reference to long cycles (implying rhythmic movement) and 
instead refers to long waves with an undertone of expansion and long waves with an 
undertone of stagnation. 
Schumpeter (1961, 132-136) integrated the concept of the Kondratiev cycle into 
his general theory of business cycles and was among a few economists to put technical 
change and entrepreneurship at the root of economic growth.  He distinguished 
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between invention (the realm of science and technology) and innovation (the 
commercial introduction of a new product).  It is with profit in mind that entrepreneurs 
turn inventions into innovations, thus steering research efforts in particular directions.  
These decision processes are shaped by relative prices, institutional factors, and 
perceived market potential.  Innovation, he claimed, is the meaningful space in which 
technical change needs to be studied, where technology, the economy, and the social-
institutional context converge. 
Technological innovations are not random; they tend to appear along with 
neighbouring innovations.  Also, their evolution does not occur in isolation, but through a 
collective process that increasingly involves agents of change such as suppliers, 
distributors, consumers, and so on.  The techno-economic and social interactions 
between producers and users weave complex dynamic networks that are clusters 
(Schumpeter, 1982, 167).  Furthermore, major innovations tend to be inductors of 
further innovations and often stimulate entire industries; they demand complementary 
ones upstream and downstream and facilitate similar ones, including competing 
alternatives. 
While Schumpeter’s conceptualization of clusters of ‘creative destruction’ is 
useful for understanding the long cycles of uneven capitalist development, he arbitrarily 
divides invention from innovation leaving the related conditions surrounding the 
emergence of particular sciences and technologies completely out of the analysis.  
Moreover, for Schumpeter innovation emerges out of entrepreneurship and not class 
struggle therefore separating conceptually entrepreneurs from capitalists.  Here we 
have no motive for invention or innovation.  While such an analysis relates the 
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development of science and technology to capitalist social formations, the former 
deterministically determines the latter in advanced industrial societies (Loeppky, 2005). 
The work of Schumpeter has subsequently been drawn upon by neo-
Schumpeterians (see, for example, Dopfer et al., 2004; Dopfer and Potts, 2008; Dosi, 
1982, 1988; Dosi and Grazzi, 2010; Freeman, 1982, 1994; Freeman and Soete, 1997; 
Pavitt, 1999, 2001; Winter, 1982, 1987).  In contrast to the emphasis on equilibrium and 
efficient allocation within given constraints associated with neo-classical economics, 
neo-Schumpeterians are more interested in the disequilibrium of processes through 
which new technologies come to displace pre-existing technologies and how constraints 
on economic development may be transcended.  A useful distinction often made in the 
neo-Schumpeterian literature is between the micro (innovation and learning behavior in 
the firm), meso (innovation-driven industry dynamics), and macro (innovation-driven 
economic growth and competiveness) levels of the economy (Dopfer et al., 2004). 
Beginning at the micro level, the conception, design, and production of any 
technology often involves sequences of cognitive and physical acts.  The cognitive acts 
identify the inputs that are to be acted on and any required equipment, and the physical 
acts specify the actions that need to be taken to achieve a desired outcome.  Although 
one single person may possess the full set of skills required to move from the raw inputs 
to the final output, this is usually not the case.  In the domain of industrial technologies, 
the requisite knowledge and skills are distributed across many individuals and a crucial 
issue concerns when and how they are called for.  The success or failure of these 
processes depends on the structure and dynamics of procedures in the combination of 
elementary cognitive and physical components underlying the intra- and inter-
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organizational division of labour and its dynamics.  Input/output relations are essentially 
the by-product of successful attempts to change procedures and designs in desired 
directions.  The mappings between procedure-centred and input/output-centred 
representations of technologies are crucial for any theory of production (Marengo and 
Dosi, 2005; Marengo et al., 2000; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). 
The procedures through which firms operate entail organizational routines.  A 
routine is “an executable capability for repeated performance in some context that has 
been learned by an organization” (Cohen et al., 1996, 683).  According to Nelson and 
Winter (1982), routines (1) embody a good part of the memory of the problem-solving 
repertoires of any one organization; (2) entail complementary mechanisms of 
governance for potentially conflicting interests, and in turn, ensembles of routines are 
the building blocks of distinct organizational competences and capabilities; and (3) 
organizational capabilities involve some ‘meta-routines’, which govern and possibly 
challenge and modify ‘lower level’ organizational practices (e.g., the more incremental 
part of R&D activities, and recurrent exercises of ‘strategic adjustment’).  Such ‘higher 
level’ capabilities go under the name of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). 
Procedures draw on specific elements of knowledge ranging from ‘theoretical’ or 
codified knowledge (general scientific knowledge to knowledge of highly specific 
engineering applications) to ‘know-how’ or tacit knowledge reflected in the procedures 
and organizational routines of those engaged in production (see Polanyi, 1958, 1962, 
1966, 1967).  Codified knowledge is readily available in the professional communities 
and can be transferred in formal and systematic language using formats such as 
blueprints or operating manuals.  By contrast, tacit knowledge cannot be communicated 
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in any codified way; it comes from direct experience.  As such, tacit knowledge 
represents disembodied know-how that is acquired via the informal learned behaviour 
and procedures.  Some tacit knowledge is associated with learning without awareness 
(Polanyi, 1966).  Polanyi (1962) sums up tacit knowledge as an act of ‘indwelling’, the 
process of assimilating to ourselves things from outside.  In addition, tacit knowledge 
cannot be directly or easily transmitted, as knowledge and task performance are 
individual and specific and involve the acquirer making changes to existing behaviour.  
Within the range of tacit knowledge itself, the less explicit and codified the tacit 
knowledge is, the more difficult it is to assimilate it (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
The combination of codified knowledge and the degree of tacit skills of 
individuals have manifold implications for patterns of innovation, the division of labour, 
and the presence or absence of markets for technology.  The source of technological 
knowledge primarily emanates from business firms complemented by universities, 
public laboratories, and individuals in the industries of more developed economies.  
Technological knowledge has some important features that include (1) acknowledging 
some common features of information and knowledge in general, and with reference to 
scientific and technological knowledge in particular; and (2) distinguishing the specific 
features of technological knowledge and the ways it is generated and exploited in 
contemporary economies.  This applies to the pre-existing knowledge leading to any 
discovery and also to the knowledge required to interpret and apply whatever codified 
information is generated.  Moreover, there are costs involved in acquiring and using 
relevant technological knowledge and the uncertainty about its ultimate success (Dosi et 
al., 2008; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1987). 
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Shifting the focus to the meso and macro levels, newly introduced radical 
innovations that make it to the market are subjected to a series of incremental 
innovations following the changing rhythm of a logistic curve (see Figure 2.7).   
Figure 2.7: Trajectory of an Individual Technology 
 
Source: Perez, 2010, 187 
Changes generally occur slowly at first, while producers, designers, distributors and 
consumers engage in feedback learning processes; rapidly and intensively once a 
dominant design has become established in the market; and slowly once again when 
maturity is reached. 
In addition to rhythm, Dosi (1982, 1984) suggested that innovations may be 
understood through the concepts of technological paradigms and trajectories that 
attempt to capture the common features of technological activities and the procedures 
and direction of technical change.  A technological paradigm is based on three 
fundamental ideas: first, an understanding of what technology is and how it changes 
must embody the representation of specific forms of knowledge on which a particular 
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activity is based.  Such representation primarily concerns problem-solving activities 
involving tacit forms of knowledge.  Accordingly, technology is a set of pieces of 
knowledge ultimately comprising selected physical and chemical principles, know-how, 
methods, experiences of successes and failures, and the physical devices and 
equipment.  Second, paradigms entail specific heuristics and visions about ‘how to do 
things’ and how to improve them, often shared by the community of practitioners in each 
particular activity (e.g., engineers, firms, technical societies).  Together these comprise 
collectively shared cognitive frames.  Third, paradigms often employ basic templates of 
artifacts and systems which are progressively modified and improved.  These basic 
artifacts can also be described in terms of some fundamental technological and 
economic characteristics.  For example, an airplane is not only described in terms of 
inputs and production costs, but also in terms of take-off weight, speed, and so on. 
The concept of technological trajectories is associated with the progressive 
realization of the innovative opportunities underlying each paradigm, which can be 
measured in terms of the changes in the fundamental techno-economic characteristics 
of artifacts and production processes.  The core idea is that each particular body of 
knowledge or paradigm shapes and constrains the rate and direction of technical 
change.  Moreover, learning is local (i.e., occurring in the neighbourhood of the 
techniques and architecture) and cumulative (i.e., building on past experiences of 
production, innovation, and problem-solving junctures).  There is a structure to 
technological knowledge and there are relatively ordered patterns of technological 
innovation linked to specific routes to the solution of particular problems. 
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What holds for the technological paradigms and trajectories of individual 
technologies also holds in terms of the evolution of whole products in an industry and 
whole sets of interrelated industries.  These kinds of interrelated dynamics are 
encompassed in what Freeman (1992, 81) referred to as technology systems.  
Technology systems describe how Schumpeterian clusters are formed and evolve.  
Rather than being simple improvements, the incremental innovations along the 
trajectory are new products, services, and even entire industries, building upon the 
innovative space inaugurated by the initial radical innovation and widened by its 
followers.  This leads to the modification of the institutional context and the culture in 
which they occur, which in turn tend to have feedback effects upon the technologies, 
shaping and guiding the direction they take within the range of different possibilities.  
Maturity is reached when the innovative possibilities of the system begin to wane and 
the corresponding markets to saturate. 
Just as individual innovations are interconnected in technology systems, these 
are in turn interconnected in technological revolutions.  A technological revolution can 
be defined as “a set of interrelated radical breakthroughs, forming a major constellation 
of interdependent technologies; a cluster of clusters or a system of systems” (Perez, 
2010, 189).  Perez (2002) identified five successive technological revolutions: The 
Industrial Revolution (1771); Age of Steam and Railway (1829); Age of Steel, Electricity 
and Heavy Engineering (1875); Age of Oil the Automobile and Mass Production (1908); 
and the Age of Information and Telecommunications (1971).  Technological revolutions 
more generally are major upheavals of the wealth-creating potential of the economy, 
opening vast innovation opportunities and providing a new set of associated generic 
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technologies, infrastructures, and organizational principles that can significantly 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of all industries and activities. 
The structure of each revolution includes a significant number of interrelated new 
products and production technologies, giving rise to new industries.  From the point of 
view of the role they play in driving change, the core industries of each revolution can 
be ranged into four main categories: one, the motive branches, which produce the 
cheap inputs.  Two, the carrier branches, which are the most visible and active users of 
the inputs and represent the paradigmatic products of the revolution.  Three, the 
infrastructures, which are part of the revolution in terms of technology and whose impact 
is felt in shaping and extending the market boundaries for all industries.  Four, the 
induced branches, which encompass a set of industries that may be seen as 
indispensable to facilitate the maximum diffusion of the core industries (Perez, 1983, 
1985). 
The techno-economic paradigm is articulated through the use of new 
technologies as they diffuse and multiply their impact across the economy and 
eventually also modifies the way socio-institutional structures are organized.  The 
construction of a techno-economic paradigm occurs simultaneously in three main areas: 
one, in the dynamics of the relative cost structure of inputs to production where new low 
and decreasing cost elements appear and become the most attractive choice for 
profitable innovation and investment.  Two, in the perceived spaces for innovation, 
where entrepreneurial opportunities are increasingly mapped for the further 
development of the new technologies or for using them advantageously in the existing 
sectors.  Third, in the organizational criteria and principles, where practice keeps 
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showing the superior performance of particular methods and structures when it comes 
to taking advantage of the power of the new technologies for maximum efficiency and 
profits.  The principles of organization for maximum efficiency and effectiveness 
embodied in the techno-economic paradigm gradually spread out of the business world 
and into government and other non-profit institutions.  Organizational inertia is a well-
known phenomenon of human and social resistance to change.  In the market 
economy, however, inertia is overcome by competition, which, by showing the direction 
of success, serves as a guide to best practice and as a survival threat to the laggards.  
Eventually, the new techno-economic paradigm becomes the shared, established and 
unquestioned ‘common sense’ both in the economy and in the socio-institutional 
framework creating a clearly biased context in favour of the trajectories of the 
technologies of the revolution and their use across the economy (Perez, 2007, 2009). 
To summarize, technical change occurs during specific historical periods 
characterized by long cycles in the uneven development of capitalism.  Although the 
periodic recurrence of minor cycles condition the internal dynamics of capitalism, larger 
segments of the capitalist curve of development are determined by the ‘external 
conditions’ through which these processes flow.  The external conditions and the 
relative autonomy of ‘superstructural’ phenomena determine the uneven flow of 
capitalist development that incorporates perpetual revolutions in technology. 
Invention and innovation occur in clusters of ‘creative destruction’.  New 
technologies displace pre-existing technologies in an attempt to transcend constraints 
on economic development.  This occurs at the micro (innovation and learning behavior 
in the firm), meso (innovation-driven industry dynamics), and macro (innovation-driven 
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economic growth and competiveness) levels of the economy.  Micro processes include 
cognitive acts that identify the inputs that are to be acted on and any required 
equipment, and physical acts that specify the actions that need to be taken to achieve a 
desired outcome.  These are embedded in procedures and organizational routines that 
draw on specific elements of knowledge ranging from ‘theoretical’ or codified knowledge 
(general scientific knowledge to knowledge of highly specific engineering applications) 
to ‘know-how’ or tacit knowledge reflected in the procedures and organizational routines 
of those engaged in production. 
At the meso and macro levels, newly introduced radical innovations that make it 
to the market are subjected to a series of incremental innovations.  Changes generally 
occur slowly at first, while producers, designers, distributors and consumers engage in 
feedback learning processes; rapidly and intensively once a dominant design has 
become established in the market; and slowly once again when maturity is reached.  In 
addition, technological paradigms and trajectories attempt to capture the common 
features of technological activities and the procedures and direction of technical 
change.  What holds for the technological paradigms and trajectories of individual 
technologies also holds in terms of the evolution of whole products in an industry and 
whole sets of interrelated industries referred to as technology systems.  Just as 
individual innovations are interconnected in technology systems, these are in turn 
interconnected in technological revolutions.  A technological revolution can be defined 
as “a set of interrelated radical breakthroughs, forming a major constellation of 
interdependent technologies; a cluster of clusters or a system of systems” (Perez, 2010, 
189).  The structure of each revolution includes a significant number of interrelated new 
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products and production technologies, giving rise to new industries.  As a result, the 
techno-economic paradigm is articulated through the use of new technologies as they 
diffuse and multiply their impact across the economy and eventually also modifies the 
way socio-institutional structures are organized. 
 
2.3.4 Geography and Technical Change 
Geographers have also drawn on the contributions of Kondratiev and Schumpeter in 
their understanding of technical change.  Long waves theorizing has generated 
hypotheses about and insights into the dynamics of capitalist development and the 
relationships between uneven development and the generation and geographical 
implications of long waves (see, for example, Coe et al., 2013, chapter nine; Dicken, 
2011, chapter four; Hall, 1985; Hall and Preston, 1988; Knox et al., 2003; Marshall, 
1987). 
The geographical implications of long waves are profound and may be 
associated with the rise and fall of regions and places of production (Hall, 1985; 
Massey, 1988).  Broadly speaking, there are two schools of thought on the implications 
of long waves for geographically uneven development.  Hall (1985) argued that places 
are differentially endowed with respect to the development and growth of new 
technology, so that uneven development will and should result and that such differences 
should be intensified in policies of economic growth.  By contrast, other authors argued 
that technical change is facilitative and places may be adapted to such change 
(Marshall, 1987; Massey, 1988).  Marshall (1987) pointed out that new or ‘high’ 
technology rarely represents a sudden or complete break with the past and that ‘low’ 
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technology may be modified by high technology via process innovation.  Insofar as 
geography represents an integral part of the conditions of existence of productive 
activity, it seems likely that the geography of the generation of long waves is not 
reducible merely to local conditions of innovation, but to contradictions and potentials in 
the geographical structure of economic development at particular places and points of 
time to which technical change and innovation may represent a positive response. 
Geographers have highlighted the importance of regions for an understanding of 
technical change (see, for example, Cooke and Schwartz, 2007; Fagerberg et al., 2005; 
Gertler and Vinodrai, 2009; Mackinnon et al., 2002; Malecki, 2007, 2010, 2012; Rigby, 
2003; Spencer et al., 2010).  A regional economy may be crudely conceived as a 
collection of economic agents, firms, and workers embedded in a set of organizational 
and institutional structures that guide behavior to a greater or lesser degree.  Regions 
are also repositories of accumulated knowledge, both codified and tacit.  Region-
specific knowledge bases consist of familiarity with the production of particular 
commodities and of specific techniques used in their production.  They also include 
experience with organizational forms of different ways of separating production through 
the division of labour, managing inter- and intra-firm relations, and experience with 
institutional structures that regulate the environment in which economic agents operate.  
These knowledge bases incorporate behavioural conventions that shape the way in 
which knowledge is produced or obtained in the region.  Since these pools of 
knowledge differ across space, technology may be differentiated geographically, along 
with the characteristics and determinants of technological change (Rigby, 2003). 
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A substantial literature exists on regional innovation systems (Asheim and 
Isaksen, 1997; Cooke, 1992, 1998, 2001; Cooke et al., 1997), learning regions 
(Archibugi and Lundvall, 2001; Bathelt et al., 2011; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; 
Morgan, 1997) and localized knowledge economies (Asheim and Gertler, 2005) that 
foster the production of knowledge (Feldman and Kogler, 2010; Hudson, 2011).  Critical 
in much of this work is the idea that different knowledge economies/learning regions 
produce different subsets of knowledge as the source of their competitive advantage.  
Regional innovation systems stem from the existence of technological trajectories that 
are based on knowledge and localized learning in a region.  These can become more 
innovative and competitive by promoting stronger systemic relationships between firms 
and the region’s knowledge infrastructure.  They also stem from the presence of 
knowledge creation organizations whose output can be exploited for economically 
useful purposes by supporting newly emerging economic activity.  The emergence of 
the concept of a regional innovation system coincides with the success of regional 
clusters and industrial districts in the post-Fordist era (Asheim, 2000; Asheim and 
Cooke, 1999) and the elaboration of the concept represents an attempt to understand 
the central role of institutions and organizations in promoting innovation-based regional 
growth (Asheim and Herstad, 2003; Gertler and Wolfe, 2004). 
The regional innovation system can be thought of as the institutional 
infrastructure supporting innovation in the production structure of a region.  The concept 
of region highlights an important level of governance of economic processes between 
the national level and the level of the individual cluster or firm (Asheim and Cooke, 
1999).  The region is increasingly the level at which innovation is produced through 
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regional networks of innovators, local clusters, and the cross-fertilizing effects of 
research institutions.  In varying degrees, regional governance is expressed in both 
private representative organizations such as branches of industry associations and 
chambers of commerce, and public organizations such as regional agencies with 
powers devolved from the national level to promote enterprise and innovation support 
(Asheim and Herstad, 2003; Cooke et al., 2000). 
The systemic dimension of the regional innovation system derives in part from 
the team-like character associated with innovation in networks.  Such relationships must 
involve some varying degrees of interdependence.  As the interactive mode of 
innovation grows in importance, these relations are more likely to become regionally 
contained, especially in the case of specialized suppliers with a specific technology or 
knowledge-base.  Such suppliers often depend on tacit knowledge, face-to-face 
interaction and trust-based relations and, thus, benefit from cooperation with customers 
in regional clusters, while capacity subcontractors are increasingly sourced globally.  
Further reinforcing the systemic character of the regional innovation system is the 
prevalence of a set of attitudes, values, norms, routines, and expectations; described by 
some authors as a distinctive ‘regional culture’ that influences the practices of firms in 
the region.  It is this common regional culture, itself the product of commonly 
experienced institutional forces, that shapes the way that firms interact with one another 
in the regional economy (Asheim and Gertler, 2005). 
Geographers have recognized the geographical patterns of specialization in the 
distribution of industries (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999), in techniques of production (Rigby 
and Essletzbichler, 1997, 2006), and in organizational and institutional formations 
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(Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997).  Aggregation of these geographical differences has 
generated interest in the ‘knowledge-base’ of regions (Malecki, 2007, 2010; Quatraro, 
2010; Todtling and Trippl, 2005).  In particular, it has been argued that as developed 
countries have lost comparative advantage in manufacturing to developing countries, 
they have sought to promote knowledge-driven economies based on high value-added 
activities such as R&D.  As a consequence of this shift, particular industrial sectors have 
been identified as crucial in the knowledge economy, not only because they enable new 
modes of interaction and learning (e.g., information technology), but also because they 
provide the knowledge-base for whole new sectors (e.g., agricultural biotechnology). 
When one considers the actual knowledge-base of various industries and sectors 
of the economy, it is clear that knowledge and innovation have become increasingly 
complex.  There is a larger variety of knowledge sources and inputs to be used by 
organizations and firms, and there is more interdependence and a finer division of 
labour among individuals, companies, and other organizations (Cowan et al., 2000).  
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have pointed out that the process of knowledge 
generation and exploitation requires a dynamic interplay between, and transformation 
of, tacit and codified forms of knowledge as well as a strong interaction of people within 
organizations and between them.  These knowledge processes have become 
increasingly inserted into various forms of networks and innovation systems at regional, 
national, and international levels. 
Despite the general trend towards increased diversity and interdependence in the 
knowledge process, some authors have argued that the innovation process of firms is 
also strongly shaped by their specific knowledge-base, which tends to vary 
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systematically by industrial sector (Fagerberg, 2005; von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005).  
The knowledge-base may be distinguished between two types: synthetic and analytical 
(Laestadius, 1998).  These types entail different mixes of tacit and codified knowledge, 
as well as different codification possibilities and limits.  They also imply different 
qualifications and skills, reliance on different organizations and institutions, as well as 
contrasting innovation challenges and pressures. 
A synthetic knowledge-base prevails in industrial settings where innovation takes 
place mainly through the application or novel combination of existing knowledge.  This 
occurs in response to the need to solve specific problems arising in the interaction with 
clients and suppliers.  Industry examples include specialized industrial machinery, plant 
engineering, and shipbuilding.  R&D is in general less important than in other sectors of 
the economy.  When it occurs, it tends to take the form of applied research, but more 
often it involves incremental product or process development related to the solution of 
specific problems presented by customers (von Hippel, 1988). 
University-industry links are relevant, but they are clearly more significant in the 
realm of applied R&D than in basic research.  Knowledge is created less in a deductive 
process or through abstraction than through an inductive process of testing, 
experimentation, computer-based simulation, or practical work. Knowledge embodied in 
the respective technical solution or engineering work is at least partially codified; 
however, tacit knowledge seems to be more important than in other types of activity, 
due to the fact that knowledge often results from experience gained at the workplace, 
and through learning by doing, using, and interacting.  These forms of knowledge are 
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often provided by professional and poly-technical schools, or by on-the-job training 
(Asheim and Gertler, 2005). 
In contrast, an analytical knowledge-base dominates economic activities where 
scientific knowledge is highly important, and where knowledge creation is often based 
on formal models, codified science, and rational processes (e.g., agricultural 
biotechnology and information technology).  Both basic and applied research as well as 
the systematic development of products and processes are central activities in this form 
of knowledge production.  Companies typically have their own in-house research and 
development departments but they also rely on the research output of universities and 
other research organizations in their innovation processes.  University-industry links and 
networks are thus important, and this type of interaction is more frequent than in the 
synthetic type of knowledge-base.  Knowledge inputs and outputs in this type of 
knowledge-base are more often codified than in the case of synthetic knowledge.  This 
does not imply that tacit knowledge is irrelevant, since both kinds of knowledge are 
always involved in the process of knowledge creation and innovation (Nonaka et al., 
2000; Johnson et al., 2000). 
The importance of codification in analytic knowledge reflects several factors: 
knowledge inputs are often based on reviews of existing (codified) studies, knowledge 
generation is based on the application of widely shared and understood scientific 
principles and methods, knowledge processes are more formally organized (e.g. in R&D 
departments), and outcomes tend to be documented in reports, electronic files, or 
patent descriptions.  Knowledge application takes the form of new products or 
processes, which are more likely to constitute radical innovations than in those 
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industries for which synthetic knowledge constitutes the principal knowledge base.  New 
firms and spin-off companies (i.e., new market entrants rather than existing firms) are 
an important conduit for the application of knowledge embodied in these radically new 
inventions or products (Asheim and Gertler, 2005). 
To sum up, technical change is fragmented into discrete geographical locations.  
The geographical implications of long cycles in the uneven development of capitalism 
are profound and may be associated with the rise and fall of regions and places of 
production.  A regional economy may be crudely conceived as a collection of economic 
agents, firms, and workers embedded in a set of organizational and institutional 
structures that guide behavior to a greater or lesser degree.  Regions are also 
repositories of accumulated knowledge, both codified and tacit.  Regional innovation 
systems incorporate learning regions, and localized knowledge economies that foster 
the production of knowledge.  Different knowledge economies/learning regions produce 
different subsets of knowledge as the source of their competitive advantage. The 
regional innovation system can be thought of as the institutional infrastructure 
supporting innovation in the production structure of a region.  The systemic dimension 
of the regional innovation system derives in part from the team-like character associated 
with innovation in networks.  The innovation process of firms is also strongly shaped by 
their specific knowledge-base, which tends to vary systematically by industrial sector.  
The knowledge-base may be distinguished between two types: analytical and synthetic.  
These types entail different mixes of tacit and codified knowledge, as well as different 
codification possibilities and limits.  They also imply different qualifications and skills, 
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reliance on different organizations and institutions, as well as contrasting innovation 
challenges and pressures. 
 
2.4 The Development, Adoption, and Production of GM Crops 
The contributions on the development of science and technology in capitalism provide 
the basis for understanding the historical and geographical development of agricultural 
biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops.  The development of 
agricultural biotechnology is not simply the result of the autonomous processes of a 
purely technological phenomenon (i.e., the so-called ‘biotechnology revolution’), but 
capitalist social relations that demand innovation.  This has been the result of the efforts 
of a conjunction of social actors (e.g., governments, corporations, and public 
institutions) and practices of scientific research and technological applications 
necessary for sustaining such processes amidst systemic contradictions.  The outcome 
has been a R&D structure that broadly accommodates the needs of capital and 
promotes the patenting of life forms in agriculture, further concentration and 
centralization among multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations, a 
discourse that sustains and legitimizes the production of GM crops by positioning 
agricultural biotechnology as a panacea for perplexing socio-economic problems such 
as (inter) national economic growth and development, a stagnate agricultural industry, 
health and environmental issues, population growth and poverty, and so on, and the 
unprecedented global adoption and production of GM crops.  
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2.4.1 The State and Civil Society 
As Canada’s economic situation steadily declined amid the economic recession and 
lagging manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, concern for the national 
economy and industrial performance emerged as major issues.  The Government of 
Canada has for many years attested that the development of science and technology 
will reap great socio-economic benefits for the Canadian population (see, for example, 
Government of Canada, 2003; Health Canada, 2005).  Canada’s national biotechnology 
strategy was inaugurated to facilitate the potential of new recombinant DNA techniques 
that were being developed and support the regulatory and R&D activities of various 
federal departments and agencies.  Innovation featured prominently as a policy goal 
that entailed a substantial spending program for: improving technological innovation and 
diffusion; developing ‘strategic’ technologies; assuring a highly trained workforce; 
supporting basic and applied research; controlling the effects of technology on society; 
and promoting a ‘science culture’ (Abergel and Barrett, 2002). 
Public policy can influence innovation through a variety of policy instruments 
such as a stable economic environment aided by tax incentives for industrial research, 
monetary policy, direct subsidies for R&D, trade policy, regulatory frameworks and 
standards, and IP rights.  Government innovation programs can involve creating a 
scientific and technological infrastructure that includes universities, research centers, 
government departments, educational and training institutions, financial institutions, and 
information network centers.  By drawing on these instruments the Science Council of 
Canada directed attention to the importance of integrating technology into modern 
industrial processes.  This entailed long-term restructuring of the economy, increased 
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cooperation between the government and the private sector, and the strengthening of 
Canada’s technological capabilities by focusing on additional key areas to 
biotechnology such as engineering and computer technology (Abergel and Barrett, 
2002). 
The Government of Canada had succeeded in producing a regulatory framework 
based on the following principles: first, to build on current legislation where possible, 
rather than creating new legislation to govern new products which are developed.  
Second, to focus on product characteristics, rather than the method of production.  All 
products developed through genetic engineering are assessed for unintended effects 
that may result from the introduction of foreign genes or DNA sequences.  Third, to 
conduct evaluations for each product on the basis of its unique characteristics and to 
establish appropriate safety levels based on the best scientific information.  In addition, 
the Government of Canada supported efforts towards harmonizing regulatory efforts 
with those of trading partners such as the US and other OECD member countries, 
recognizing that continued export of agricultural and other products and the removal of 
trade barriers depended on mutually consistent standards of safety and regulatory 
oversight.  In 1988, AAFC began accepting applications to conduct Canada’s first 
confined research field trials for plants with novel traits (CFIA, 2007).  Following 
vigorous marketing in Canada of GM canola, soybean, and corn (the three largest GM 
crops cultivated in Canada), Monsanto received regulatory approval from Health 
Canada to market herbicide resistant canola for food use in 1994, herbicide resistant 
soybean in 1996, and insect resistant corn in 1997 (Health Canada, 1997).  From 1994 
to 2014, Health Canada approved 184 novel foods (Health Canada, 2015).  In 2015, 
100 
GM corn, soybean, canola, and sugar beet accounted for 86%, 62%, 95%, and 100% 
respectively of total crop in Canada.  Canada is an exporter of GM crops and products, 
including grains and oilseed such as canola, soybean, and corn.  In the marketing year 
2013/2014, Canada exported approximately 9.2 million metric tons (MMT) of canola, 3.4 
MMT of canola meal, and 2.3 MMT of canola oil.  Canada also exported 4.1 MMT of 
soybean, 92 thousand metric tons (TMT) of soybean oil, and 113 TMT of soybean meal.  
Canada’s corn exports in 2013/2014 amounted to 1.9 MMT (Dessureault and Lepescu, 
2015). 
These developments may be understood in light of what Andrée (2005) referred 
to as the formation of a transnational biotech bloc.  The transnational biotech bloc is 
spearheaded by the US, multinational corporations, and promotional and regulatory 
arms of government and civil society organizations.  It has successfully (albeit unevenly 
temporally and spatially) promoted its own interests in the development of 
biotechnology as those of society as a whole.  This has been accomplished through 
various discursive, material, and organizational practices including public relations 
campaigns, promoting IP regimes in plants and novel technologies, and gaining the 
support of public scientists, university departments, and regulatory structures.  This has 
resulted in controversies that erupted both inside and outside the scientific community 
over issues such as gene transfer, the evolution of weed and insect resistance to 
modified traits, socio-economic impacts, among others (see Colwell et al., 1985; 
Halvorson et al., 1985). 
Given the controversies surrounding the adoption and production of GM crops, 
the Government of Canada organized a series of meetings in 1993 that included 
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representatives from government, academia, NGOs, and industry.  While the purpose of 
the meetings at first appeared to be an effort towards more diverse debates around 
biotechnology, in reality they were predominantly confined around discussions about 
‘science-based’ approaches to regulation and the economic advantages of adopting 
biotechnology.  Following the 1993 meetings, branches of the Government of Canada 
produced documents and held consultations that emphasized the need to moderate the 
drive towards biotechnological innovation with considerations of the social, economic, 
political, environmental, and ethical dimensions (Abergel and Barrett, 2002). 
The most critical assessment of the Government of Canada’s biotechnology 
regulatory framework came in 2001 from the Royal Society of Canada’s (RSC) Expert 
Panel Report on the Future of Food Biotechnology entitled Elements of Precaution: 
Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada (see RSC, 
2001).  In response, the Government of Canada published an action plan and 
accompanying progress reports (see, for example, Government of Canada, 2001; 
Health Canada, 2013).  In the spring of 2001, the CBAC held five consultations across 
Canada with industry stakeholders, academia, and civil society organizations to discuss 
the regulation of novel foods.  Examining the CBAC’s consultations between 1999-
2003, Prudham and Morris (2006, 147) argued “that the CBAC GM foods project was, at 
best, a poorly conceived effort to engage with and respond to public concerns about GM 
foods, compromised by a prior commitment to commercialization.  At worst, it was a 
cynical exercise coloured by a desire to secure and consolidate the legitimacy of GM 
foods in the midst of growing controversy”.  The authors link this to the CBAC’s close 
ties with Industry Canada which resulted in discouraging many NGOs from participating 
102 
in the CBAC’s public consultations, therefore limiting their efficacy, and the CBAC’s 
recommendations which highly favoured the biotechnology industry. 
The development, adoption, and production of agricultural biotechnology in the 
Canadian context is not only the result of the efforts of individual capitals, but also those 
of the Canadian state.  This raises issues about the relationship of the state to, on the 
one hand, capitalist social relations, and on the other hand, science and technology.  
Regarding the relationship of the state to capitalist social relations, an extensive debate 
exists in the Marxist literature (for reviews of this debate see, for example, Clarke, 
1991a; Jessop, 1982).  By virtue of its insertion into the structure of capitalist social 
relations, the state must promote value accumulation and reproduce the capitalist 
system.  The social relations of capitalism require a regularized set of behaviours as 
well as the assurance of particular interaction between classes.  The state continues to 
be the arbiter of that interaction and an entity which enforces an environment that is 
most amenable for the continuation of capitalist development.  However, the particular 
form (e.g., policies that the state implements and the regulatory practices) the state 
takes and the outcomes are contingent on specific historical, geographical, and material 
conditions prevalent under capitalist social relations.  Clarke (1991b, 168-169) stated, 
“The state does not constitute the social relations of production, it is essentially a 
regulative agency, whose analysis, therefore, presupposes the analysis of the social 
relations of which the state is regulative. The analysis of the capitalist state conceptually 
presupposes the analysis of capital and of the reproduction of capitalist relations of 
production, despite the fact that in reality, of course, the state is itself a moment of the 
process of reproduction”.  The Government of Canada’s agricultural biotechnology 
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policy, regulation, and funding regimes demonstrate the degree to which the economic 
is embedded in political structures of power as well as the reflexive nature of those 
political forms that depend in part on the economy for their continued existence. 
Regarding the relationship of the state to science and technology, the Canadian 
state has been a critical non-economic actor in the drive toward agricultural 
biotechnology R&D aimed at commodity production.  Interestingly, this is contrary to the 
neo-liberal rhetoric advanced since the 1980s about the state withdrawing from active 
participation in the economic markets and political regulation and control of advanced 
industrial capital (Harvey, 2005).  In fact, the Government of Canada’s agricultural 
biotechnology science and technology policy implementation, regulatory practices, and 
funding structures have become part of the general and external guarantees of the 
social conditions of production directed toward specific capitals as well as the sector as 
a whole.  This demonstrates that in order for the state to ensure value accumulation and 
the reproduction of the capitalist system it must provide certain tangible, advantageous 
preconditions.  The pursuit of growth policies necessitates an infrastructure that requires 
significant capital outlays which cannot be realized by individual capitals.  Public policy 
is utilized to transfer social surplus value into particular sectors that not only give extra 
incentives to develop science and technology, but minimize the associated risks of 
venturing into such avenues (Hirsch, 1978; Loeppky, 2005).  This is orchestrated, as 
has been discussed, in different ways, such as funding projects, tax relief incentives, 
infrastructure development, and so on.  By accepting and promoting capitalist control 
over the development of biotechnology R&D, the Canadian state has been compelled to 
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operate in ways that ensure the success of the industry for the greater goal of 
contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
Moreover, civil society action has been effective, for example, by pressuring sub-
national and national levels of authority to implement moratoria on the production and/or 
importation of GM crops and foods, and by directly challenging multinational 
corporations, the institutionalization of systems of private regulation, and the creation of 
new market categories (Hall and Moran, 2006; Harsh, 2014; Heller, 2006; King and 
Pearce, 2010; Schurman and Munro, 2009).  In the Canadian case, the strong 
opposition to the adoption of GM wheat has illustrated the historical, political, and 
cultural significance of wheat farming, and its role in crop rotation, seed saving, and the 
economic viability of farmers.  Farmers and consumers voiced concerns about 
environmental implications, international market opposition, and the lack of 
transparency in the formulation of policies and regulation of GM crops (Eaton, 2009, 
2011, 2013; Magnan, 2007; Marcoux and Létourneau, 2013).  Indeed, as Prudham and 
Morris (2006, 168) noted “the culturally loaded and embedded character of food as a 
class of commodities throws these tensions into sharp relief, and biotechnology – as a 
controversial suite of innovations with intersecting social, ethical, environmental, and 
health implications – provides rich opportunities for exploring how they work themselves 
out”. 
 
2.4.2 Agricultural Biotechnology Discourse 
The promotion of agricultural biotechnology has been generated at the international and 
national scales as part of (inter) national economic growth and development strategies, 
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human progress and well-being, new knowledge and innovative products, food safety 
and security, environmental sustainability, and so on (see, for example, CGIAR, 2000; 
FAO, 2004; Government of Canada, 2003; Health Canada, 2005; UNDP, 2001; World 
Bank, 2007).  One of the ways that the Government of Canada and the Canadian 
industry have sustained and legitimized the development, adoption, and production of 
GM crops is by constructing a pro-GM crops discourse.  This has occurred in part by 
drawing on and propagating opinions from ‘authoritative’ sources including scientists 
and bureaucrats.  A clear distinction is made between ‘proper’ science conceived by a 
narrowly defined ‘expert’ scientific community, and an ill-informed, naive, irrational, ‘non-
expert’ public.  The presumption is made that only opinions from scientists are valid 
while opinions from people with some scientific training, social scientists, or scientists 
that are opposed to GM crops, are for the most part simply dismissed.  This perspective 
problematically makes the assumption that there is consensus among scientists 
regarding the development of agricultural biotechnology, when in fact the scientific 
debate has intensified both inside the Government of Canada’s scientific community 
and outside of it (Tam, 1999).  In addition, many studies by world-renowned scientists 
that highlight some of the negative impacts of GM foods have been published in peer-
reviewed scientific journals despite the claim that such studies are flawed (see Verzola, 
1999).  
The sentiment of scientists that are proponents of GM crops has also been 
supported by government bureaucrats who do not permit including ‘non-scientific’ 
issues into regulatory assessments (Munn-Venn and Mitchell, 2005).  By disregarding 
public concerns about biotechnology, the Government of Canada has maintained the 
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perspective that the public, for the most part, is ignorant of the purported benefits that 
the technology will reap for Canadians.  The Government of Canada has been actively 
promoting and supporting the development of the biotechnology industry for more than 
twenty-five years, and the multinational corporations that dominate the industry have 
been aggressively marketing the technology.  Any attempts at questioning these 
processes and in any way hindering their development is met with obdurate resistance 
on the part of government scientists, bureaucrats, and the industry. 
Given the authoritative role of scientists in the debate over GM crops, perhaps 
the most deeply rooted premise in the pro-GM crops discourse is that the answers to all 
questions about the development, adoption and production of GM crops are to be found 
exclusively in the confines of science.  It is as though, once the scientific evidence can 
be agreed upon, then all the purported benefits of GM crops will automatically follow.  
This problematically implies that there are only two criteria surrounding the debate 
about GM crops, ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’, and thus denies the validity of any other 
criteria (e.g., political, economic, cultural).  To say that there are dimensions of the 
debate which are not scientific, however, is neither to dismiss scientific evidence nor to 
succumb to irrationality and prejudice.  Although scientific findings are of critical 
importance, they do not encompass the entire debate over GM crops.  The concern, in 
other words, has been much more with an appeal to science rather than with science 
itself.  This reflects a common supposition that when a scientist speaks, in whatever 
forum, on whatever topic, and in whatever style, something of his or her authority 
carries over into other domains.  In this way, science has come to be seen less as a 
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way of proceeding or as a mode of thought, and more as the property of a particular 
group of people (Cook, 2005, 77-80). 
In addition, there is a blurring of the distinction between genetic modification and 
natural processes, where the former is normalized as part of the latter, further 
legitimatizing the development of biotechnology as part of the history of the genetic 
manipulation of plants.  This framing uncritically sustains “The “plant manipulation as 
progress” narrative”, where “domestication is genetic modification” (Stone, 2010, 384) 
and is often combined with the rhetoric about the benefits of GM crops for growing 
populations and feeding the poor.  This is predicated on a form of neo-Malthusianism, 
which is a combination of Malthusianism and technological determinism (see Das, 2002, 
60-65 for a related discussion on the Green Revolution technology).  This suggests that 
there is a necessary relationship between GM crop technology and poverty reduction; 
however, the effect of the technology on poverty reduction is contingent.  The only 
necessary effects of GM crop technology are technical or physical (e.g., greater yield), 
but the social effects (e.g., poverty reduction) are contingent.  To make the claim that 
GM crop technology is beneficial for the poor is to grant technology much more power 
than it can possibly have.  Also, underlying the technological determinism is the looming 
threat of population growth.  The suggestion is made that a growing population can be 
fed from constant land only through the application of GM crop technology; however, a 
population’s relation to poverty directly or its relation to GM crop technology’s impacts 
on poverty is also contingent.  Indeed the application of GM crop technology may 
increase food production, but whether or not this will result in reducing hunger in 
developing countries depends on a number of other factors (e.g., unequal power 
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structures at multiple scales that affect the way food and other goods and services are 
produced and distributed, pauperization and proletarianization, income levels, social 
provisions, and so on). 
Such statements and ideas have been given further legitimacy by asserting they 
are based on ‘sound science’.  This phrase routinely appeared in corporate and 
government websites and documents (see, for example, Bayer CropScience, 2009; 
Government of Canada, 2003; Health Canada, 2006; Monsanto, 2015b; Syngenta, 
2013b).  The phrase ‘sound science’ implies that there is another type of science that is 
‘unsound’.  Science may be unsound in the sense that, while genuinely trying to follow 
scientific principles, it is full of mistakes: the methods are flawed, the evidence is wrong, 
or the calculations and inductions are incorrect.  This is the kind of allegation which is 
often levelled by proponents of GM crops against the work of those scientists who are 
opponents of GM crops.  Cook (2005, 95) noted, “The phrase ‘sound science’ is not in 
itself very sound.  When used by scientists it can become self-congratulatory (rather like 
Monsanto’s ‘thoughtful dialogue’) and circular: an epithet awarded by those on one side 
of a scientific dispute to themselves, and denied to their opponents”. 
By manipulating the pro-GM crops discourse, government and industry are 
actively engaging in strategies designed to control the discursive norms and institutional 
contexts that encompass agricultural biotechnology.  This obscures the interest of 
capitalist accumulation more generally and those of individual capitals more specifically 
as the general interests of the Canadian public and farming communities and in part 
establishes and maintains the conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation.  Since 
class struggle is inherent to capitalist relations of production, capital is compelled to 
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engage in different strategies that provide the basis for accumulation in order to 
safeguard its existence.  Any threat to the balance of power between classes that 
impedes capitalist accumulation is susceptible to such strategies (Peekhaus, 2013).  
This may be illustrated, as discussed, by the efforts of the industry with support from 
government scientific and financial capacities to engage in public relations campaigns, 
attacks on opponents, the maligning of unsympathetic scientific findings, intense 
lobbying, and the ability to disseminate information that is primarily sympathetic to the 
agricultural biotechnology industry.  These strategies serve to constrain the discourse 
surrounding biotechnology in ways that ensure the success of the industry for the 
greater goal of contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
In addition, the pro-GM crops discourse raises the issue about the relationship 
between the development of science and technology and capitalist social relations of 
production.  One of the arguments posited by the government and industry in the 
construction of the discourse is the ostensibly ‘neutral’ development of science and 
technology under capitalist social relations of production and its corresponding specious 
and teleological claims about the putative capacity of science and technology to 
guarantee socio-economic progress.  This perspective undermines the distinction 
between the development of science and technology in general and the development of 
science and technology under capitalist social relations of production, where the latter 
reflects the social relations under which it occurs.  The appeal to science has provided 
government and industry a convenient strategy around which to circumscribe the social 
relations that underlie the pro-GM crops discourse and the adoption an production of 
GM crops.  The development of science and (bio) technology is not a neutral affair.  The 
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conception of science and technology as asocial catalysts for progress independent of 
purposive human agency that benefits one group of people over another serves to 
obscure the social relations underlying the development of science and technology from 
the design and development stages of technological innovation.  Such a conception not 
only relegates the social relations underlying new technologies to the instances of their 
application, but also casts their social effects on society as secondary and contingent.  
This suggests that scientists and technologists are the discoverers of laws and 
processes immanent in an exogenous natural realm.  Progress is putatively rooted in 
the natural order of a world that triumphs over historical and social peculiarities.  This 
discursive framing easily explains away social relations as unavoidable byproducts of 
history’s teleological march of progress that can be mitigated through the perspicacious 
applications of new technologies (Leoppky, 2005). 
Lastly, the pro-GM crops discourse obscures some fundamental aspects of the 
role of the development of GM technology in agriculture.  The development of science 
and technology in agriculture has allowed for the reduction in the cost of agricultural 
production by increasing labour productivity, decreasing the reproduction cost of labour-
power, and increasing surplus production at the societal level.  The combination of 
labour with GM technology results in more output (farmers plant GM crops and get a 
higher yield than if they plant conventional crops).  The increased output or the higher 
yield must be understood not only in terms of its use-value (more food to be consumed), 
but also in terms of its surplus-value (a given input of labour in a given time produces 
more output).  Moreover, GM seeds producers, such as Monsanto, are driven by the 
capitalist profit motive.  Billions of dollars have been invested in the R&D of GM seeds.  
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GM seeds producers, like any other commodity producers, rely on being the first to 
market so as to capture the largest market share and reap the greatest gains from their 
investment.  The immediate objective of GM seeds production is not human sustenance 
and well-being but increase in profits.  Accordingly, such discursive struggles have 
material consequences for the development, adoption, and production of GM crops, 
seed saving and production, multinational corporations, Canadian farming, the public, 
and food production in general. 
 
2.4.3 Economic Effects of GM Crops Production on Farmers 
The agricultural sectors of developed economies have experienced significant changes 
over the last four decades as farm size, intensity, capitalization, and specialization have 
dramatically moved from conventional configurations to what has been referred to 
variously as the third agricultural revolution, the modernization of farming, the 
industrialization of farming, and the restructuring of farming (Bowler, 2014).  At the farm 
level, the general model is one of a shift from small-scale (less than 50 hectares) or 
medium-scale (51 to 150 hectares), generally mixed-enterprise (including two or more 
crops), to large-scale farms (151 or more hectares) (FAO, 2014).  This is characterized 
by increased labour substitution, capital investments in land, and an increase in off-farm 
inputs such as mechanical (energy intensive machinery) and biological (GM seeds and 
associated agrochemicals).  At the agro-food system level, the process involves 
integration between fewer and fewer industrialized farms, and between agribusiness 
and government.  The latter two ‘beyond the farm gate’ elements are the most important 
aspects, influencing and controlling the restructuring process (Troughton, 1986). 
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Significant structural changes have occurred in Canadian farming.  On the one 
hand, farm numbers in Canada have declined from 280,043 farms in 1991 to 205,730 
farms in 2011 (Statistics Canada, 2012a).  On the other hand, farm annual revenue and 
farm size increased.  By 2011, farms with $1 million or more in annual revenue 
represented the fastest growing sector of Canadian agriculture.  While these farms 
make up less than 5% of the total number of producers, they account for nearly half of 
Canada’s food production (Statistics Canada, 2015a).  In addition, subsidies continue to 
be a cardinal facet of Canadian agriculture and have had a major role to play in 
international trade despite the World Trade Organization’s Agreements on Agriculture 
and Subsidies which have curbed agricultural subsidies in developed countries (see 
WTO, 2016; Swain, 2009).  Although there has been a decrease since the mid-1980s in 
the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) as a share of gross farm receipts in Canada, as 
of 2015, the Canadian PSE amounted to $5.5 billion representing 9.4% of gross farm 
receipts (OECD, 2015). 
Along with decreases in subsidies to farmers has been the policy shifts of AAFC 
since the mid-1980s from practices that benefit Canadian farmers, such as developing 
new publicly funded varieties that are resistant to drought, disease, and pests, in favour 
of contracts and partnerships with private clients to meet exclusively private-sector 
needs such as patented agronomic inputs.  AAFC policy objectives have become 
increasingly market oriented: ensuring supply of diverse food products; making the 
marketing system more effective; and increasing the economic viability of the industry in 
a context of free trade (Moore, 2002). Despite such efforts, the collapse of world 
commodity prices in 1997 resulted in a significant drop in net farm income.  The 
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Government of Canada responded by providing subsidies to farmers totaling $1.5 billion 
while the AAFC developed a performance framework that defined four main objectives: 
expanding markets; innovating for a sustainable future; building a strong foundation for 
the industry and rural communities; and providing departmental policies and services 
(Dakers and Forge, 2000). 
The development, adoption, and production of GM crops has been in part a 
critical component of the drive in Canadian agriculture towards international 
competitiveness, productivity, economic growth, and innovation.  This has been 
substantiated by significant expenditures on biotechnology R&D and science and 
technology R&D by the Canadian federal government totaling billions of dollars (see, 
Statistics Canada, 2010, 2012b, 2014b).  In addition has been the important role of a 
handful of multinational corporations that have captured the global proprietary GM seed 
and agrochemical (herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides) markets.  In 2013, the top 
six companies: Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF accounted for 
65% of the global proprietary GM seed market, and 75% of the global agrochemical 
market with sales of GM seeds, agrochemicals, and GM traits exceeding $65 billion per 
annum (ETC Group, 2015).  As of 2015, the estimated seeded areas of GM corn, 
soybean, canola, and sugar beet (the four GM crops grown in Canada) were 86%, 62%, 
95%, and 100% respectively of total crop area (Dessureault and Lupescu, 2015). 
Farmers enter contracts with corporations, such as Monsanto, to cultivate GM 
crops.  The contract between the farmer and the corporation significantly limits the 
farmer’s rights to the purchased seeds through a ‘no saved seed’ provision which 
prohibits saving seeds and/or reusing seeds from GM crops.  In effect, the provision 
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requires farmers to purchase GM seeds on an annual basis (Fernandez-Cornejo and 
McBride, 2002).  This significantly alters the practices of generations of farmers who 
have selected, saved, exchanged, sold, and reused seeds.  The value of a seed is 
realized not just in one harvest, but in the seeds it produces for future crops and the 
material it provides for future breeding.  Patent protection over new genetic sequences 
is one legal mechanism that takes ownership of seeds out of the hands of farmers and 
allows corporations to capture value from them.  In practice, this means that patents 
allow the corporation that developed a GM trait to forbid farmers from saving and 
replanting seeds with that trait, and public breeders from further selecting or developing. 
Moreover, in Canada there has been an exponential rise in the cost of 
commercial seed compared to other farm expenses.  For example, the annual rate of 
increase of commercial seed cost from 1986 to 2015 was 15% compared to 3.5% for 
machinery fuel or 5.1% for electricity (Statistics Canada, 2016a).  More specifically, data 
from the Government of Alberta (2016) confirm the continuing rise in the cost of GM 
canola since 2012.  For example, the cost of Bayer GM canola per 22.7 kg bag 
increased from $492.83 in January 2012 to $597.11 in January 2016 and the cost of 
Monsanto GM canola per 22.7 kg bag increased from $389.12 in January 2012 to 
$469.33 in January 2016.  In addition to seed cost, farmers were required to sign and 
pay for a Technology Use Agreement (TUA) fee.  For example, in 2011 Monsanto 
charged GM canola farmers a $15/acre TUA fee, which amounted to approximately 
$261 million in Canada over and above seed cost (NFU, 2013). 
One of the common claims to justify the adoption and production of GM seeds is 
that they produce higher yields than conventional seeds.  This claim is then linked to the 
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assumption that higher yields result in higher incomes for farmers.  Data confirms that 
there has been a general increase in yields since the production of GM canola (2% 
increase from 1996 to 2015), GM corn (3.1% increase from 1997 to 2015), and GM 
soybean (0.8% increase from 1996 to 2015) (Statistics Canada 2015b); however, 
increase in yields of the same crops also occurred prior to the introduction of GM traits.  
For example, the annual average increase in yields of conventional canola, corn, and 
soybean from 1966 to 1995 were 1.3%, 0.9%, and 1.4% respectively (Statistics Canada 
2015b).  Increases in yields as well as yearly fluctuations are attributed to many factors 
including: improvements in conventional breeding, geographical location, environmental 
changes, fertilizer and pesticide use, agronomic practices, farm machinery, and farm 
management (Veeman and Gray, 2009). 
Moreover, data confirms that there has been a general increase in the gross farm 
income of Canadian farmers since the production of GM canola (from $6 million in 1996 
to a peak of $546 million in 2013), GM corn (from $3.2 million in 1997 to a peak of $143 
million in 2012 and down to $107 million in 2013), and GM soybean (from $41,000 in 
1997 to a peak in 2006 of $18 million and down to $7 million in 2013) (Brookes and 
Barfoot, 2015); however, there has been a general stagnation in net farm from 1976 to 
2015 despite an increase in gross income (see Statistics Canada, 2016b).  In addition, 
there has been an exponential rise in farm expenses and farm debt (see Statistics 
Canada, 2016a, 2016d).  The impact of adopting GM crops on farm income is attributed 
to additional factors such as: global and domestic commodity prices, currency exchange 
fluctuations, and trade decisions; the profitability of a crop in terms of how much any 
benefits outweigh the cost of inputs such as seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, and land; 
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farm management and agronomic practices; and geographical location and 
environmental attributes affect profitability directly through increased fertility and 
indirectly through its influence on pests. 
Lastly, despite stagnant net farm income and increasing farm expenses and 
debt, the net income of multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations continue 
to rise at unprecedented rates.  For example, Monsanto’s average annual net income 
from 2005 to 2015 has increased from a net income of US$255 million in 2006 to 
US$2.3 billion in 2015 (Monsanto, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016b).  To put this in perspective, 
Monsanto’s (2014a) and DuPont’s (2014a) net income in 2013 exceeded the net 
income of approximately 205,000 farmers in Canada. 
The restructuring of agriculture and the agro-food system stems from an 
extension of the structural crisis of global capitalism, which varies in form and intensity, 
according to natural qualities and social and technological characteristics at national 
and international scales.  Agricultural restructuring in Canada has brought significant 
challenges to the mostly family-owned farms in Canada.  This has included an increase 
in off-farm mechanical (e.g., machinery) and biological (e.g., GM seeds and associated 
agrochemicals) inputs, farm production that is increasingly focused on fewer and larger 
farms in the most productive regions, large capital-intensive farms that focus on fewer 
farm products as resources are devoted to those items giving the best comparative 
advantage, a decrease in farm subsidies, government agricultural policy shifts that 
favour the private sector, and unfavourable environmental and market conditions.  
Among the purported solutions to these perplexing issues has been intense innovation 
in agricultural biotechnology, funded by the Government of Canada and multinational 
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corporations, aimed at economic growth and the expansion of value accumulation in an 
era of competitive innovation in high-technology industries.  This is manifested in the 
rise and consolidation of a handful of multinational GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations, vigorous marketing and government regulatory approval of GM products, 
the appropriation of germplasm, rapid expansion of IP rights, and the high adoption and 
production of GM crops.  Farmers are increasingly dependent on commodified (GM) 
seeds, which have been rapidly converted from public goods and means of production 
controlled by direct producers, into commodities controlled by multinational 
corporations, bought and sold in trans-national markets.  The serious consequences for 
farmers have included a significant increase in the cost of GM seeds and associated 
agrochemicals relative to other operational costs; GM seeds that are less adapted to 
their regions and less resilient to environmental change; fewer choices for farmers as 
conventional seeds are phased out; and less farmer autonomy due to stringent 
contracts that prevent farmers from selecting, saving, exchanging, selling, and reusing 
seeds.  Although there has been a rise in yields and gross farm income as a result of 
adopting GM crops, net farm income has remained stagnant due to an increase in farm 
expenses and debt while the net income of leading GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations has increased sharply as farmers become more dependent on 
commodified off-farm inputs that are increasingly controlled by multinational 
agribusiness corporations.  These processes constitute a major driving force behind the 
restructuring and transformation of the Canadian agriculture and agro-food system.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
Having examined the academic literature on agricultural geography and agricultural 
biotechnology and identified some gaps, I provided an alternative theoretical framework 
for understanding the development of science and (bio) technology.  I begin by 
identifying the concepts from Marx that underlie the critical role of science and 
technology in capitalism.  The contradiction between the productive forces and the 
social relations of production which accounts for the historical development of a 
succession of modes of production is applied to understand the dynamics of capitalism.  
Marx incorporated his conceptualization of technology by way of the abstract concepts 
productive forces and social relations of production as these are embodied in the 
concrete materiality of the labour process, while abstracting from the specific details of 
actual technological changes.  The on-going quest on the part of capitalists to 
appropriate surplus-value impels perpetual revolutions in the productive forces (i.e., the 
means of production such as mechanical implements including tools and machinery and 
biological implements including GM seeds and agrochemicals, raw materials, and 
spaces; and labour-power in its various qualitative aspects).  Such revolutions, 
however, create conditions that are inconsistent with the further accumulation of capital 
and the reproduction of class relations.  This results in an unstable and crisis prone 
capitalist system, though each crisis may be resolved through a restructuring of the 
productive forces and social relations of production, the underlying source of conflict is 
never eliminated. 
Capitalist society has exhibited an extraordinary degree of technical change and 
organizational dynamism.  Competition compels capitalists to constantly attempt to 
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lower the costs of production to earn the profits necessary for the accumulation of 
capital that ensures their survival.  To do so and increase the value they appropriate, 
capitalists try to increase the length and intensity of the workday, lower wages, and 
increase the productivity of labour through technological development.  Technological 
development implies using less labour for the same or more output.  The coercion on 
individual capitalists to accumulate operates through the mechanism of competition.  
These factors play a central role in the interrelationship between capitalism and 
technical change. 
Technical change occurs during specific historical periods characterized by long 
cycles in the uneven development of capitalism.  Here, “The periodic recurrence of 
minor cycles is conditioned by the internal dynamics of capitalist forces, and manifests 
itself always and everywhere once the market comes into existence.  As regards the 
large segments of the capitalist curve of development (fifty years)… their character and 
duration are determined not by the internal interplay of capitalist forces but by those 
external conditions through whose channel capitalist development flows” (Trotsky, 1973, 
276-277).  ‘External conditions’ and the relative autonomy of ‘superstructural’ 
phenomena determine the uneven flow of capitalist development that incorporates 
perpetual revolutions in technology. 
Invention and innovation occur in clusters of ‘creative destruction’.  New 
technologies displace pre-existing technologies in an attempt to transcend constraints 
on economic development.  This occurs at the micro (innovation and learning behavior 
in the firm), meso (innovation-driven industry dynamics), and macro (innovation-driven 
economic growth and competiveness) levels of the economy.  Micro processes include 
120 
cognitive acts that identify the inputs that are to be acted on and any required 
equipment, and physical acts that specify the actions that need to be taken to achieve a 
desired outcome.  These are embedded in procedures and organizational routines that 
draw on specific elements of knowledge ranging from ‘theoretical’ or codified knowledge 
(general scientific knowledge to knowledge of highly specific engineering applications) 
to ‘know-how’ or tacit knowledge reflected in the procedures and organizational routines 
of those engaged in production. 
At the meso and macro levels, newly introduced radical innovations that make it 
to the market are subjected to a series of incremental innovations.  Changes generally 
occur slowly at first, while producers, designers, distributors and consumers engage in 
feedback learning processes; rapidly and intensively once a dominant design has 
become established in the market; and slowly once again when maturity is reached.  In 
addition, technological paradigms and trajectories attempt to capture the common 
features of technological activities and the procedures and direction of technical 
change.  What holds for the technological paradigms and trajectories of individual 
technologies also holds in terms of the evolution of whole products in an industry and 
whole sets of interrelated industries referred to as technology systems.  Just as 
individual innovations are interconnected in technology systems, these are in turn 
interconnected in technological revolutions.  A technological revolution can be defined 
as “a set of interrelated radical breakthroughs, forming a major constellation of 
interdependent technologies; a cluster of clusters or a system of systems” (Perez, 2010, 
189).  The structure of each revolution includes a significant number of interrelated new 
products and production technologies, giving rise to new industries.  As a result, techno-
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economic paradigm is articulated through the use of new technologies as they diffuse 
and multiply their impact across the economy and eventually also modifies the way 
socio-institutional structures are organized. 
Technical change is fragmented into discrete geographical locations.  The 
geographical implications of long cycles in the uneven development of capitalism are 
profound and may be associated with the rise and fall of regions and places of 
production.  A regional economy may be crudely conceived as a collection of economic 
agents, firms, and workers embedded in a set of organizational and institutional 
structures that guide behavior to a greater or lesser degree.  Regions are also 
repositories of accumulated knowledge, both codified and tacit.  Regional innovation 
systems incorporate learning regions, and localized knowledge economies that foster 
the production of knowledge.  Different knowledge economies/learning regions produce 
different subsets of knowledge as the source of their competitive advantage. The 
regional innovation system can be thought of as the institutional infrastructure 
supporting innovation in the production structure of a region.  The systemic dimension 
of the regional innovation system derives in part from the team-like character associated 
with innovation in networks.  The innovation process of firms is also strongly shaped by 
their specific knowledge-base, which tends to vary systematically by industrial sector.  
The knowledge-base may be distinguished between two types: analytical and synthetic.  
These types entail different mixes of tacit and codified knowledge, as well as different 
codification possibilities and limits.  They also imply different qualifications and skills, 
reliance on different organizations and institutions, as well as contrasting innovation 
challenges and pressures. 
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The contributions on the development of science and technology in capitalism 
provide the context for understanding the historical and geographical development of 
agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops.  The 
development of agricultural biotechnology is not simply the result of the autonomous 
processes of a purely technological phenomenon (i.e., the so-called ‘biotechnology 
revolution’), but capitalist social relations that demand innovation manifested in the 
emergence of agricultural biotechnology.  This has been the result of the efforts of a 
conjunction of social actors (e.g., governments, corporations, and public institutions) 
and practices of scientific research and technological applications necessary for 
sustaining such processes amidst systemic contradictions.  The outcome has been a 
R&D structure that broadly accommodates the needs of capital and promotes the 
patenting of life forms in agriculture, further concentration and centralization among 
multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations, a discourse that sustains and 
legitimizes the production of GM crops by positioning agricultural biotechnology as a 
panacea for perplexing socio-economic problems such as (inter) national economic 
growth and development, a stagnate agricultural industry, health and environmental 
issues, population growth and poverty, and so on, and the unprecedented global 
adoption and production of GM crops. 
The Canadian case shows that the adoption and production of GM crops 
represents in part a significant attempt by the state to secure the ongoing capitalist 
development of the agricultural biotechnology industry.  This occurs through a complex 
array of processes, on the one hand, by a variety of government agencies that are 
necessary for the procurement of costly generic scientific and technological R&D, 
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legislation, and regulation (e.g., Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Environment 
Canada, Health Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada), and on the other hand, by 
instances of the state neutralizing or countering the political struggles waged by various 
civil society organizations that have challenged such outcomes.  This signifies an 
economic geography in which ‘competitiveness’ at the national and international scales 
is heralded resulting in the support of innovation systems and the expansion and 
protection of value accumulation, while simultaneously civil society action seeks to 
challenge pressures toward market-oriented restructuring and reform.  The GM crops 
narrative is in part about the tension between compliant government structures and 
resistant civil society action seeking to partially counter the encroachment of the 
capitalist market. 
In addition, the state and sections of civil society, government scientists and 
bureaucrats, corporations, and industry supported websites and NGOs have played an 
important role in the construction of a pro-GM crops discourse.  The manipulation of the 
pro-GM crops discourse serves to control the discursive norms and institutional contexts 
that surround agricultural biotechnology.  This process seeks to represent the interest of 
capitalist accumulation and those of individual capitals as the general interests of the 
Canadian public and farming communities therefore establishing and maintaining some 
of the conditions that ensure the success of the industry for the greater goal of 
contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
Lastly, the restructuring of the agricultural sector has encompassed a wide range 
of forces and conditions among which has been the dramatic increase in the adoption 
and production of GM crops.  This has been associated with the rise and consolidation 
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of a handful of multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations aimed at 
economic growth in the agricultural sector in an era of competitive innovation in high-
technology industries.  The serious consequences for Canadian farmers have included 
stagnant net farm income despite increasing yields and gross income, higher farm 
expenses and debt, and stringent patent laws that limit farmers’ autonomy.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Historical and Geographical Macro-Empirical Analysis of Agricultural  
Biotechnology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Historically farmers have been the primary generators and stewards of crop genetic 
resources.  The common heritage principal of genetic resources as belonging to the 
public domain has been the foundation of farming communities for millennia where 
seeds were exchanged and invention was collective.  The planting of genetically diverse 
and geographically localized landraces by farmers may be conceptualized as a 
decentralized management regime with significant biological, political, and economic 
implications (Castree, 2008; Shiva, 2007; Stone, 2007).  Studies of traditional farming 
systems suggest that farmers in Africa (Mulatu and Zelleke, 2002; van Leur and Gebre, 
2003) the Americas (Bellon et al., 1997) and Asia (Jaradat et al., 2004) managed and 
continue to manage existing varieties and innovate new ones through different 
techniques including hybridization with wild species, regulation of cross-pollination, and 
directional selection.  In many parts of the world it is women’s knowledge systems that 
select and shape crop genetic resources (Beintema, 2014). 
 Over the past century, however, plant breeding has developed incrementally by 
harnessing advances in plant biology, supplemented at times by traditional empirical 
knowledge (lore), and informed by the principles of Mendelian genetics.  The scientific 
breakthrough that figured most prominently in the subsequent commodification of 
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biotechnology was that of Herbert Boyer and Stanley Cohen.  In 1973, Boyer and 
Cohen employed genetic engineering techniques to transfer genetic material into a 
bacterium allowing the imported material to be reproduced.  In 1976, Boyer joined 
venture capitalist Robert Swanson and founded one of the first biotechnology 
companies Genentech.  In 1978, Genentech cloned human insulin using recombinant 
technology and bacteria (Thieman and Palladino, 2012).  The rapid expansion of the 
biotechnology industry quickly followed as investment dollars poured into the industry.  
Peekhaus (2013, 39) noted, “Aside from a plethora of start-up biotechnology 
companies, a number of the major pharmaceutical and chemical multinationals began 
developing in-house research programs using recombinant DNA, signed research 
contracts with some of the start-ups, and even began acquiring equity stakes in a 
number of them”. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical and geographical 
development of agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM 
crops.  I address the following questions: what role have public and private institutions 
played in the development of agricultural biotechnology?  How did changes in IP rights 
affect access to and use of genetic resources?  How has public and private investment 
in agricultural R&D affected the development of GM crops?   What are the effects of 
greater concentration and centralization among GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations?  To what extent have GM crops been adopted and produced globally?  I 
argue that the historical and geographical development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops is not simply the result of the autonomous processes of a purely technological 
phenomenon (i.e., the so-called ‘biotechnology revolution’), but capitalist social relations 
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that demand innovation manifested in the emergence of agricultural biotechnology.  
This has been the result of the efforts of a conjunction of social actors (e.g., 
governments, corporations, and public institutions) and practices of scientific research 
and technological applications necessary for sustaining such processes amidst 
systemic contradictions.  The outcome has been a R&D structure that broadly 
accommodates the needs of capital by promoting the patenting of life forms in 
agriculture, further concentration and centralization among multinational GM seed and 
agrochemical corporations, and the unprecedented global adoption and production of 
GM crops. 
The chapter is organized in the following way.  In section 3.2 The Emergence of 
Agricultural Biotechnology I examine the shift from public to private ownership of 
germplasm (section 3.2.1 From Public to Private Ownership of Germplasm); the 
ensuing IP rights in plant genetic resources (section 3.2.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
in Plant Genetic Resources); the investments in agricultural R&D (section 3.2.3 
Agricultural Research and Development Investment); and the increasing 
concentration and centralization of GM seed and agrochemical corporations (section 
3.2.4 Concentration and Centralization in the Agricultural Biotechnology 
Industry).  In section 3.3 The Global Adoption of GM Crops I explore the number of 
GM crops field trials conducted (section 3.3.1 GM Crop Field Trials); the adoption of 
GM crops by country and crop (section 3.3.2 GM Crops by Country and Crop); the 
economic impacts of adopting GM crops (section 3.3.3 Economic Impacts of 
Adopting GM Crops); and the specific cases of the US and Canada (section 3.3.4 US 
Leads and Canada Follows).  In section 3.4 Conclusion I provide a summary of the 
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findings and draw out some conceptual implications and the contribution of the chapter 
to the academic literature. 
 
3.2 The Emergence of Agricultural Biotechnology 
 
3.2.1 From Public to Private Ownership of Germplasm 
In the first half of the 20th century, public sector institutions emerged that catalyzed 
formal crop improvement, focusing on yield with high input requirements and wide 
adaptability.  These advancements had both positive and negative impacts on farming 
communities as more uniform crops replaced locally adapted crops.  Expeditions to 
collect global germplasm by several countries and gene banks were established for the 
conservation of germplasm for use in research and breeding.  Public sector institutions 
were the dominant distributors of improved varieties.  The rediscovery of Mendel’s laws 
of heredity in 1900 and the discovery of heterosis in 1908 spurred the growth of the 
commercial industry (Crow, 1998).  Throughout the 20th century, universities and 
research institutes gradually specialized in basic research while the private sector 
increased its capacity in practical breeding.  The public sector assumed primary 
responsibility for managing genetic resources, creating scientific networks that acted as 
conduits of information and technology flow, and establishing regulatory bodies for 
variety testing, official release, and seed certification (Pingali and Traxler, 2002). 
The education, research, and institutional system triad commonly found in 
developed countries was exported to developing countries in an attempt at fostering 
agricultural development and food security mainly through the development of broadly 
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adapted germplasm.  With the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation (and later the Ford 
Foundation), a collaborative research program on maize, wheat, and beans in Mexico 
was founded in 1943.  This laid the foundation for the first international research centers 
of the CGIAR, with the initial focus to improve globally important staple crops.  The 
formation of the CGIAR centers laid the groundwork for the emergence of the Green 
Revolution technologies.  Borrowing from breeding work in developed countries, high-
yielding varieties of rice, wheat, and maize were developed in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Also, the FAO launched a significant program to establish formal seed production 
capacities and ‘lateral spread’ systems in developing countries to make the new 
varieties available to as many farmers as possible.  These public seed projects, 
financed by the UNDP, World Bank, and bilateral donors were subsequently 
commercialized, often as parastatal companies before national or multinational seed 
companies were established in developing countries (IAASTD, 2009).  The CGIAR and 
the FAO arrangements, however, had limitations.  Formal breeding programs have 
resulted in homogeneous varieties that favour uniform conditions rather than the 
heterogeneous ecological clines that characterize the majority of small farmers’ fields.  
The prevalence of pests, disease, and variability of climate and land require a wide 
range of locally adapted heterogeneous varieties (Wolfe, 1992).  Erosion of crop 
diversity is commonly paralleled by erosion of farmers’ skills and empowerment.  This 
results in a loss of community sovereignty as fewer people are able to cultivate and 
control their own food (Stone, 2007).  Debates continue as to whether or not increases 
in food production, such as those of the Green Revolution, necessarily lead to increases 
in food security (Das, 2002). 
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3.2.2 Intellectual Property Rights in Plant Genetic Resources 
Until the 1970s, there were very few national and international laws creating proprietary 
rights or other forms of explicit restriction of access to plant genetic resources.  Since 
that time, however, the common heritage principle has been turned on its head, with the 
gradual encroachment of claims for control over access to and use of genetic resources 
through the introduction of IP laws (Safrin, 2004).  As a result, the  GM seed industry 
has benefited from the ability to appropriate profits through end-point royalties and 
excluding others from making, using, importing, and selling patented GM seeds for a set 
period of time, usually between fifteen and twenty years.  This has allowed GM seed 
companies to recoup investments and foster further research, organizational capability, 
and growth.  The increasingly international character of IP laws regimes is a reflection of 
widespread and integrated trade in germplasm resources as well as global trends 
toward liberalization of markets and trade, privatization, and structural adjustment that 
reduce the role of the public sector (Tripp and Byerlee, 2000). 
In the 1980s, patents entered plant breeding initially through court decisions in 
the US via association with biotechnology.  In particular, the influential 1980 Supreme 
Court decision in Diamond vs. Chakrabarty laid the legal groundwork for the 
privatization and commodification of germplasm and established the US as the global 
patent leader (Stein, 2005).  Subsequently, other developed countries offered greater 
protection to a wider array of products and processes, such as genes, traits, molecular 
constructs, and enabling technologies (Lesser and Mutschler, 2002).  The EU, however, 
introduced a breeders’ exemption into its IP laws, and some EU countries introduced a 
farmers’ privilege to avoid the pitfalls of excessively strong protection (World Bank, 
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2006).  The series of biotechnology patenting cases that followed during the 1980s and 
1990s not only greatly expanded the legal boundaries of patentable living matter, but 
also narrowed the traditional seed saving exemptions for farmers (Stein, 2005).  This 
loss of privilege generated heated debates among countries because it limits the rights 
of farmers to freely save, exchange, reuse, and sell agricultural seeds (Tansey and 
Rajotte, 2008).  In addition, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization, devised in 1994 by the US in 
conjunction with the private sector extended the global reach of IP regulation based on 
the concepts of protection and exclusion rather than dissemination and competition.  
Unlike earlier conventions, TRIPS does not merely circumscribe the range of acceptable 
policies, but obliges governments to take action to protect IP rights (Sell, 2003). 
As pressure to protect IP rights in improved varieties and ‘inventions’ increased, 
the atmosphere concerning access to and use of genetic resources became politicized.  
This was augmented with concern, particularly among developing countries, that 
inequitable global patterns were established in the distribution of benefits associated 
with the use of genetic resources.  Concurrently, there was growing concern that 
genetic diversity and local knowledge related to the use of those resources continued to 
be eroded under the pressures of modernization (Gepts, 2004).  In response, the 
international community attempted to address these tensions by creating a new regime 
for access to genetic resources and sharing the benefits associated with their use.  One 
of the most significant outcomes was the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 
which came into force in 1993.  The CBD emphasized states’ sovereign rights over their 
natural resources and addressed the rights of local and indigenous communities in this 
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respect.  Most countries have interpreted the access and benefit sharing provisions of 
the CBD as the basis for establishing much tighter procedural and substantive 
restrictions to gaining access to genetic resources within their borders (IAASTD, 2009). 
 
3.2.3 Agricultural Research and Development Investment 
Investment in agricultural R&D in the public and private sectors is a significant factor 
affecting the development of GM crops.  The full scope of public sector agricultural R&D 
covers three main areas: crops, livestock, and natural resources with more than half of 
agricultural R&D investment allocated for the development of crop technologies.  Public 
sector agricultural R&D in the US and Canada is conducted mainly in state agricultural 
experiment stations located in colleges and universities with agricultural programs and 
in federally administered, but often regionally located, laboratories.  In Asia-Pacific and 
Latin America approximately 75% of the public sector agricultural R&D is conducted by 
government agencies.  This is similar to the government agency share in 27 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  A small but growing proportion of public sector agricultural R&D in 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa is conducted by non-profit institutions.  Non-profit 
institutions are often managed by independent boards not directly under government 
control.  Many are closely linked to producer organizations from which they receive the 
large majority of their funding, typically by way of taxes levied on production or exports 
(IAASTD, 2009). 
Global public sector agricultural R&D investment increased by 22% during the 
2000-2008 period, from US$26.1 to US$31.7 billion, an average of 2.4% increase per 
annum.  Expenditures were split roughly evenly between developed (high-income) and 
developing (middle-income and low-income) countries.  Middle-income countries such 
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as China, India, and Brazil accounted for approximately 25% of global investment and 
approximately 50% of combined investment in middle-income and low-income 
countries.  Other middle-income countries (Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Nigeria, and Russia) 
also significantly increased their public sector agricultural R&D investment and 
collectively accounted for $1.2 billion or 20% of global investment (Beintema et al., 
2012).  In low-income countries, investment increased by 2.1 % per year during the 
2000-2008 period, driven largely by increases in the larger East African countries 
(Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) (Beintema and Stads, 2011).  Comparing 
public sector agricultural R&D investment across middle-income and low-income 
regions reveals that all regions increased their agricultural R&D expenditures from 2000 
to 2008.  Within regions, however, this was mostly driven by a few countries.  China and 
India accounted for more than 90% of investment in Asia-Pacific.  Likewise, 
approximately 50% of the investment in sub-Saharan Africa was driven by Nigeria, and 
approximately 33% was driven by Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda.  Argentina, Brazil, 
and Mexico accounted for 86% of Latin America’s investment.  Iran and Turkey 
accounted for 75% of investment in West Asia and North Africa.  Among the former 
Soviet States and Eastern Europe, Russia accounted for approximately 50% of 
investment (Beintema et al., 2012). 
High-income countries were an exception to the global pattern.  Public sector 
agricultural R&D investment in high-income countries has continued to decrease.  In the 
1980s, investment averaged 2% per annum, but decreased to an average of 1.1% per 
annum from 2000 to 2004, and further to an average of approximately 0% from 2005 to 
2008.  The US and Japan, with investment levels of US$4.8 and US$2.7 billion in 2008 
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respectively, accounted for 50% of public sector agricultural R&D investment among 
high-income countries from 2000 to 2008 (Fuglie and Schimmelpfennig, 2010). 
Global private sector investment in agricultural R&D increased from US$12.9 
billion in 1994 to US$18.2 billion in 2008.  Information on private sector investment in 
developing countries is limited, but some authors suggest significant growth in large 
middle-income countries.  Private sector agricultural R&D investment in India accounted 
for 19% of total investment from 2008 to 2009 (Pal et al., 2012).  In China, private sector 
investment accounted for 16% of total investment in 2006 (Hu et al., 2007).  Examining 
low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, only 2% of total agricultural R&D is 
conducted by the private-sector, most of which was conducted in South Africa.  Most 
firms in sub-Saharan Africa have few research staff with low total investment, focusing 
mainly on crop improvement research (Beintema and Stads, 2011). 
Although the vast majority of private sector agricultural R&D investment occurs in 
developed countries, many of these firms maintain experiment stations in developing 
countries in order to transfer new proprietary technologies to those markets (Fuglie et 
al., 2011).  Private sector investment in agricultural R&D in developed countries differs 
from one country to another.  In 2000, more than 80% of the total agricultural R&D 
investment in Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland was conducted by the private sector.  
In contrast, private sector shares were below 25% in Australia, Austria, Iceland, and 
Portugal that same year (Fuglie and Schimmelpfennig, 2010).  Private sector 
agricultural R&D investment in the GM seed industry has increased rapidly both in 
absolute terms and relative to public expenditures, altering the focus of R&D and of the 
crops studied.  Technological innovation in the form of modern biotechnology and 
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changes in IP rights have enabled private sector firms to capture more value from the 
GM seeds that they develop, and GM seed R&D remains the most intensive of the 
agricultural input sectors to date (Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014). 
One of the most rapidly growing areas of private sector R&D expenditure has 
been in biotechnology.  According to the OECD (2015), biotechnology R&D expenditure 
in 2013 or latest available year totaled $US42.6 billion for 28 countries, with developed 
countries accounting for the vast majority of biotechnology R&D expenditure.  In 
particular, the US share of biotechnology R&D expenditure in 2013 was $US26.9 billion 
accounting for 63% of the total biotechnology R&D expenditure (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: Private Sector Biotechnology Expenditure in 2013 or Latest Available Year 
Country Millions of $US, 2013 or latest 
available year 
Biotechnology Expenditure 
as Percentage of Global 
Biotechnology Expenditure 
United States 26893.0 63.20 
France 3267.9 7.68 
Switzerland 2560.0 6.02 
Korea 1354.4 3.18 
Japan 1230.1 2.89 
Germany 1201.8 2.82 
Denmark 1082.2 2.54 
Spain 756.6 1.78 
Belgium 660.8 1.55 
Netherlands 420.2 0.99 
Sweden 411.7 0.97 
Israel 400.5 0.94 
Italy 395.3 0.93 
Ireland 380.9 0.90 
Canada 308.4 0.72 
Austria 159.7 0.38 
Czech Republic 140.6 0.33 
Norway 137.2 0.32 
Russian Federation 135.3 0.32 
Australia 120.5 0.28 
Finland 111.3 0.26 
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Poland 104.7 0.25 
Mexico 93.9 0.22 
South Africa 69.6 0.16 
Slovenia 69.3 0.16 
Portugal 41.8 0.10 
Estonia 33.3 0.08 
Slovak Republic 10.5 0.02 
Source: OECD, 2015 
 
3.2.4 Concentration and Centralization in the Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
In the context of newly emerging IP rights and the development of biotechnology there 
has been greater concentration and centralization among GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations.  Concentration in the chemical industry began with the development of 
chemical firms into multinational corporations.  This is best illustrated by the emergence 
of DuPont from its humble beginnings in the early 1800s to its current position as a 
leading multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporation (see DuPont, 2015).  
Centralization followed as multinational chemical corporations began to acquire family-
owned seed companies to capitalize on the synergies between chemical and seed 
inputs (Falcon and Fowler, 2002).  These processes intensified throughout the 1990s as 
a result of extreme vertical integration of the seed and biotechnology industries followed 
by a horizontal integration of the agriculture and pharmaceutical industries into life 
sciences companies (Hayenga, 1998).  A handful of vertically coordinated firms have 
been the key players in ushering in the biotechnology revolution in agriculture in the US 
and other countries.  Agrochemical corporations, such as Monsanto and Syngenta, 
which had no expertise in either biotechnology or plant breeding, began to massively 
invest in developing GM varieties by recruiting new staff and merging with or acquiring 
seed companies that had experience in plant breeding and the commercialization of 
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seeds.  Between 1995 and 1998, approximately 68 seed companies in the US were 
either acquired by or entered into joint ventures with the top six multinational 
corporations (King, 2001). 
Vertical integration has been driven by: (1) the stagnation of the agrochemical 
sector; (2) the changing knowledge base and innovations in chemistry and 
biotechnology; and (3) the policy environment, such as increased regulations (Falcon 
and Fowler, 2002; Hayenga, 1998).  Srinivasan’s (2004) analysis of thirty countries 
identified a high degree of concentration in the ownership of plant variety rights for six 
major crops at the national level in the developed world.  Liberalized foreign investment 
policies and multinational structures have allowed agribusiness companies to conduct 
upstream research with local seed companies providing the crop varieties developed for 
specific geographical markets.  For developing countries, this concentration has 
implications for (1) the structure and autonomy of their domestic seed industries; (2) 
their access to protected varieties; and (3) the use of important breeding technologies. 
The outcome of the increasing concentration and centralization in the agricultural 
biotechnology industry has had mixed social, economic, and environmental effects in 
both developed and developing countries, with the differences caused in part by the 
technology adopted, the structure of farming, the organization of GM seed markets, and 
the regulatory and institutional contexts (Fukuda-Parr, 2007).  For example, agricultural 
liberalization in East Africa has led to an increase in the number of seed companies and 
varieties on the market, but this has not led to an increase of maize yields or production 
per capita since the mid-1980s (De Groote et al., 2005).  Also, the top 10 agribusiness 
companies based in the US, Europe, and Japan and representing half of the world’s 
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commercial seed sales increased their control of biotechnology patents to over 50% in 
2000 (Pray et al., 2005).  Some authors have suggested that we are seeing the 
beginning of the negative impacts on innovation and competition through increased 
concentration and centralization in the private sector (Brennan et al., 2005).  This may 
be illustrated by the decreasing trend in the number of granted plant technology patents 
in the US from 2002 to 2015 (see Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1: Number of Plant Technology Patents Granted in the US 
 
Source: USPTO, 2016 
Given greater concentration and centralization in the agricultural biotechnology 
industry, a handful of multinational corporations have emerged as the global leaders 
(See Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Top 12 GM Seed and Agrochemical Corporations by Country 
Country Corporation 
Denmark DLF-Trifolium 
France Groupe Limagrain 
Germany BASF, Bayer, KWS SAAT SE 
Japan Sakata, Takii 
Switzerland Syngenta 
US Dow, DuPont, Land O’Lakes, Monsanto 
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BASF is based in Ludwigshafen, Germany and is organized into five segments: 
chemicals, performance products, functional materials, agriculture, and oil and gas.  
Since 2007, BASF Plant Science has collaborated with Monsanto in plant biotechnology 
focusing on development of high-yielding and stress-tolerant crops.  BASF Crop 
Protection started research in nitrogen management, water management, and biological 
crop protection, announcing the formation of Functional Crop Care in 2011.  With the 
2012 acquisition of Becker Underwood, BASF established Functional Crop Care as a 
global business unit to become a leading global provider of biological seed treatment 
and enhancement, and biological crop protection products.  The company has 
approximately 113,000 employees globally including approximately 10,700 in R&D.  
Research is conducted with more than 600 universities, research institutes, and 
companies globally including approximately 3000 research projects.  In 2014, BASF 
R&D expenditure was approximately USD$2.1 billion with 27% or USD$575.1 million 
allocated to plant biotechnology.  Reported sales in 2014 were approximately USD$8.3 
billion with 7% or USD$581 million in agriculture.  Net income in 2014 was 
approximately USD$5.8 billion (BASF, 2015). 
Bayer is a global firm based in Leverkusen, Germany with core competencies in 
the areas of health care, agriculture, and high-tech polymer materials.  Bayer Crop 
Science is organized in two operating segments: Crop Protection Seeds and 
Environmental Science.  Crop Protection/Seeds markets a portfolio of high-value GM 
seeds and traits along with chemical and biological pest management solutions, at the 
same time providing extensive customer service to the agriculture industry.  
Environmental Science focuses on non-agricultural applications, with a broad portfolio 
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of pest control products and services for areas ranging from the home and garden 
sector to forestry.  Bayer collaborates with universities, public research institutes, and 
partner companies (e.g., MS Technologies, Syngenta).  The company has 
approximately 119,000 employees globally including approximately 14,000 in R&D.  At 
the end of 2014, Bayer owned approximately 68,200 valid patent applications and 
patents globally relating to some 8,300 protected inventions.  In 2014, Bayer R&D 
expenditure was approximately USD$4 billion with 25% or USD$1 billion allocated to 
Bayer Crop Science.  Reported sales in 2014 were approximately USD$47.4 billion with 
22% or USD$10.4 billion in Bayer Crop Science.  Net income in 2014 was 
approximately USD$2.8 billion (Bayer, 2015). 
Dow is based in Michigan, US specializing in chemical, advanced materials, 
agro-sciences, and plastics.  The Agricultural Sciences segment provides crop 
protection and GM seed and plant biotechnology products and technologies, urban pest 
management, and healthy oils.  The business invents, develops, manufactures and 
markets products for use in agricultural, industrial, and commercial pest management, 
and food service.  Agricultural Sciences has significant technology-driven growth, led by 
plant biotechnology traits and crop protection products that utilize proprietary 
formulations.  As a result, patents, trademarks, licenses, and registrations are used to 
protect investment in germplasm, traits, and proprietary chemistries and formulations.  
Dow also licenses plant biotechnology traits from third parties and engages in research 
collaborations with global industry, universities, and governments.  The company has 
approximately 53,000 employees globally.  Dow owns 4,210 active US patents and 
17,311 active foreign patents with 855 in Agricultural Science. In 2014, Dow R&D 
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expenditure was approximately USD$1.6 billion.  Reported sales in 2014 were 
approximately USD$58.2 billion with 13% or USD$7.3 billion in Agricultural Science.  
Net income in 2014 was approximately USD$3.4 billion (Dow, 2015). 
DuPont is based in Delaware, US and consists of 12 businesses which are 
aggregated into seven segments in agriculture, electronics and communications, 
industrial biosciences, nutrition and health, performance chemicals, performance 
materials, and safety and protection. Agriculture businesses, DuPont Pioneer and 
DuPont Crop Protection, deliver products and services that are specifically targeted to 
achieve gains in crop yields and productivity, including Pioneer brand GM seed 
products and well-established brands of insecticides, fungicides, and herbicides.  The 
company has approximately 63,000 employees globally.  DuPont owns more than 
27,000 patents and 16,500 patent applications.  In 2014, Dow R&D expenditure was 
approximately USD$2 billion with 50% or USD$1 billion allocated to agriculture.  
Reported sales in 2014 were approximately USD$34.7 billion with 33% or USD$11.3 
billion in agriculture.  Net income in 2014 was approximately USD$3.6 billion (DuPont, 
2015). 
Monsanto is based in Missouri, US and is a global provider of agricultural 
products for farmers such as GM seeds, biotechnology traits, herbicides, and precision 
agriculture products.  The company is organized in two segments: genomics and 
agricultural productivity.  The GM seeds and genomics segment produces leading GM 
seed brands, including DEKALB, Asgrow, Deltapine, Seminis, and De Ruiter, and 
develops biotechnology traits that assist farmers in controlling insects and weeds. 
Monsanto also provides other GM seed companies with genetic material for their GM 
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seed brands.  The company has approximately 27,000 employees globally.  In 2014, 
Monsanto R&D expenditure was approximately USD$1.7 billion.  Reported sales in 
2014 were approximately USD$15.9 billion.  Net income in 2014 was approximately 
USD$2.7 billion (Monsanto, 2015a). 
Syngenta is based in Basel, Switzerland and is an agriculture company with 
businesses producing herbicides, insecticides, and fungicides for crop protection, field 
crops, vegetables and flower seeds, seed care products, turf, garden, home care, and 
public health products.  The company has a 141 R&D facilities in Switzerland, UK, US, 
China, and India.  The company has approximately 29,000 employees globally.  In 
2014, Syngenta R&D expenditure was approximately USD$1.4 billion.  Reported sales 
in 2014 were approximately USD$15.1 billion.  Net income in 2014 was approximately 
USD$1.8 billion (Syngenta, 2015).  The total investment in agricultural biotechnology 
R&D by the leading firms in 2014 was approximately USD$7.3 billion, with total sales of 
approximately USD$60.6 billion, and net income of USD$20.1 billion. 
In 1996, the top 11 GM seed companies (Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Groupe 
Limagrain, Land O’Lakes, KWS SAAT SE, Dow, Sakata, DLF-Trifolium, Takii) 
accounted for 37% of the world’s GM seed market.  In 2009, the top three GM seed 
companies in the world (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta) accounted for 23%, 14%, 
and 8% respectively totaling 45% of the global proprietary GM seed market, and GM 
seed revenues of approximately US$7.3 billion, US$4.6 billion, and US$2.5 billion 
respectively totaling US$14.4 billion.  Monsanto, which emerged as the largest player in 
the industry, controlled 23% of the global proprietary GM seed market, and an 
estimated 87% of the total land area planted with GM seeds was planted with Monsanto 
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products either directly or indirectly through licences to other companies.  In terms of 
proprietary GM seed revenues, in 2009 sales for the top 11 companies were: US$19.7 
billion (62%) of the US$32 billion global proprietary seed market, and the top three 
companies controlled US$14.5 billion (45%).  Monsanto controlled US$7.3 billion (23%) 
of the US$32 billion global proprietary GM seed market (Peekhaus, 2013, 42-44).  As of 
2013, the world’s top three GM seed companies, Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta 
accounted for 26%, 21%, and 8% respectively or 55% collectively of the global 
proprietary GM seed market, while the top three agrochemical companies, Syngenta, 
Bayer, and BASF accounted for 20%, 18%, and 13% respectively or 51% collectively of 
the global agrochemical market.  Collectively, the top six companies: Monsanto, 
DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF accounted for 65% of the global proprietary 
GM seed market, and 75% of the global agrochemical market with sales of GM seeds, 
agrochemicals, and GM traits exceeding $65 billion per annum (ETC Group, 2015). 
 
3.3 The Global Adoption of GM Crops 
 
3.3.1 GM Crop Field Trials 
While the rapid adoption and production of GM crops is the fulfillment of R&D efforts, 
benchmarks include the number of GM crop field trials.  GM crop field trials are an 
important indicator of the global adoption of agricultural biotechnology.  These trials are 
an essential early step in bringing agricultural biotechnology to commercial markets.  
From 1986 to 1995, a total of 3,647 field trials were conducted in 34 countries (see 
Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3: Global Number of GM Crop Field Trials by Country from 1986 to 1995 
Country Number of field trials 
Argentina 78 
Australia 46 
Belgium 97 
Belize 5 
Bolivia 6 
Bulgaria 3 
Canada 486 
Chile 39 
China 60 
Costa Rica 17 
Cuba 18 
Denmark 16 
Egypt 2 
Finland 10 
France 253 
Germany 49 
Guatemala 3 
Hungary 22 
Italy 69 
Japan 25 
Mexico 38 
New Zealand 15 
Norway 1 
Portugal 5 
Russia 11 
South Africa 22 
Spain 30 
Sweden 18 
Switzerland 2 
Thailand 2 
The Netherlands 113 
United Kingdom  133 
United States 1,952 
Zimbabwe 1 
Total 3,647 
Source: James and Krattiger, 1996 
By 2000, more than 11,000 field trials were conducted using 81 GM crops (see Table 
3.4).  
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Table 3.4: GM Crop Field Trials by Crop and Region from 1986 to 2000 
GM crop US and 
Canada 
Europe, Australia, 
New Zealand, and 
Japan 
Developing 
Countries 
Total 
Corn 2749 452 680 3881 
Canola 826 366 50 1242 
Potato 770 227 91 1088 
Soybean 552 20 210 782 
Cotton 407 72 244 723 
Tomato 494 89 71 654 
Sugar beet 118 237 39 394 
Tobacco 197 63 53 313 
Wheat 190 23 19 232 
Rice 102 36 51 189 
Other 1087 316 207 1610 
Total 7492 1901 1715 11108 
Source: Pray and Naseem, 2007 
Following many field trials, GM crops are granted regulatory approval for 
commercial use as food, feed or for environmental release.  As of October 2014, a total 
of 38 countries have granted regulatory approvals.  From these countries, 3,083 
regulatory approvals have been issued for 27 GM crops and 357 GM events.  1,458 are 
for food use (direct or processing), 958 for feed use (direct or processing) and 667 for 
environmental release or planting.  Japan has the most number of approvals (201), 
followed by the US (171), and Canada (155) (see Figure 3.2).  
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Figure 3.2: Number of GM Crop Regulatory Approvals for Commercial Use by Country 
from 1994 to 2014 
 
Source: ISB, 2015 
Regulatory approvals for commercial use have been attributed to several interrelated 
factors including: government policies and institutional frameworks that support the 
development of agricultural biotechnology, a scientific structure and on-going 
investment in agricultural biotechnology R&D, the regulation of GM seed markets and 
the enforcement of IP rights, and increasingly competitive global markets amidst 
stagnating agricultural sectors and output (Fukuda-Parr, 2007). 
 
3.3.2 GM Crops by Country and Crop 
The global adoption of GM crops has increased at an annual rate of between 3% and 
4% from 1.66 million hectares in 1996 to 181.5 million hectares (approximately 10% of 
global cropland) in 2014 making GM crops the fastest adopted crop technology in the 
modern era (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3: Global Area of GM Crops in Millions of Hectares from 1996 to 2014
 
Sources: James, 2011, 2013, 2014, 2015 
In 2014, there were 28 countries (where more than 60% of the world’s population 
reside) that adopted GM crops.  Among developed countries, the US is the leading 
grower with 73.1 million hectares in maize, soybean, cotton, canola, sugar beet, alfalfa, 
papaya, and wheat, followed by Canada with 11.6 million hectares in canola, maize, 
soybean, and sugar beet.  Among developing countries, Brazil followed by Argentina 
are the leading growers with 42.2 million hectares and 24.3 million hectares respectively 
in soybean, maize, and cotton.  India grows 11.6 million hectares in cotton and China 
grows 3.9 million hectares in cotton, papaya, poplar, tomato, and sweet pepper (see 
Table 3.5).  
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Table 3.5: Global Area of GM Crops in Millions of Hectares by Country in 2014 
Rank Country Area 
(million 
hectares) 
GM Crops 
1 US 73.1 Maize, soybean, cotton, canola, sugar beet, 
alfalfa, papaya, squash 
2 Brazil 42.2 Soybean, maize, cotton 
3 Argentina 24.3 Soybean, maize, cotton 
4 India 11.6 Cotton 
5 Canada 11.6 Canola, maize, soybean, sugar beet 
6 China 3.9 Cotton, papaya, poplar, tomato, sweet pepper 
7 Paraguay 3.9 Soybean, maize, cotton 
8 Pakistan 2.9 Cotton 
9 South Africa 2.7 Maize, soybean, cotton 
10 Uruguay 1.6 Soybean, maize 
11 Bolivia 1.0 Soybean 
12 Philippines 0.8 Maize 
13 Australia 0.5 Cotton, canola 
14 Burkina Faso 0.5 Cotton 
15 Myanmar 0.3 Cotton 
16 Mexico 0.2 Cotton, soybean 
17 Spain  0.1 Maize 
18 Colombia 0.1 Cotton, maize 
19 Sudan 0.1 Cotton 
20 Honduras <0.05 Maize 
21 Chile <0.05 Maize, soybean, canola 
22 Portugal <0.05 Maize 
23 Cuba  <0.05 Maize 
24 Czech 
Republic 
<0.05 Maize3 
25 Romania <0.05 Maize 
26 Slovakia <0.05 Maize 
27 Costa Rica <0.05 Cotton, soybean 
28 Bangladesh <0.05 Brinjal (eggplant) 
Source: James, 2015 
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A location quotient is (LQ = 
𝑋
𝑌
𝑋′
𝑌′
 ) a useful way of quantifying GM cropland area relative 
to total cropland area.  Assuming X is the amount of GM cropland area in a particular 
country, and Y is the total amount of cropland area in the same country, X/Y is then the 
over- or under-representation of GM cropland in a given country relative to global 
patterns.  Also, assuming X’ is the amount of GM cropland area globally and Y’ is the 
amount of cropland area globally, then the LQ or the relative concentration of GM 
cropland in one country to the globe is (X/Y)/(X’/Y’).  When the location quotient equals 
1, this indicates that GM cropland area is equally concentrated relative to total cropland 
area in the country and the globe, while a location quotient of less than 1 indicates that 
GM cropland area is less concentrated relative to total cropland area in the country and 
the globe, and a location quotient of more than 1 indicates that GM cropland area is 
more concentrated relative to total cropland area in the country and the globe.  For 
example, a location quotient for GM crops of 1.50, 1.48, and 1.47 for Paraguay, the US, 
and Canada respectively indicates that in these countries GM cropland area is more 
concentrated relative to total cropland area in the country and the globe whereas a 
location quotient for GM crops of 0.01, 0.02, and 0.03 for Australia, Mexico, and Spain 
respectively indicates that in these countries GM cropland area is less concentrated 
relative to total cropland area in the country and the globe.  Also, while in absolute 
terms GM cropland area for both Canada and India is 11.6 million hectares, the location 
quotient is 1.47 for Canada and 0.53 for India which indicates a much greater 
concentration of GM cropland relative to total cropland area in Canada than India (see 
Table 3.6). 
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Table 3.6: Location Quotient for GM Crops 
Country GM crop 
area in 
millions of 
hectares (X) 
Crop area 
in millions 
of hectares 
(Y) 
Global GM 
crop area in 
millions of 
hectares (X') 
Global crop 
area in 
millions of 
hectares (Y') 
LQ 
US 73.1 408.7 181.5 1500 1.47818 
Brazil 42.2 275.6 181.5 1500 1.265458 
Argentina 24.3 149.3 181.5 1500 1.34512 
India 11.6 179.6 181.5 1500 0.533785 
Canada 11.6 65.3 181.5 1500 1.468113 
China 3.9 514.6 181.5 1500 0.062634 
Paraguay 3.9 21.5 181.5 1500 1.499135 
Pakistan 2.9 36.1 181.5 1500 0.663904 
South Africa 2.7 96.8 181.5 1500 0.230517 
Uruguay 1.6 14.2 181.5 1500 0.931207 
Bolivia 1 37.6 181.5 1500 0.2198 
Philippines 0.8 12.4 181.5 1500 0.533191 
Australia 0.5 405.5 181.5 1500 0.01019 
Burkina Faso 0.5 12.1 181.5 1500 0.341507 
Myanmar 0.3 12.5 181.5 1500 0.198347 
Mexico 0.2 106.7 181.5 1500 0.015491 
Spain 0.1 26.9 181.5 1500 0.030723 
Sources: James, 2015; Helgilibrary, 2016 
 
3.3.3 Economic Impacts of Adopting GM Crops 
Many farm-level empirical studies about the economic impacts of adopting GM crops 
exist (see, for example, Barrows et al., 2013; Brookes and Barfoot, 2013; Gouse et al., 
2004; 2006; IFPRI, 2009; Kathage and Qaim, 2012; Pray et al., 2002; Qaim, 2009; 
Qaim and de Janvry 2003; Yorobe and Quicoy, 2006).  The primary impact of GM HT 
(largely tolerant to the broad spectrum herbicide glyphosate) technology has been to 
provide more cost effective and easier weed control for farmers.  Also, some users of 
this technology have also derived higher yields from better weed control (relative to 
weed control obtained from conventional technology).  The main source of additional 
production from this technology has been through the facilitation of no tillage production 
151 
systems, therefore shortening the production cycle.  The primary impact of GM IR 
(engineered to resist insects) technology has been the lowering of the levels of pest 
damage and hence delivering higher yields.  Also, additional cost savings are derived 
from a significant decrease in the use of pesticides.  One of the earliest analysis from 
the IFPRI (2009) provided a summary of 67 studies that showed predominantly positive 
economic impacts for farmers that adopted GM cotton in China (studies on other GM 
crops and countries were included, but GM cotton in China dominated the literature); 
however, the magnitude of the economic advantages varied widely according to the 
cropping season, geographical location, length of the period over which adoption and 
impacts were observed, and the particular point along the adoption path that was 
analyzed.  Also, Qaim’s (2009) summary of several studies that investigated yield and 
gross margin impacts when switching from conventional crops to GM cotton and GM 
maize found that GM cotton increased yields by 37%, 33%, 24%, and 22%, and gross 
margins by US$135, US$23, US$470, and US$91, in India, Argentina, China, and 
South Africa respectively, and GM maize increased yields by 34%, 11%, and 9%, and 
gross margins by US$53, US$42, and US$20, in the Philippines, South Africa, and 
Argentina respectively.  In a more recent study, Barrows et al. (2013) examined yield 
gains on the intensive margin (plots switching from conventional to GM crops) and the 
extensive margin (new plots entering production).  In 2010, the authors found that GM 
crops increased the supply of maize between 10% and 16%, cotton between 15% and 
20%, and soybean between 2% and 39%.  Yield increases can be translated into price 
effects given a range of estimated elasticity of supply and demand (see de Gorter & 
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Zilberman 1990).  Accordingly, these supply impacts translate into 13% to 27% lower 
maize prices, 19% to 33% lower cotton prices, and 2% to 65% lower soybean prices. 
More recent analysis by Brookes and Barfoot (2013) found an increase of 
US$19.8 billion in 2011 and US$98.2 billion from 1996 to 2011 in farm incomes globally 
from adopting GM maize, cotton, canola, and soybean.  The largest gains in farm 
incomes in 2011 were in the maize sector, largely from yield gains.  Cumulatively since 
1996, GM maize has added nearly US$30 billion to the income of farmers globally.  
Substantial gains have also arisen in the cotton sector through a combination of higher 
yields and lower costs.  Cotton farm income levels in GM adopting countries increased 
by US$6.73 in 2011 and US$32.5 billion from 1996 to 2011.  Significant increases to 
farm incomes have also resulted in the soybean and canola sectors.  GM soybeans 
increased farm incomes by US$3.89 billion in 2011, and $32.2 billion from 1996 to 
2011.  In the canola sector (largely North American) an additional US$3.1 billion has 
been generated from 1996 to 2011 (see Table 3.7). 
Table 3.7: Global Farm Income Increases in Million US$ from Adopting GM Crops from 
1996 to 2011 
GM Crop Farm 
income 
increase in 
2011 
Farm 
income 
increase 
from 1996 to 
2011 
Farm income 
increase in 2011 as 
percentage of total 
value of 
production of 
these crops in GM 
adopting countries 
Farm income 
increase in 2011 
as percentage of 
total value of 
global 
production of 
crop 
Soybean 3,879.2  32,211.9  3.8  3.2  
Corn  8,645.1 29,974.2 8.3 4 
Cotton  6,726.5 32,48.73 15.1 11.9 
Canola  433.2  3,131.4  1.4  1.2  
Other 83.3  412.0  N/a N/a 
Total 19,767.3  98,216.8  6.3  5.9  
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
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Farm income benefits may be summarized in key GM crop adopting countries (see 
Table 3.8). 
Table 3.8: Global Farm Income Increases in Million US$ from Adopting GM Crops by 
Country and Crop from 1996 to 2011 
Country Corn Soybean Cotton Canola Total 
Argentina 891.20 12624.6 451.30 N/a 13,967.10 
Australia N/a N/a 583.80 27.5 611.30 
Bolivia N/a 327 N/a N/a 327.00 
Brazil 2,228.40 4314.5 102.50 N/a 6,645.40 
Burma N/a N/a 338.70 N/a 338.70 
Canada 887.20 231.6 N/a 2862.5 3,981.30 
China N/a N/a 13,067.80 N/a 13,067.80 
Colombia 30.10 N/a 28.60 N/a 58.70 
India N/a N/a 12,579.50 N/a 12,579.50 
Mexico N/a 4.9 175.30 N/a 180.20 
Pakistan N/a N/a 334.20 N/a 334.20 
Paraguay N/a 732.4 N/a N/a 732.40 
Philippines 264.40 N/a N/a N/a 264.40 
Romania N/a 44.6 N/a N/a 44.60 
South Africa 891.10 7 34.60 N/a 932.70 
Spain 139.10 N/a N/a N/a 139.10 
Uruguay 11.70 83.4 N/a N/a 95.10 
US 24,607.80 13835.9 4,694.20 241.5 43,379.40 
Other EU Countries  16.20 N/a N/a N/a 16.20 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
In terms of the cost farmers pay for accessing GM technology across the four main GM 
crops, the total cost in 2011 was equal to 21% of the total technology gains, inclusive of 
farm income gains plus cost of the technology payable to the GM seed supply chain 
(see Table 3.9).  
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Table 3.9: Global Cost of Accessing GM Technology in Million US$ Relative to the Total 
Farm Income in 2011 
GM crop Cost of 
technology 
Farm income 
gain 
Total benefit of technology to 
farmers and GM seed supply 
chain 
Soybean 1,647.60 3,879.20 5,526.80 
Corn 2476.2 1707.1 4183.3 
Cotton 1071.6 7538.1 8609.7 
Canola 140.20 6,559.60 6,699.80 
Other 71.10 83.30 154.40 
Total 5,406.70 19,767.30 25,174.00 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
 
3.3.4 US Leads and Canada Follows 
US government policies have strongly favoured the use of GM crops.  Significant levels 
of public funding for biotechnology research that maintain the required administrative 
infrastructure have been committed.  The federal government, through the Agricultural 
Research Service (ARS) of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) spends well over 
US$125 million per annum on plant biotechnology.  The US GM seed market is 
supported by large crop improvement efforts shared by four institutions: government 
(ARS/USDA), state agricultural experiment stations (SAESs), private companies, and 
universities (private and public).  Before commercialization, all agricultural 
biotechnology products (mostly GM crops) must conform to standards set by state and 
federal statutes (Fernandez-Cornejo and Caswell, 2006; USDA and APHIS, 2013). 
Under the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, federal 
oversight is shared by the USDA, the US Environmental Protection Agency, and the US 
Food and Drug Administration.  The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) plays a central role in regulating field trials of GM crops.  GM cops that 
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meet six specific criteria undergo an administratively streamlined process known as a 
notification.  Under a notification, applicants provide information on the nature of the 
plant and introduced genes, descriptions of genetic modifications, size of the 
introduction, and origin and destinations for movement or the location of a field trial.  For 
GM crops that do not meet the criteria for a notification, a permit is required.  This 
process involves a more comprehensive review.  In addition to the data required for a 
notification, permit applicants must describe how they will perform the field trial, 
including specific measures to reduce the risk of harm to other plants, so the tested 
organisms remain confined and do not persist after completion of the field trial.  
Following either a notification or permit, APHIS issues authorizations for field releases 
of those GM crops that are categorized as ‘regulated articles’ allowing an applicant to 
pursue field trials.  Following field trials, an applicant may petition APHIS for a 
‘determination of nonregulated status’ to allow commercialization of the product.  Once 
APHIS issues a determination of nonregulated status the GM crop is no longer 
considered a regulated article and can be moved and planted without APHIS oversight 
(USDA and APHIS, 2012). 
The number of field release notifications and permits issued by APHIS increased 
from 4 in 1985 to a peak of 1,194 in 2002 and then decreased to 558 in 2014 (see 
Figure 3.4).  
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Figure 3.4: Number of Approved Field Trials in the US from 1985 to 2014
 
Source: ISB, 2015 
A notification and permit may include many release sites and authorize many different 
gene constructs (ways that the gene of interest is packaged with other elements) to be 
tested at each site.  Therefore, while the number of APHIS notifications and permits 
peaked in 2002, a more comprehensive measure of the amount of R&D activity in 
agricultural biotechnology includes the number of authorized sites and authorized 
constructs, which have increased very rapidly since 2006 (see Table 3.10). 
Table 3.10: Number of Notifications and Permits, Authorized Sites, and Authorized 
Constructs Approved by APHIS from 1989 to 2012 
Year Notifications and 
Permits 
Authorized Sites Authorized Constructs 
1989 30 12 74 
1990 51 14 142 
1991 90 10 226 
1992 160 121 427 
1993 301 455 870 
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1994 579 1669 1926 
1995 711 3690 2666 
1996 612 2745 2305 
1997 763 3427 2650 
1998 1071 4781 2830 
1999 983 4134 3502 
2000 925 3836 3126 
2001 1083 5831 3208 
2002 1194 5111 3234 
2003 813 2910 2650 
2004 893 4523 2851 
2005 955 4939 3042 
2006 865 4327 18532 
2007 932 3623 63217 
2008 871 7744 125365 
2009 751 6751 217502 
2010 660 6626 297422 
2011 792 10128 395501 
2012 665 9133 469202 
Source: Fernandez-Cornejo et al., 2014 
In 2014, the top holder of notifications and permits among the top ten firms and 
institutions in the US was Monsanto with 7,032 or 63% followed by Pioneer with 1160 or 
10%.  Private sector firms held 10,546 or 94.5%, the USDA/ARS held 395 or 3.6%, and 
the University of Florida held 211 or 2% (see Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5: Number of Issued Notifications and Permits Held by Firms and Institutions 
in the US in 2014 
 
Source: ISB, 2015 
The US regulatory model for biotechnology has been employed in Canada, as 
well as other countries such as Mexico and Australia.  The focus of the Canadian model 
has been on competitiveness and regulatory intervention.  The model employs product-
based regulations within existing vertical regulatory jurisdictions, where supplemental 
regulations or guidelines have been developed to deal with new concerns and risks 
associated with novel organisms and products.  Furthermore, regulatory decision-
making employs the reasonably certain interpretation of the precautionary principal and 
there are a limited number of actors that directly influence regulatory decision-making 
(Isaac et al., 2001). 
In 1993, the Canadian Federal Regulatory Framework for the regulation of 
biotechnology products was announced by the Canadian government.  The framework 
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is intended to ensure that the benefits of biotechnology products and processes are 
realized in a way that protects health, safety, and the environment.  One of the key 
principles adopted by the regulatory departments includes the use of existing laws and 
regulatory departments.  Regulatory authority for food products derived from 
biotechnology falls under several federal departments and agencies.  Health Canada is 
responsible for assessing the human health safety of products derived through 
biotechnology including foods, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and pest control 
products.  The CFIA shares responsibility for the regulation of products derived from 
biotechnology including plants, animal feeds, fertilizers, and veterinary biologics.  For 
GM crops, the CFIA assesses the potential risk of adverse environmental effects, 
authorizes and oversees import permits, confined trials, unconfined release, and variety 
registration.  In 1994, the Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods were 
published by Health Canada.  The guidelines are based on internationally accepted 
principles for establishing the safety of foods derived from GMOs, and were developed 
in consultation with other government agencies, consumers, and industry.  In 2006, 
Health Canada revised the guidelines to reflect the advancement of methods and 
knowledge regarding product review (Health Canada, 2012). 
In Canada, novel foods are defined in The Novel Foods Regulation as products 
that have never been used as a food; foods which result from a process that has not 
previously been used for food; or, foods that have been modified by genetic 
manipulation.  This last category of foods have been described as GM foods, genetically 
engineered foods or biotechnology-derived foods.  Health Canada is responsible for 
ensuring that all foods, including those derived from biotechnology, are safe prior to 
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their entering into the Canadian food system.  The Novel Foods Regulation requires that 
notification be made to the Health Products and Food Branch by the company who 
wants to sell the product prior to the marketing or advertising of a novel food.  Pre-
market notification permits Health Canada to conduct a thorough safety assessment of 
all biotechnology-derived foods to demonstrate that a novel food is safe and nutritious 
before it is allowed in the Canadian marketplace (Health Canada, 2012). 
From 1994 to 2014, Health Canada approved 184 novel foods (see Table 3.11).  
Table 3.11: Number of Approved Novel Food Decisions by Health Canada from 1994 to 
2014 
 
Source: Health Canada, 2015 
In 2014, the top holder of approved novel food decisions among the top 24 firms in 
Canada was Monsanto with 39, followed by BASF with 17, and Pioneer with 13.  Private 
sector firms held 181 or 98% of approved novel food decisions, Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada held 1, the University of Saskatchewan held 1, and the University of 
British Columbia held 1 (see Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6: Number of Approved Novel Food Decisions by Health Canada by Firm from 
1994 to 2014 
 
Source: Health Canada, 2015 
Four GM crops are grown in Canada: canola, corn, soybean, and sugar beet 
(see Table 3.12).  
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Table 3.12: Canadian Area of Conventional and GM crops in Thousands of Hectares by 
Crop from 2007 to 2012 
Crop Area 
(hectares in 
thousands) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Corn for grain 1,391.50 1,204.00 1,203.50 1,214.30 1,217.70 1,472.40 
Fodder corn 246.4 244.9 312.2 244.6 205.9 230.7 
Total corn 1,637.90 1,448.90 1,515.70 1,458.90 1,423.60 1,703.10 
GM corn  636.7 632.6 743 795.1 811.3 1,201.40 
GM corn  as percent 
of total 
39% 44% 49% 54% 57% 71% 
Soybean 1,180.10 1,211.30 1,395.30 1,483.00 1,549.90 1,746.50 
GM soybean 529.7 604.7 604.6 658.1 742.3 1,130.10 
GM soybean as 
percent of total 
45% 50% 43% 44% 48% 65% 
Canola 5,959.50 6,398.90 6,555.80 6,806.10 7,633.20 8,608.70 
GM canola  4,767.60 5,119.10 5,244.60 5,444.90 6,106.60 8,178.30 
GM canola as 
percent of total 
80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 95% 
Source: Evans and Lupescu, 2012 
GM sugar beet has been planted in Canada since 2008.  Production is concentrated in 
Taber, Alberta where Canada’s only sugar beet processing plant is located.  In 2010, 
96% of the sugar beet crop (approximately 13,000 ha) was GM sugar beet (Evans and 
Lupescu, 2012). Currently, I am not aware of any published analysis of the economic 
impact of GM sugar beet in Canada. 
Most of Canada’s canola production is centered in the western provinces of 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba.  Approximately 15% of the Canadian canola 
crop is consumed in Canada in various forms.  The remainder 85% of GM canola seed, 
oil, and meal are exported to destinations such as the US, Japan, Mexico, and China 
(Evans and Lupescu, 2012).  The commercialization of herb-tolerant canola began in 
1996 and by 2014 farmers planted 8 million hectares accounting for 95% of all the 
canola grown in Canada and 69% of all GM crops. 
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The overall impact on profitability from adopting GM canola (inclusive of yield 
improvements and higher quality) has been an increase of between CDN$22/ha and 
CDN$74/ha.  The annual total national farm income benefit from using the technology 
has risen from $6 million in 1996 to $404 million in 2011.  The cumulative farm income 
benefit over the 1996-2011 period was $2.86 billion (see Table 3.13). 
Table 3.13: Farm Level Income Impact from Adopting GM Canola in Canada from 1996 
to 2011 
Year Cost 
savings 
in 
CDN$/ha 
Cost saving 
inclusive of 
cost of 
technology 
in CDN$/ha 
Net cost 
saving/increase 
in gross 
margins in 
CDN$/ha 
Increase in 
farm income 
at a national 
level in 
million CDN$ 
Increase in 
national 
farm 
income as 
percent of 
farm level 
value of 
national 
production 
1996 28.59 -4.13 45.11 6.23 0.4 
1997 28.08 -4.05 37.11 21.69 1.17 
1998 26.21 -3.78 36.93 70.18 3.43 
1999 26.32 -3.79 30.63 90.33 5.09 
2000 26.32 -3.79 22.42 59.91 5.08 
2001 25.15 -1.62 23.1 53.34 5.69 
2002 24.84 -3.59 29.63 61.86 6.17 
2003 28.04 -4.05 41.42 132.08 6.69 
2004 21.42 4.44 19.09 70.72 4.48 
2005 23.11 4.5 32.9 148.12 6.56 
2006 34.02 16.93 50.71 233.13 8.09 
2007 35.44 17.46 66.39 341.44 7.54 
2008 35.53 17.39 64.76 361.7 6.36 
2009 37.76 17.99 63.62 369.7 7.32 
2010 35.15 16.36 73.99 448.27 6.11 
2011 43.32 25.35 56.79 404.33 4.99 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
GM corn has also been grown commercially in Canada since 1996.  In 2011 it 
accounted for 70% of the 1.2 million ha of corn grown in Canada.  Traditionally, Quebec 
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and Ontario are the primary corn-growing regions, accounting for 86 percent of total 
Canadian corn.  In Quebec, 74% of the total corn crop was GM corn in 2012, up from 47 
percent in 2007, while in Ontario 75% of the total corn crop was GM corn in 2012, up 
from 41 percent in 2007.  More recently there has also been an upward trend in the 
planting of GM corn in Manitoba (Evans and Lupescu, 2012).  The additional farm 
revenue from the use of GM corn at the national level was CDN$116 million in 2011 and 
cumulatively CDN$694.4 million since 1996 (see Figure 3.7). 
Figure 3.7: National Farm Revenue from Adopting GM Corn in Canada from 1996 to 
2011 in Millions of CDN$ 
 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
GM soybean was first planted in Canada in 1997.  Traditionally, Quebec and Ontario 
have been the primary soybean growing regions in Canada, accounting for 92% of total 
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soybean acreage in 2007.  With the rise of Manitoba as a soybean producing province, 
the combined share for Quebec and Ontario has slowly declined over time. In 2012, 
Ontario and Quebec accounted for approximately 78% of total soybean acreage, while 
Manitoba’s share increased from 8% in 2007 to 20% in 2012 (Evans and Lupescu, 
2012). The average farm income benefit has been between CDN$14/ha and 
CDN$40/ha and the increase in farm income at the national level was CDN$12.3 million 
in 2011. The cumulative increase in farm income since 1997 has been CDN$155.5 
million (see Table 3.14). 
Table 3.14: Farm Level Income Impact from Adopting GM Soybean in Canada from 
1997 to 2011 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2013 
The agriculture and agro-food sector in Canada uses biotechnology in a variety 
of ways to produce agricultural inputs and food products including: veterinary drugs and 
Year Cost 
savings 
CDN$/ha 
Net cost 
saving/increase 
in gross 
margins in 
CDN$/ha 
Impact on farm 
income at a 
national level  in 
million CDN$ 
Increase in national 
farm income as percent 
of farm level value of 
national production 
1997 64.28 41.17 0.041 0.01 
1998 56.62 35.05 1.72 0.3 
1999 53.17 31.64 6.35 1.29 
2000 53.2 31.65 6.71 1.4 
2001 49.83 29.17 9.35 3.4 
2002 47.78 27.39 11.92 2.79 
2003 49.46 14.64 7.65 1.47 
2004 51.61 17.48 11.58 1.48 
2005 55.65 18.85 13.3 2.26 
2006 59.48 23.53 17.99 2.22 
2007 61.99 24.52 16.87 1.57 
2008 56.59 18.28 16.08 1.45 
2009 55.01 12.02 10.46 0.87 
2010 43.93 17.75 13.11 0.68 
2011 44.65 18.55 12.35 0.65 
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biologics (drugs used for the treatment or diagnosis of infectious diseases of animals); 
plants with novel traits (crops and horticultural plants); bio-pesticides (for insect, 
disease, and pest control); novel fertilizer supplements or bio-fertilizers (to improve plant 
growth); livestock feed and feed additives; and novel foods.  Products are regulated by 
government agencies in order to protect human, animal, and environmental health, and 
to protect consumers against fraud.  Regulation also serves to maintain international 
quality and safety standards that facilitate trade (CFIA, 2007). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Over the past century, plant breeding has developed incrementally by harnessing 
advances in plant biology, supplemented at times by traditional empirical knowledge 
(lore), and informed by the principles of Mendelian genetics.  Public sector institutions 
emerged to catalyze formal crop improvement, focusing on yield with high input 
requirements and wide adaptability.  The education, research, and institutional system 
triad commonly found in developed countries was exported to developing countries to 
foster agricultural development and food security mainly through the development of 
broadly adapted germplasm. 
Since the 1970s, the common heritage principle has been turned on its head with 
the gradual encroachment of claims for control over access to and use of genetic 
resources through the introduction of IP laws.  In the 1980s, patents entered plant 
breeding initially through court decisions in the US via association with biotechnology.  
The series of biotechnology patenting cases that followed during the 1980s and 1990s 
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not only greatly expanded the legal boundaries of patentable living matter, but also 
narrowed the traditional seed saving exemptions for farmers. 
In addition to the introduction of patents into agriculture has been significant 
public and private investments in agricultural R&D.  Governments have entered this 
arena to accommodate the needs of capital by providing significant outlays of 
investment necessary for the development of the R&D infrastructure.  This not only 
mitigates the associated risks of venturing into such avenues, but gives extra incentives 
to develop agricultural science and technology with research institutions that effectively 
have taken up the task set for them by governments and corporate actors. 
With the agricultural R&D infrastructure firmly set in place, there has been 
greater concentration and centralization among GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations since the 1980s.  Corporations which had no expertise in either 
biotechnology or plant breeding began to massively invest in developing GM varieties. 
As a result, several of these companies grew exponentially from relatively small-scale 
enterprises to large-scale corporations.  Concentration among large-scale corporations 
has resulted in centralisation through mergers and acquisitions of small-scale 
enterprises by large-scale ones.  The result has been greater control of R&D and 
market imperatives in the agricultural biotechnology industry by a handful of 
multinational corporations. 
The fulfillment of R&D efforts has been the rapid (albeit temporally and 
geographically uneven) global adoption and production of GM crops.  This has 
confirmed some of the claims about the economic benefits of adopting and producing 
GM crops; however, the magnitude of the economic advantages vary widely according 
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to the cropping season, geographical location, length of the period over which adoption 
and impacts were observed, and the particular point along the adoption path that was 
analyzed (IFPRI, 2009).  Also, the majority of the GM crops that have been developed 
and released for commercial use have been genetically engineered for the production 
requirements and benefit of farming in developed countries.  This has led to a narrow 
focus on a few commercially important crops and engineered traits, while minor crops 
and traits remain largely ignored (Fukuda-Parr, 2007).  For example, the US continues 
to be the leading grower of GM crops, accounting for 40% of global hectares of mostly 
maize, soybean, and cotton while all developing countries combined account for only 
53% of global hectares of mostly the same crops (James, 2015).  Also, some authors 
have questioned whether or not the structure of scientific research mitigate against 
developing products that are beneficial for small-scale resource-poor farmers.  The 
incentives and institutional relations of GM crop research requires a vastly more 
advanced infrastructure, expertise, and expense than did earlier methods of seed 
improvement.  Most of the research and innovation needed to create functional GM 
crops has been done in the academic institutions of developed countries (Altieri and 
Rosset, 1999).  The changing role of the university toward an institution more aligned 
with private sector interests and orientations has involved the expansion of the state-
university-industry nexus and a dramatic shift in the way university research is expected 
to contribute to public good.  This has been facilitated by the selling of publicly funded 
research into private hands in what has been referred to as ‘academic capitalism’ 
(Glenna et al., 2007). 
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Moving away from analyses that regard technology as an exogenous and socially 
neutral force in the development of capitalism, I provide a different perspective by 
situating agricultural biotechnology in the context of capitalism as a form of society.  
Accordingly, the development, adoption, and production of GM crops is primarily 
motivated by capitalism’s on-going need to enhance the possibility of value 
accumulation through innovation, not only in the agricultural and agro-food sectors, but 
also in the economy as a whole.  The aggravating conditions of capitalist valorization 
and accumulation in the agricultural sector, as in other sectors of the economy, have 
given rise to what is often referred to as the ‘biotechnology revolution’.  The specific 
developments in agricultural biotechnology create the possibility for entirely new 
conditions for the accumulation of capital, and give rise to new economic contradictions 
and significant social disruptions.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The State, Civil Society, and the Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction 
An important idea in Marxism is that a given object or process is connected to many 
other objects or processes and it is subjected to contradictory movements.  This is the 
case for biotechnology.  There are complex ways in which biotechnology, agricultural 
production, and the interventions by the state and civil society organizations are 
interconnected.  Advanced capitalism is characterized by a general (albeit temporally 
and spatially uneven) tendency towards technological change in its various forms.  In 
the contemporary era, biotechnology is one such form.  As with all forms of technology, 
its emergence is a contradictory process.  As an industrial phenomenon, biotechnology 
may be considered as an opportunity for individual segments of the capitalist class for 
accumulation of exchange value as well as a capitalist growth strategy at the sectoral 
level.  Its emergence is indicative of an instantiated counter-struggle on the part of 
specific capitals against impinging price competition in the agricultural industry and, at a 
macro-scale, of the more general intensifying decline in the rate of profit in advanced 
industrial economies.  The emergence and utilization of biotechnology both as a means 
of production and as a means of increasing (monopolistic) profit is part of a wider 
process of market-oriented reforms in the agrarian sector occurring at national and 
international scales.  This process is not only economic but also political.  The large-
scale introduction of biotechnology would not have been possible without the 
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interventions on the part of the state, which generally tends to play an enabling role by 
assisting capitalists in the development and adoption of novel biotechnology products.  
While capitalist strategies and state interventions are pushing for the introduction of 
biotechnology, there are forces (e.g., civil society organizations) whose aim is to at least 
partly resist the expansion of the market for biotechnology.  This means that the 
outcomes of market-based restructuring in general and the use and consequences of 
biotechnology in particular are anything but automatic. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the role of the state and civil society 
organizations in relation to the development, adoption, and production of GM crops at 
local and national scales.  I address the following questions: in what ways has the 
federal government of Canada supported R&D) and innovation?  What are the 
objectives of the Canadian biotechnology strategy and policies?  How have the federal 
government of Canada’s biotechnology regulatory practices supported industry 
initiatives and addressed public concerns?  What effect have the federal government of 
Canada’s biotechnology policies and regulatory practices had on the adoption and 
production of GM crops?  How does resistance by various civil society organizations 
affect the expansion of the market for biotechnology products?  Why do various 
government agencies continue to promote the development, adoption, and production 
of GM crops despite on-going public resistance?  I argue that the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops in the Canadian context represents in part a 
significant attempt by the state to secure the ongoing capitalist development of the 
agricultural biotechnology industry.  This occurs through a complex array of processes, 
on the one hand, by a variety of government agencies that are necessary for the 
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procurement of costly generic scientific and technological R&D, legislation, and 
regulation, and on the other hand, by instances of the state neutralizing or countering 
the political struggles waged by various civil society organizations that have challenged 
such outcomes.  This signifies an economic geography at the national and international 
scales in which ‘competitiveness’ is heralded resulting in the support of innovation 
systems and the expansion and protection of value accumulation, while simultaneously 
civil society action seeks to challenge pressures toward market-oriented restructuring 
and reform.  The tension between compliant government structures and resistant civil 
society action counter the encroachment of the capitalist market. 
To support the argument, I examine the Biotechnology in Canada report, the 
establishment of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy and the National Biotechnology 
Advisory Committee, and the Canadian biotechnology regulatory practices.  In addition, 
I incorporate select responses from 19 interviews conducted between January and 
August 2015 with personnel from government agencies such as AAFC and Health 
Canada and civil society organizations such as Greenpeace Canada and the CBAN.  
AAFC (2016) is responsible for governing agricultural production, farming income, R&D, 
inspection, the regulation of animals and plants, and rural development.  Personnel that 
were interviewed were from the Research Branch.  These respondents provided 
insights about different solutions and opportunities based on science that the AAFC has 
implemented to support competitiveness and the sustainability of the agriculture and 
agri-food sector.  Health Canada (2011) is responsible for national public health.  
Personnel that were interviewed were from the science and research division.  These 
respondents provided insights about the costs to Health Canada associated with 
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conducting applied science activities, such as food inspection, disease tracking, and 
compliance testing of consumer products.  Greenpeace Canada (2015b) is known for its 
work among civil society organizations in Canada.  Personnel that were interviewed 
have been involved in the campaign for sustainable agriculture.  This campaign rejects 
genetically engineered organisms (GMOs) and promotes biodiversity and socially 
responsible farming.  The CBAN (2015a) promotes food sovereignty and democratic 
decision-making regarding science and technology issues in order to protect the 
integrity of the environment, health, food, and the livelihoods of people in Canada.  This 
is accomplished by facilitating, informing, and organizing civil society action, 
researching, and providing information to government for policy development.  
Personnel that were interviewed have been involved in various anti-GMOs campaigns. 
The chapter is organized in the following way.  I bring into focus Canada’s 
biotechnology R&D initiatives (section 4.2 Canadian Research and Development and 
Innovation), strategy, policy (section 4.2.1 Canadian Biotechnology Strategy and 
Policy), and regulatory framework (section 4.2.2 Canadian Agricultural 
Biotechnology Regulation), and their economic impact on the biotechnology industry 
(section 4.3 Market Impact of the Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Industry).  
Moreover, I highlight some of the rising contestations from civil society organizations 
(section 4.4 Rising Contestations).  In the conclusion (section 4.5 Conclusion) I 
provide a summary the findings, draw out some conceptual implications, and situate the 
contribution of the chapter in the broader academic literature.  
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4.2 Canadian Research and Development and Innovation 
The Government of Canada has for many years evinced a sense for technological 
optimism in which the idea is propagated that the development of science and 
technology will reap great socio-economic benefits for the Canadian population (see, for 
example, Government of Canada, 2003; Health Canada, 2005; for a critical analysis see 
Smardon, 2014).  In the 1960s, the federal government began to fund industrial R&D on 
a broad basis through direct grants and tax incentives.  Under various governments, the 
federal state established several new programs: the Defence Industrial Research 
program; the Industrial Research Assistance Program, which was housed in the 
National Research Council (NRC); the Program for the Advancement of Industrial 
Technology; and the Industrial Research and Development Incentives Act program.  
Such efforts expanded throughout the 1970s as major new tax credits for industrial R&D 
were added as well as contracting out federal research needs to the private sector.  
These incentives quickly grew to become the core source of federal support for R&D in 
Canadian industry. 
R&D and innovation continued to receive a great deal of attention in the 1980s 
and 1990s as more initiatives were implemented at the federal level.  Although there 
were fewer grants and contributions to industry these were compensated for by rising 
levels of spending on R&D contracts with industry and a continued commitment to R&D 
tax credits.  The Industrial Regional Development Program (created as part of the new 
department of Regional Industrial Expansion) led to expanded funding in the early to 
mid-1980s.  The Scientific Research Tax Credit led in the same period to more federal 
money being focused on tax incentives.  The InnovAction initiative in 1987 led to a new 
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focus on ‘research networks’ and to the Networks of Centres of Excellence program 
(involving networks of research connections between industry and the universities) in 
the latter part of the 1980s; and a new federal department called Industry, Science, and 
Technology Canada was formed to manage the promotion of R&D and innovation in 
Canadian industry.  
The focus on promoting domestic technological capacities continued into the 
early 1990s through the establishment of the Prosperity Initiative.  Reflecting a 
movement away from grant-based forms of assistance in the post-free trade period, 
grants and contributions to industry from the NRC and from the newly formed Industry, 
Science and Technology Canada declined in the latter part of the 1980s and remained 
at a lower level in the early 1990s.  This, however, was compensated for by rising levels 
of spending on R&D contracts with industry and a commitment of the federal state to 
R&D tax credits.  Although the Scientific Research Tax Credit was eliminated in the face 
of widespread abuse, the broader Scientific Research and Experimental Development 
tax credit was created, which was among the most generous in the advanced capitalist 
world in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
R&D grants and contributions to the business enterprise sector rebounded from 
their lower level from 1995 to 1997 to levels higher than in the period before the 1995 
budget.  A range of other new initiatives reflected the increased influence of “systems of 
innovation” thinking.  These included the Partnerships in Knowledge program; the 
Synergy Awards program; the creation of Industrial Research Chairs; Strategic Projects 
for pre-competitive research involving universities and industry; and Research 
Partnership Agreements among universities, industry, and government organizations.  
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In addition to these initiatives were various sectoral strategies, such as the Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy and new program and spending initiatives undertaken in the 
latter part of the 1990s, ranging from the creation of the Canadian Foundation for 
Innovation, which provided funding for new research infrastructure projects in university 
and non-profit institutions, to expanded funding for existing programs, such as the 
Networks of Centres of Excellence.  Through these various programs and initiatives 
over a forty-year period, the federal state spent substantial sums of money in pursuit of 
the goal of expanded industrial R&D and greater domestic technological capabilities, 
particularly through the creation of R&D tax incentives that provided higher levels of 
funding than in other advanced capitalist countries (Smardon, 2014, 3-28). 
 
4.2.1 Canadian Biotechnology Strategy and Policy 
The Government of Canada’s biotechnology strategy and policy were in part an attempt 
at stimulating the national economy and international competitiveness through 
innovative, research-intensive, high-technology industries during the general global 
economic slowdown following the so-called ‘golden age of capitalism’.  As Canada’s 
economic situation steadily declined amid the economic recession and lagging 
manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, concern for the national economy and 
industrial performance emerged as major issues.  In one of my interviews, an employee 
from the AAFC remarked about the important role of agricultural biotechnology as part 
of the solution for ameliorating the more general crisis in agriculture. 
Part of the entire strategy by the government had to do with the crisis that 
many nations, not only Canada, were facing in the 1980s and 1990s.  I 
mean you could look it up yourself, farmers in Canada, and around the 
world as a matter of fact were not doing well, farming was in trouble, 
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really.  There was talk about putting money into biotech, not just in 
agriculture but other places as well, to generate the sector, although this 
was only part of the solution.  There were consultations that were taking 
place with industry, farmers, and people from the public about the kind of 
solutions we were going to come up with to get us out of this mess.  You 
know, biotech was going to be part of the answer.  So, when you talk 
about this or that strategy or policy you can’t really do that without talking 
about farming in Canada, which is still really big business, and how far the 
government of Canada is willing to go to support that (AAFC Employee 1). 
 
Canada’s national biotechnology strategy may be traced back to the 1980s when 
the federal Ministry of State for Science and Technology published the Biotechnology in 
Canada report and established a private sector task force initiating the promotion and 
development of biotechnology.  The report outlined the potential of growing 
opportunities for R&D in biotechnology, but emphasized Canada’s lack of expertise, 
educational programs, and industrial activity compared with that of the US and other 
countries in Europe.  The report recommended that Canada focus on and develop key 
areas of biotechnology R&D including new plant technologies.  Accordingly, the private 
sector task force outlined a 10-year plan to establish and grow various biotechnology 
industries.  Essential elements of this plan were: a coordinated effort by the entire 
sector including the lead and catalyzing role of the government; industry incentives such 
as tax shelters and funding; developing the R&D infrastructure; increased international 
corroboration and enactment; and modification or elimination of regulation which inhibits 
Canada’s competitiveness (MOSST, 1980). 
These initiatives resulted in the establishment of the CBS and the National 
Biotechnology Advisory Committee (NBAC).  The CBS was rooted in the late 1970s 
when a task force composed of industry and academia was established to determine 
how to facilitate the potential of new recombinant DNA techniques that were being 
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developed.  The CBS is Canada’s plan for the emerging field of biotechnology that 
supports and compliments the regulatory and research activities of various federal 
departments and agencies and operates in a policy framework which defined the 
following objectives and principles: 
Ensure that Canadians have access to, confidence in and benefit from 
safe and effective biotechnology-based products and services; Ensure an 
effective scientific base and invest strategically in research and 
development; Position Canada as a responsible world leader in the 
development, commercialization, sale and use of biotechnology; Be 
sensitive to the needs of developing countries to build local capacity in 
managing the potential risks of biotechnology.  Improve public awareness 
and understanding of biotechnology; … Promote awareness of and 
maintain excellence in Canada's regulatory system; … Support the 
development of human resources in the sector; and Work with the 
provinces, territories, businesses, academia and consumer and other 
groups to develop and carry out action plans (Health Canada, 2005). 
 
The objectives and principles were premised on biotechnology having transformative 
potential.  Accordingly, two issues have dominated the debates over the impact of 
biotechnology: first is the potential creative impact as biotechnology opens up new 
avenues for economic growth and employment; and second, the potential disruptive 
impact on society, social norms, and existing economic practices.  While the growth 
potential of biotechnology made it an attractive sight for government activity, the 
potential controversies over biotechnological applications produced ongoing concerns 
regarding political responsibility (Sharaput, 2008). 
In addition to the CBS initiatives, biotechnology brought together a wide array of 
ministries and governmental agencies with Industry Canada emerging as the lead trans-
ministerial coordinator.  Among the number of initiatives involving biotechnology were: 
the Canadian Foundation for Innovation (CFI); the Canadian Institutes of Health 
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Research; the Genomics R&D initiative; Genome Canada; Canadian Regulatory 
System for Biotechnology; Smart Regulations; and the Biotechnology Regulatory 
Framework.  These federal government initiatives directly fund R&D efforts.  For 
example, the Canadian Regulatory System for Biotechnology initiative ($35 million per 
year) and the Genomics R&D initiative ($20 million per year) (Government of Canada, 
2011).  An employee from Health Canada in an interview commented on the significant 
costs associated with genetic R&D and policy implementation. 
One of our priorities has always been this highest standards of safety in 
the world.  For this reason the spending on the development of 
biotechnology has been substantial.  Just the cost of infrastructure for 
R&D itself is substantial.  The government has literally spent billions, but 
this is what it takes to get a project like this off the ground.  This has of 
course been done in conjunction with industry, universities, health groups, 
and all kinds of organizations across Canada.  We knew that if we get it 
right there would be great social and economic benefits down the line 
(Health Canada Employee). 
 
A key element of the CBS was the establishment of the NBAC which consisted of 
multidisciplinary experts and members of the general public including representatives 
from academia, the private sector, and government.  The mandate of the committee 
was the formulation of the government’s biotechnology program which included: 
substantially greater financial investments in developing a science-base and technology 
transfer; remaining competitive on the global market; tax incentives and financial 
assistance for industry; legislation including IP laws that favour the industry; and 
improved collaborative efforts between Canada and the international community 
(Abergel and Barrett, 2002).  In 1983, the National Biotechnology Strategy (NBS) was 
established to develop biotechnology in order to enhance economic, health, and 
environmental benefits to Canada.  The NBS was renewed in 1998 after extensive 
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consultation with provincial governments, industry, non-government organizations 
(NGOs), scientific and academic institutes, and other partners.  Components of the NBS 
included: management structure and governance; an advisory committee; the 
framework underpinning the strategy; and mechanisms to facilitate the evolution of 
biotechnology towards refining a science-based regulatory system, commercialization, 
and social acceptance (Health Canada, 2005). 
Innovation featured prominently as a policy goal throughout the 1980s and was 
strengthened by the science and technology policy InnovAction that was introduced in 
1987.  This policy entailed a substantial spending program that included: improving 
technological innovation and diffusion; developing ‘strategic’ technologies; assuring a 
highly trained workforce; support for basic and applied research; controlling the effects 
of technology on society; and promoting a ‘science culture’.  Public policy can influence 
innovation through a variety of policy instruments such as a stable economic 
environment aided by tax incentives for industrial research, monetary policy, direct 
subsidies for R&D, trade policy, regulatory frameworks and standards, and IP rights.  
Government innovation programs can involve creating a scientific and technological 
infrastructure that includes universities, research centers, government departments, 
educational and training institutions, financial institutions, and information network 
centers.  By drawing on these instruments the Science Council of Canada directed 
attention to the importance of integrating technology into modern industrial processes.  
This entailed long-term restructuring of the economy, increased cooperation between 
the government and the private sector, and the strengthening of Canada’s technological 
capabilities by focusing on additional key areas to biotechnology such as engineering 
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and computer technology (Abergel and Barrett, 2002).  Describing some of the tensions 
surrounding biotechnology in Canada, an employee from AAFC commented about the 
efforts by multiple Canadian government agencies for implementing policies that would 
strengthen the Canadian industry. 
The policies that were put in place in many ways were used to help 
secure the development of biotechnology.  There was a lot of controversy 
about biotechnology and quite frankly much of it was nonsense.  We were 
trying to position ourselves to make sure that we could meet any current 
and future challenges.  We knew, based on a lot of scientific studies, that 
GM was safe.  We also knew that we wanted to strengthen Canada’s 
position in terms of our own contributions to agriculture and 
biotechnology.  There was a lot of work to be done and a kind of re-
making of the industry as novel technologies were being introduced.  We 
wanted to move forward and figure how we could get GM foods into the 
market because this was in the best interest of Canadians.  There were a 
lot of people on-board with this, like Health Canada, and Industry Canada, 
so it wasn’t just Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.  There were also other 
groups that were involved from the public including NGOs and there were 
consultations that were held, but sometimes regardless of what you do 
you always have people that are going to assume that the entire project 
was shoved down people’s throats, but it was not.  I think you would agree 
that when you look at the outcome today, you will quickly learn that the 
project has been a great success (AAFC Employee 2). 
 
Canada’s biotechnology strategy and policy initiatives have been 
substantiated by significant federal government expenditures on biotechnology 
R&D more specifically (see Table 4.1) and science and technology R&D more 
generally (see Table 4.2).  
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Table 4.1: Annual Federal Government Science and Technology R&D on 
Biotechnology Expenditures 
Year Amount (thousands of dollars) 
2003/2004 756,239 
2004/2005 804,161 
2005/2006 864,830 
2006/2007 880,087 
2007/2008 920,548 
2008/2009 936,827 
Notes and sources: this table contains the most current data available from Statistics 
Canada on biotechnology R&D expenditures.  Disaggregated data following 2008/2009 
is not available, (Statistics Canada, 2010, 2012b). 
 
Table 4.2: Annual Federal Government Science and Technology R&D and Related 
Activities Expenditures 
Year Amount (millions of dollars) 
2003/2004 8,765 
2004/2005 8,934 
2005/2006 9,449 
2006/2007 9,633 
2007/2008 10,176 
2008/2009 10,573 
2009/2010 11,614 
2010/2011 12,014 
2011/2012 11,395 
2012/2013 11,166 
2013/2014 10,868 
2014/2015 10,281 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014b 
In summary, the federal government of Canada has evinced a sense of 
technological optimism backed by substantial funding and tax credits for 
industrial R&D innovation going back to the 1960s.  Amidst economic recession 
and lagging manufacturing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the federal 
Government of Canada began to promote and develop biotechnology in part as 
an attempt at stimulating the national economy and international competitiveness 
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through innovative, research-intensive, high-technology industries.  The 
publication of the Biotechnology in Canada report and the establishment of the 
CBS and the NABC, among other initiatives, set the course for the establishment 
and growth of various biotechnology industries.  The federal government 
established a policy structure that can influence innovation through a variety of 
instruments such as a stable economic environment aided by tax incentives for 
industrial research, monetary policy, direct subsidies for R&D, trade policy, 
regulatory frameworks and standards, and IP rights. Canada’s innovation in 
biotechnology was regarded as part of the necessary adaptation and change 
which characterizes the essence of the capitalist production site. 
 
4.2.2 Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation 
Canadian regulatory agencies have attempted to develop regulatory practices that are 
rigorous but not restrictive so that agricultural biotechnology products may be used 
without adversely harming humans, animals, and the environment, while simultaneously 
not delaying or restricting industry competitiveness.  The Government of Canada’s 
efforts, however, have not taken place in isolation but have been influenced by the 
scientific community, NGOs, trading partners (the US and other OECD member 
countries), international organizations, and the biotechnology industry.  The foundation 
of Canada’s regulatory framework has been shaped by several regulatory documents 
from international organizations including: the OECD, the National Academy of 
Sciences, the FAO, and the World Health Organization (WHO).  For example, in 1986, 
the OECD published the Recombinant DNA Safety Considerations, which provided 
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guidance in the form of a set of recommended requirements for biotechnology products.  
This proved to be an important document, used by many countries including Canada, to 
develop their regulatory framework (OECD, 1986). The follow-up document, Safety 
Considerations for Biotechnology outlined safety assessment requirements especially 
related to environmental issues (OECD, 1992). 
Among other things, these regulatory documents introduced and developed the 
principles of ‘familiarity’ (in reference to environmental release) and ‘substantial 
equivalence’ (in reference to food safety) which became central to the Canadian 
regulatory framework.  The concepts of familiarity and substantial equivalence were 
premised on the notion that organisms developed through recombinant DNA techniques 
are not inherently different from organisms developed through other methods of genetic 
alteration (including, for example, natural mutation).  Following from this perspective, 
the claim is made that GM products using recombinant DNA do not pose unique 
hazards and do not require distinctive risk assessment procedures.  Any potential 
environmental impacts are expected to be similar to those that have been observed with 
the introduction of naturally occurring species or selected species used for agricultural 
applications (Abergel and Barrett, 2002). 
The concepts of familiarity and substantial equivalence provided a ‘science-
based’ rationale for streamlining the regulatory process.  In 1988, the AAFC began 
accepting applications to conduct Canada’s first confined research field trials for plants 
with novel traits.  AAFC was responsible for testing and registration of new plant 
cultivars under the Seeds Act.  As such, AAFC fostered the required expertise in 
agriculture, agronomy, and biology to evaluate plants with novel traits.  On assuming 
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this new regulatory responsibility, AAFC conducted a number of multi-stakeholder 
consultations to seek advice on the scope and approach of its regulatory framework.  
For example, in 1988 the Canadian Agri-Food Research Council (CARC) held a 
workshop for Canadian scientists on the regulation of agricultural biotechnology.  CARC 
is a non-profit consortium of researchers from industry, academia, and federal and 
provincial governments.  As a result of this workshop, a product-based (i.e., genetic trait 
based), rather than process-based (i.e., technology used to develop the product), trigger 
for safety assessments of novel agricultural products was recommended to the 
Government of Canada.  Also in 1988, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
(CEPA) was enacted with a requirement for regulatory review, adding a further level of 
guidance federally.  CEPA identified that any person wanting to import, manufacture or 
sell a new product must notify the appropriate Canadian regulatory authority so the 
product could be evaluated for potential effects on the environment and human health 
(CFIA, 2007). 
Given these efforts, among others, by the end of the 1980s the Government of 
Canada had succeeded in producing a regulatory framework based on the following 
principles: first, to build on current legislation where possible, rather than creating new 
legislation to govern new products which are developed.  Second, to focus on product 
characteristics, rather than the method of production.  All products developed through 
genetic engineering are assessed for unintended effects that may result from the 
introduction of foreign genes or DNA sequences.  Third, to conduct evaluations for each 
product on the basis of its unique characteristics and to establish appropriate safety 
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levels based on the best scientific information.  Safety is defined, not as the complete 
absence of risk, but as the level of acceptable risk. 
In addition, the Government of Canada supported efforts towards harmonizing 
regulatory efforts with those of trading partners such as the US and other OECD 
member countries, recognizing that continued export of agricultural and other products 
and the removal of trade barriers depended on mutually consistent standards of safety 
and regulatory oversight.  Accordingly, the Government of Canada participated in the 
OECD Working Group on Harmonization of Regulatory Oversight in Biotechnology and 
the Taskforce for the Safety of Novel Foods and Feeds.  The primary focus of these 
groups was to develop consistent regulations among member countries while avoiding 
trade barriers.  Membership in international organizations helps to exchange expertise 
and facilitate access to current scientific and regulatory information regarding safety 
assessments of novel agricultural products at the international scale.  The Government 
of Canada was also interested in bilateral initiatives with other countries.  For example, 
Canada and the US have harmonized their data requirements for molecular 
characterization data (the detailed information describing the genetic makeup of an 
organism) of the regulatory review process for plants with novel traits.  At the national 
scale, the CFIA and Health Canada have adopted a policy of concurrent approvals (i.e., 
required assessments for all uses are completed at approximately the same time) to 
minimize the potential for unapproved plants with novel traits, novel livestock feeds, 
and/or novel foods to enter into the Canadian environment, livestock feed and/or food 
supply (CFIA, 2007). 
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Despite previous attempts throughout the 1980s to establish a regulatory 
framework for biotechnology, in 1993, the Government of Canada produced a new 
biotechnology regulatory framework entitled Federal Regulatory Framework for 
Biotechnology.  This framework resulted from an agreement among federal regulatory 
departments on principles for an efficient and effective approach for regulating 
biotechnology.  The framework was based on the following principles: 
maintains Canada’s high standards for the protection of the health of 
workers, the general public, and the environment; uses existing legislation 
and regulatory institutions to clarify responsibilities and avoid duplication; 
continues to develop clear novel product evaluation guidelines that are 
harmonized with national priorities and international standards; provides a 
sound scientific database on which to assess risk and evaluate products; 
ensures transparent and consultative development and enforcement of 
Canadian biotechnology regulations; [and] contributes to the prosperity 
and well being of Canadians by fostering a favourable climate for 
investment, development, innovation, and adoption of sustainable 
Canadian biotechnology products and processes (CFIA, 2007, 13). 
 
Currently, several agencies in Canada are involved in the regulation of 
agricultural products.  For example, the CFIA is the lead agency responsible for 
regulation under the jurisdiction of, among others, the Health of Animals Act, the Plant 
Protection Act, the Seeds Act, the Fertilizers Act, and the Feeds Act.  The CFIA is 
responsible for regulating both the efficacy and the environmental safety of the product 
in question.  Regulations clearly describe how the CFIA will conduct environmental 
assessments of agricultural biotechnology products.  Also, the CFIA is responsible for 
inspection and monitoring so that registered products continue to meet quality and 
safety standards after their approval.  Lastly, the CFIA is responsible for non-safety 
related product labelling (e.g., voluntary labelling, consumer fraud issues).  Health 
Canada, under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drugs Act, has primary responsibility for 
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human health related issues.  Health Canada is responsible for setting standards for 
safety of the food supply, including biotechnology food products (novel foods).  Their 
Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods outline the criteria they consider 
in making an assessment of the safety to human health from GM microorganisms and 
plants.  Also, Health Canada is responsible for required labelling related to health and 
safety issues (e.g., allergenicity, changes in nutritional composition) (CFIA, 2014) (see 
Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Agricultural Products, Legislation and Regulatory Control, with Particular 
Emphasis on Novel Agricultural Products Grown Domestically 
Department/  
Agency  
Products Regulated  Relevant Legislation  Regulations  
Canadian Food 
Inspection 
Agency (CFIA)  
Plants and seeds, 
including those with 
novel traits,  
Animals,  
Animals vaccines and 
biologics,  
Fertilizers,  
Livestock feeds  
Consumer Packaging 
and Labeling Act,  
Feeds Act,  
Fertilizer Act,  
Food and Drugs Act,  
Health of Animals Act,  
Seeds Act,  
Plant Protection Act  
Feeds 
Regulations,  
Fertilizer 
Regulations,  
Health of Animals 
Regulations,  
Food and Drug 
Regulations  
Environment 
Canada (EC)  
Biotechnology products 
under CEPA, such as 
microorganisms used in 
bioremediation,  
Waste disposal, mineral 
leaching or enhanced oil 
recovery  
Canadian 
Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA)  
New Substances 
Notification 
Regulations  
(These regulations 
apply to products 
not regulated 
under other federal 
legislation)  
Health Canada 
(HC)  
Foods,  
Drugs,  
Cosmetics,  
Medical devices,  
Pest control products  
Food and Drugs Act,  
Canadian 
Environmental 
Protection Act,  
Pest Control Products 
Act  
Cosmetics 
Regulations,  
Food and Drug 
Regulations,  
Novel Foods 
Regulations,  
Medical Devices 
Regulations,  
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New Substances 
Notification 
Regulations,  
Pest Control 
Products 
Regulation  
Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada  
Potential environmental 
release of transgenic 
aquatic organisms  
Fisheries Act  Under 
development  
Source: CFIA, 2007, 11 
There is a vast array of agricultural products being developed or imported into 
Canada.  Depending on the type of product, where it comes from and the intended use, 
different control measures are used.  All potentially hazardous imported commodities 
are controlled to reduce the possibility of the introduction of agricultural pests and 
diseases.  Examples of such controls include the use of permits, testing, quarantine or 
inspection.  Products which may pose a hazard to the environment are subjected to an 
environmental safety assessment.  All new products produced by conventional means 
or derived through genetic engineering are included in this category.  Government 
evaluators, in collaboration with experts and the public, have developed guidelines for 
each class of domestically-produced product, which assist in the development of new 
products in the research stage.  These regulatory directives facilitate the presentation of 
adequate and appropriate information by the product developer, so that potential 
hazards can be identified early in the process.  Government regulators use this 
information to determine whether or not new products meet acceptable safety standards 
(CFIA, 2014). 
Based on the product definition, specified protocols are applied which govern the 
conditions of release into the environment.  Frequently, field testing is performed on a 
confined basis.  In certain cases, such as for contract growing, certain confinement 
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conditions may be either imposed or relaxed depending on the characteristics of a novel 
product.  Scientific information is gathered during the development phase, and provided 
to evaluators as required.  Information is produced during research trials conducted 
under laboratory conditions and field testing of new plants, or, in the case of veterinary 
biologics and livestock feeds, animal testing.  Depending on the product, prior to 
commercial production, approval, registration or licensing may be required.  This is 
done in the case of bio-fertilizers, certain plant species, livestock feeds, and veterinary 
biologics.  Once the product has been approved, quality assurance monitoring of the 
products, as in the case of veterinary biologics, or food safety inspection, will be 
performed.  All of these regulatory control measures are taken to assess the quality, 
safety and efficacy of the product (CFIA, 2014) (see Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4: Regulation of Plants with Novel Traits and/or Novel Livestock Feeds Derived 
from Plants in Canada 
 
Source: CFIA, 2007, 19 
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These developments may be understood in light of what some authors have 
referred to as a transnational biotech bloc.  For example, Eaton (2013, 33) noted, 
Buying into the rhetoric and material promises of the transnational biotech 
bloc, Canada has promoted biotechnology from the beginning as a 
strategy for economic development and international competitiveness.  
Regulations, international property rights, and international trade have 
been fashioned around the needs of the biotech industry, with private 
interests increasingly determining the nature of the Canadian’s state 
engagement with the technology.  Indeed the development of the biotech 
industry in Canada happened alongside a policy change that saw federal 
agricultural research move from relative autonomy toward increasing 
engagement with public-private partnerships and industry-driven research 
agendas and funding.  Before consulting the public or developing a 
regulatory structure for the approval of GMOs, the Canadian state had 
already enrolled in the transnational biotech bloc. 
 
An AAFC employee in an interview commented about the Government of Canada’s 
various attempts at regulating biotechnology in a manner that is conducive to broader 
concerns about integration and harmonization with international protocols aimed at 
market penetration.  
There wasn’t much clarity back then about how we were going to regulate 
GM products.  New plant varieties and seeds produced using genetic 
modification would be covered under the Seeds Act and administered by 
Agriculture Canada at that time which is now Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada.  There was also talk about Environment Canada under the 
CEPA [Canadian Environmental Protection Act] regulating biotechnology 
products, which would then subject biotech products to environmental 
assessment by Environment Canada.  Things were moving quickly though 
and there was the sense that we shouldn’t do anything to inhibit getting 
the technology out into the market.  Regulation should be more about 
facilitating the process.  The Government of Canada was not alone in this.  
We were very much part of the regulatory framework that was being 
developed in the US and by the OECD.  There was a push to harmonize 
with other countries so that everyone is on the same playing field.  This 
was not just about health and the environment, there was also this whole 
commerce push and reducing international barriers to trade.  Canada of 
course supported all this because we recognized the importance of 
harmonizing for the sake of continued export of agricultural products.  
Eventually regulation remained under the mandate of Agriculture and 
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Agri-Food Canada and Environment Canada and the CEPA would play a 
safety-net role covering products not already regulated by the existing 
legislation (AAFC Employee 3). 
 
To summarize, Canadian regulatory agencies developed regulatory practices in 
conjunction with the scientific community, NGOs, trading partners, international 
organizations, and the biotechnology industry that provided a ‘science-based’ rationale 
for streamlining the regulatory process.  These developments have been fashioned 
around the biotechnology industry through an on-going engagement in private-public 
partnerships and industry driven research agendas and funding, and have been 
embedded into a nexus of relevant trade agreements that insure globally advantageous 
terms for advanced capitalist states and the corporations active in their national 
jurisdictions.  Indeed, the Canadian state has become a major player in the 
transnational biotech bloc. 
 
4.3 Market Impact of the Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology Industry 
By the mid-1990s, a concerted campaign based on aggressive corporate mergers and 
acquisitions as well as partnerships among the largest multinational corporations in 
agricultural biotechnology was taking place.  In 1996, the top 11 seed companies: 
Monsanto (US), DuPont (US), Syngenta (Switzerland), Groupe Limagrain (France), 
Land O’Lakes (US), KWS SAAT SE (Germany), Bayer (Germany), Dow (US), Sakata 
(Japan), DLF-Trifolium (Denmark), and Takii (Japan) accounted for 37% of the world’s 
seed market.  Moreover, within a short decade since its shift to agricultural 
biotechnology in the 1980s, Monsanto emerged as the largest player in the industry 
(Peekhaus, 2013).  Following vigorous marketing in Canada of GM canola, GM 
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soybean, and GM corn (the three largest GM crops cultivated in Canada), Monsanto 
received regulatory approval from Health Canada to market glyphosate tolerant canola 
for food use in 1994 and glyphosate tolerant soybean in 1996.  The glyphosate tolerant 
seeds, marketed as ‘Roundup Ready’, are genetically engineered to produce crops 
capable of surviving post-emergent applications of ‘Roundup’, a broad-spectrum non 
selective systemic herbicide that is sprayed and absorbed through the leaves of the 
plants (Health Canada, 2000).  Monsanto’s insect resistant corn received regulatory 
approval from Health Canada to market for food use in 1997 (Health Canada, 1997). 
From 1994 to 2014, Health Canada approved 184 novel foods (Health Canada, 
2015).  In 2014, the top holder of approved novel food decisions among the top 24 firms 
in Canada was Monsanto with 39, followed by BASF with 17, and Pioneer with 13.  
Private sector firms held 181 or 98% of approved novel food decisions, AAFC held 1, 
the University of Saskatchewan held 1, and the University of British Columbia held 1 
(Health Canada, 2015).  Four GM crops are grown in Canada: canola, corn, soybean, 
and sugar beet (see Table 4.5). 
Table 4.5: Canadian Area of Conventional and GM Crops in Thousands of Hectares by 
Crop from 2007 to 2012 
Crop Area 
(hectares in 
thousands) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Corn for grain 1,391.50 1,204.00 1,203.50 1,214.30 1,217.70 1,472.40 
Fodder corn 246.4 244.9 312.2 244.6 205.9 230.7 
Total corn 1,637.90 1,448.90 1,515.70 1,458.90 1,423.60 1,703.10 
GM corn  636.7 632.6 743 795.1 811.3 1,201.40 
GM corn  as percent 
of total 
39 44 49 54 57 71 
Soybean 1,180.10 1,211.30 1,395.30 1,483.00 1,549.90 1,746.50 
GM soybean 529.7 604.7 604.6 658.1 742.3 1,130.10 
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GM soybean as 
percent of total 
45 50 43 44 48 65 
Canola 5,959.50 6,398.90 6,555.80 6,806.10 7,633.20 8,608.70 
GM canola  4,767.60 5,119.10 5,244.60 5,444.90 6,106.60 8,178.30 
GM canola as 
percent of total 
80 80 80 80 80 95 
Source: Evans and Lupescu, 2012 
GM sugar beet has been planted in Canada since 2008.  Production is concentrated in 
Taber, Alberta where Canada’s only sugar beet processing plant is located.  In 2010, 
96% of the sugar beet crop (approximately 13,000 ha) was GM sugar beet (Evans and 
Lupescu, 2012). Currently, I am not aware of any published analysis of the economic 
impact of GM sugar beet in Canada. 
Most of Canada’s canola production is centered in the western provinces of 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta.  Approximately 15% of the Canadian canola 
crop is consumed in Canada in various forms.  The remainder 85% of canola seed, oil, 
and meal are exported to destinations such as the US, Japan, Mexico, and China 
(Evans and Lupescu, 2012).  The commercialization of herb-tolerant canola began in 
1996 and by 2014 farmers planted 8 million hectares accounting for 95% of all the 
canola grown in Canada and 69% of all GM crops. 
The overall impact on profitability from adopting GM canola (inclusive of yield 
improvements and higher quality) has been an increase of between $22/ha and $74/ha.  
The annual total national farm income benefit from using the technology has risen from 
$6 million in 1996 to $404 million in 2011 (Brookes and Barfoot, 2013). 
GM corn has also been grown commercially in Canada since 1996.  In 2011 it 
accounted for 70% of the 1.2 million ha of corn grown in Canada.  Traditionally, Quebec 
and Ontario are the primary corn-growing regions, accounting for 86% of total Canadian 
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corn.  In Quebec, 74% of the total corn crop was GM corn in 2012, up from 47 percent 
in 2007, while in Ontario 75% of the total corn crop was GM corn in 2012, up from 41 
percent in 2007.  More recently there has also been an upward trend in the planting of 
GM corn in Manitoba (Evans and Lupescu, 2012).  The additional farm income 
generated from the use of GM corn at the national level was $116 million in 2011 and 
cumulatively $694.4 million since 1996 (Brookes and Barfoot, 2013). 
GM soybean was first planted in Canada in 1997.  Traditionally, Quebec and 
Ontario have been the primary soybean growing regions in Canada, accounting for 92% 
of total soybean acreage in 2007.  With the rise of Manitoba as a soybean producing 
province, the combined share for Quebec and Ontario has slowly declined over time.  In 
2012, Ontario and Quebec accounted for approximately 78% of total soybean acreage, 
while Manitoba’s share increased from 8% in 2007 to 20% in 2012 (Evans and Lupescu, 
2012). The average farm income benefit has been between $14/ha and $40/ha and the 
increase in farm income at the national level was $12.3 million in 2011. The cumulative 
increase in farm income since 1997 has been $155.5 million (Brookes and Barfoot, 
2013).  Canadian grain exports demonstrate a general increase in the number of metric 
tonnes exported of the three major GM crops from 2005/2006 to 2014/2015 (see Table 
4.6).  
Table 4.6: Canadian Exports of Canola, Corn, and Soybean from Licensed Facilities for 
the Crop Years 2005/2006 to 2014/2015 in Thousands of Metric Tonnes 
 
2005-
2006 
2006-
2007 
2007-
2008 
2008-
2009 
2009-
2010 
2010-
2011 
2011-
2012 
2012-
2013 
2013-
2014 
2014-
2015 
Canola 5308.8 5466.4 5594.2 7842 7245.1 7032.3 8580.3 7165 8628 8897.8 
Corn 164.4 193.3 577 146.4 32.6 1264.3 73.7 605 1760 271.2 
Soybeans 832 1028.5 1009.2 1236.1 1197.4 2035.4 1964.3 2550.9 2405.5 2424.4 
Source: CGC, 2015 
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In addition to plants with novel traits (crops and horticultural plants), the 
agriculture and agro-food sector in Canada uses biotechnology in a variety of ways to 
produce agricultural inputs and food products including: veterinary drugs and biologics 
(drugs used for the treatment or diagnosis of infectious diseases of animals); bio-
pesticides (for insect, disease, and pest control); novel fertilizer supplements or bio-
fertilizers (to improve plant growth); livestock feed and feed additives; and novel foods 
(CFIA, 2014).  The data presented in this section confirm that the on-going promotion 
and funding of agricultural biotechnology by the Government of Canada has made a 
significant market impact on the Canadian agriculture and agro-food sector. 
 
4.4 Rising Contestations 
Public opposition to genetic engineering may be traced back to the US in the early 
1980s when proposals were made to release organisms deliberately for field testing 
(Krimsky, 1991) following which environmental organizations began to enter the debate 
(Goldburg et al., 1990).  Also, in the mid-1980s controversy began to erupt inside the 
scientific community over issues such as gene transfer, the evolution of weed and 
insect resistance to modified traits, socio-economic impacts, among other issues (see 
Colwell et al., 1985; Halvorson et al., 1985).  By the late 1980s, tensions began to erupt 
in Canada as “a growing number of activists, NGOs, and scientists began voicing 
concerns about the potential ethical, environmental, social, and health risks associated 
with GMOs” (Eaton, 2013, 33).  An activist with Greenpeace Canada in an interview 
commented on the shortcomings of regulatory practices that are based on the concepts 
of familiarity and substantial equivalence, the growing resistance by many activists 
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against such practices, and the Government of Canada’s implementation of these 
polices despite on-going resistance. 
The entire thing [regulatory process] was flawed right from the beginning, 
as far as I’m concerned.  The government has never given any kind of 
special treatment to biotechnology products, but lumped them in there 
under the regulation of other agricultural products.  How can you do that?  
How can a regulatory system designed around traditional agriculture all of 
a sudden be used for biotech agriculture?  This was part of the plan of 
getting the products into the market as fast as possible and prevent any 
kind of lengthy assessments which of course are not great for business 
and supporting the industry.  The government made sure that nothing 
would come in the way of the industry profiting despite any other issues 
that may arise.  Many of us really fought this under CEPA [Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act] and demanded a more comprehensive 
regulatory framework that encompasses biotechnology, but the 
government decided that the legislation in agriculture and health is 
sufficient.  What was interesting about this whole thing is that the 
government not only was protecting the industry against any kind of 
stringent regulations, perhaps out of fear that what happened to the 
industry in Europe may end up happening here, but also entrenching this 
crazy idea that genetic products are no different than products produced 
using natural processes.  Anyways, the government and industry had an 
agenda and nothing was going to stop them (Greenpeace Canada Activist 
1). 
 
Given these controversies, a series of meetings were organized in 1993 that 
included representatives from government, academia, NGOs, and industry.  While the 
purpose of the meetings at first appeared to be an effort towards more diverse debates 
around biotechnology, in reality they were predominantly confined around discussions 
about ‘science-based’ approaches to regulation and the economic advantages of 
adopting biotechnology.  According to Abergel and Barrett (2002), representatives from 
consumer and environmental organizations cited restricted access to information, 
inappropriate extraction of existing legislation, lack of public participation and debate, 
and failure to address ethical issues.  Representatives from government and industry 
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stressed the importance of a competitive regulatory framework, the potential costs of 
over-regulation, and the need to harmonize policies with international traders. 
Following the 1993 meetings, branches of the Government of Canada produced 
documents and held consultations that emphasized the need to moderate the drive 
towards biotechnological innovation with considerations of the social, economic, 
political, environmental, and ethical dimensions.  For example, in 1994, the report from 
the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food urged decision-makers to 
consider socio-economic and environmental effects in their assessment of GMOs.  In 
1996, the Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development stated that current 
regulatory frameworks inadequately addressed recombinant DNA technology.  In 1998, 
a NBAC report emphasized the importance of fostering public awareness, input, and 
consideration of the social-ethical dimensions of biotechnology (Abergel and Barrett, 
2002). 
The most critical assessment of the Government of Canada’s biotechnology 
regulatory framework came in 2001 from the RSC’s Expert Panel Report on the Future 
of Food Biotechnology entitled Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the 
Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada at the request of Health Canada, the 
CFIA, and Environment Canada.  The panel consisted of 14 experts from a variety of 
fields including: botany, philosophy, law, biotechnology, paediatrics, biology, toxicology, 
and animal science.  The purpose of the panel was to provide advice on the Canadian 
regulatory system and the scientific capacity the federal government required to ensure 
the safety of new food products being developed through biotechnology.  The panel 
summarized the scientific developments that led to the current status of application of 
200 
the technology and identified the social and scientific dynamics that foreshadow new 
applications of biotechnology.  It examined in detail the safety implications of these 
applications for human and animal health and the environment.  The panel also critically 
examined the standard principles and practices governing the regulation of food 
biotechnology both in Canada and internationally, and made a series of 
recommendations in three areas: first, those concerning fundamental policies and 
principles governing the regulation of biotechnology; second, those concerning specific 
Canadian regulations and guidelines; and third, those concerning the regulatory process 
itself (RSC, 2001).  These recommendations were based on the globally accepted 
precautionary approach to risk assessment developed at the Rio Conference in 1992.  
Two ideas lie at the core of the precautionary approach: first, an expression of a need 
by decision-makers to anticipate harm before it occurs.  Within this element lies an 
implicit reversal of the onus of proof.  Under the precautionary approach it is the 
responsibility of an activity proponent to establish that the proposed activity will not (or is 
very unlikely to) result in significant harm.  Second, the concept of proportionality of the 
risk and the cost and feasibility of a proposed action (Jordan and O’Riordan, 2004). 
At issue was the adoption of the controversial concepts of familiarity and 
substantial equivalence as foundational principles in the formation of the Canadian 
regulatory framework.  The panel challenged the validity of a linear model of scientific 
assessment arguing that equivalence claims cannot be made a priori; rather, an 
integrated approach of rigorous scientific evaluation is required to uncover how 
phenotypes are affected by genomes and their variants at multiple levels.  The panel 
found “the use of “substantial equivalence” as a decision threshold tool to exempt GM 
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agricultural products from rigorous scientific assessment to be scientifically unjustifiable 
and inconsistent with precautionary regulation of the technology.  The Panel 
recommends a four-stage [DNA structure, gene expression, protein profiling, and 
metabolic profiling] diagnostic assessment of transgenic crops and foods that would 
replace current regulatory reliance upon “substantial equivalence” as a decision 
threshold” (RSC, 2001, ix).  This perspective found resonance among other researchers 
as well.  For example, Millstone et al. (1999, 526) claimed that substantial equivalence 
is a “pseudo-scientific” concept that is “inherently ant-scientific” created primarily as “an 
excuse for not requiring biochemical or toxicological tests”. 
Also, the panel was critical of the government and industry’s claim that the 
regulatory process was ‘science-based’.  In particular, three issues were raised: first, 
ethical concerns about the government’s reliance on scientific research and data 
supplied by the same corporations seeking regulatory approval for their products.  
Second, the government and industry refusing experts in the field free access to data 
for scientific review including independent evaluation of the data or the statistical validity 
of the experimental design used to collect the data.  Third, a lack of transparency and 
information sharing leading to inability to assess the scientific rigour in current approval 
processes.  Although these outcomes contradict the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy’s 
emphasis on science-based technical assessment methodologies in the regulatory 
framework, it was fitting given the context of rapid technological development by large 
economies of scale where a handful of multinational corporations play national 
economies against each other for favourable market conditions.  This makes a case for 
rendering the Government of Canada’s regulatory and marketplace framework 
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conducive to private sector investment and commercialization.  A regulatory system 
increasingly stacked in favour of industry interests, as implicitly admitted by government 
policy, accounts for the conflict of interest and informational gaps in Canada’s regulatory 
regime.  This essentially placed the regulator and the industry in the same playing field 
and raised issues regarding industry capture by state regulators (Peekhaus, 2013).  An 
activist from the CBAN commented on the controversial nature of the regulatory 
process, where regulation primarily serves the interests of the industry rather than that 
of the public.  This conflict of interest has undermined the role of Government of 
Canada as both regulator and promoter of agricultural biotechnology products. 
Basically what we have here is the Government of Canada’s dual role as 
a regulator and promoter of biotechnology, and what you end up with is a 
situation where the regulation is meeting the interests of the industry 
instead of doing what regulation is supposed to do in the first place, which 
is protect the interest of the public.  Part of the problem with this scenario 
is that regulatory agencies in Canada have to establish a working 
relationship with the industry, and once you do that then it becomes very 
difficult to remain objective.  This to a great degree has undermined the 
government’s credibility; really, we don’t know what to think sometimes 
about what is going on in the CFIA and how much we can trust and what 
they’re telling us about biotechnology, and especially the foods we are 
consuming in some cases on a daily basis.  One indication of these 
tensions is that there are all kinds of criticisms coming including things like 
the RSC report, and other experts from Health Canada for example.  
There was a petition that came out some time ago from federal 
government bureaucrats, you know, saying there’s a serious conflict of 
interest here when the products you are regulating are the same products 
you are promoting.  There was also the case where Shiv Chopra and a 
bunch of his colleagues from Health Canada were fired because they 
refused to sign off on regulatory applications because they believed the 
products were dangerous for human and animal health.  I mean this is the 
kind of crazy stuff that’s happening all in the name of big business (CBAN 
Activist 1). 
 
In response, the Government of Canada published an action plan and 
accompanying progress reports (see, for example, Government of Canada, 2001; 
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Health Canada, 2013) in which the government made commitments to: revise relevant 
documents and create new information materials explaining the regulatory system to the 
public; update and refine protocols for the CFIA’s safety assessment as science 
progresses and more advanced methods become available; participate in international 
efforts and seek contributions from experts to develop and validate testing protocols and 
other tools to address biotechnology issues; increase scientific and regulatory capacity 
with scientists trained in molecular biology, entomology, ecology, and other sciences 
related to plants, animals, and the environment; and support research projects relevant 
to biotechnology issues.  Accordingly, in the spring of 2001, the CBAC held five 
consultations across Canada with industry stakeholders, academia, and civil society 
organizations to discuss the regulation of novel foods.  The CFIA officials participated in 
each workshop to provide technical and regulatory information as required.  The CBAC 
released an interim report in August 2001, and the CFIA officials met with the CBAC’s 
members to comment on the report.  The Canadian public was given until January 2002 
to provide comments.  The CBAC’s full report was released in August 2002 entitled 
Improving the Regulation of Genetically Modified Foods and Other Novel Foods in 
Canada.  The report provided 44 recommendations for improving the regulation of novel 
foods that may be categorized under eight areas: structure, organization, and operation 
of the federal food regulatory system; transparency and public involvement; 
precautionary elements; evaluation and monitoring of long-term health impacts; 
environmental stewardship; improved information to support consumer choice; labelling; 
and other social and ethical considerations related to GM foods (CBAC, 2002). 
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Although the panel recommended a four-stage diagnostic assessment of 
transgenic crops and foods that would replace current regulatory reliance on substantial 
equivalence as a decision threshold, the CBAC’s report embraced a combination of 
substantial equivalence and the precautionary principle in their criterion when assessing 
differences between conventional and genetically engineered food crops.  The report 
stated,  
Regulatory action in accord with the Precautionary Principle means the 
imposition of more “conservative” safety standards with respect to certain 
kinds of risks. Where there are health or environmental risks involving 
catastrophe scenarios (e.g. the potential effects of global warming), the 
greater the case for more conservative safety standards such as “zero-
risk” or low threshold standards, such as that of “substantial equivalence”, 
as articulated above. In the Panel’s view, when “substantial equivalence” 
is invoked as an unambiguous safety standard (and not as a decision 
threshold for risk assessment) it stipulates a reasonably conservative 
standard of safety consistent with a precautionary approach to the 
regulations of risk associated with GM-foods (CBAC, 2002, 15, italics in 
original). 
 
An activist from the CBAN commented on the perfunctory aspect of the CBAC’s 
consultations, following which, for the most part, little had changed in terms of rigorously 
assessing genetically engineered food products.  
The Canadian government was developing this new language around GM 
products like ‘novel foods’ and ‘plants with novel traits’ and it was all one 
way to hide the facts from the public about what was really happening with 
genetically engineered foods.  The most problematic thing they were 
doing was using these supposedly ‘science-based’ concepts like 
‘familiarity’ and ‘substantial equivalence’ and then they started talking 
about the ‘precaution principle’ which all sounded really great but quite 
seriously was nonsensical.  Bottom line is, after all was said and done, 
any kind of real risks that have been documented by many scientists 
about GM foods are never sufficiently scrutinized in the Canadian 
regulation system.  You know, according to their logic, there is nothing 
new under the sun when it comes to GM foods, which means there is no 
need for new regulations and no need to bother the public with talks about 
new risks.  If you take any kind of independent studies seriously, you will 
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quickly learn that the picture is not as clear as they claim it to be; I mean 
there are some serious issues with GM foods that need to be looked at 
(CBAN Activist 2). 
 
Examining the CBAC’s consultations between 1999-2003, Prudham and Morris 
(2006, 147) argued “that the CBAC GM foods project was, at best, a poorly conceived 
effort to engage with and respond to public concerns about GM foods, compromised by 
a prior commitment to commercialization.  At worst, it was a cynical exercise coloured 
by a desire to secure and consolidate the legitimacy of GM foods in the midst of growing 
controversy”.  The authors link this to the CBAC’s close ties with Industry Canada which 
resulted in discouraging many NGOs from participating in CBAC’s public consultations, 
therefore limiting their efficacy, and the CBAC’s recommendations which highly 
favoured the biotechnology industry.  An activist from Greenpeace Canada who was 
involved in the CBAC’s consultations commented in an interview that the consultations 
were not about addressing public concerns, rather they were an opportunity for the 
Government of Canada to further secure the success of the biotechnology industry, 
therefore undermining the imperative to deal democratically with public concerns while 
simultaneously supporting the profitability of the industry. 
Many of us basically boycotted the consultations.  This may seem like a 
defeatist attitude, but really it isn’t.  By the time the government had setup 
the consultations it was clear that all the decisions were already made 
about which way Canada was heading in terms of the biotechnology 
project and the GM food issue.  The consultations were a kind of façade 
to hide what was really going on.  You give the impression that people 
have a choice, and then you setup a bunch of meetings to hear them out, 
but then whatever they say basically falls on deaf ears.  I mean seriously, 
they call this a debate, but what debate?  This may seem very cynical, but 
there was nothing we could do to change the course of action that was 
coming.  Billions had already been spent, the CBAC was in the pocket of 
Industry Canada; there were corporations that were expecting support to 
move forward, and those of us who were questioning things like regulation 
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and human and animal safety, and the rest of it, had to be appeased in 
some way.  The government had to make it look like it really cares about 
what Canadians think, so the consultations were supposed to do that, but 
in reality it was business-as-usual, which was the case before the 
consultations started (Greenpeace Canada Activist 2). 
 
To summarize, although the expected benefits from biotechnology were shared 
across ministerial boundaries, biotechnology became a subject of much public debate.  
Biotechnology was perceived not only as an opportunity, but also as a risk with social 
and economic consequences.  Moreover, given the novelty of biotechnology, the public 
was unfamiliar with it.  Consequently, while a particular ministry became involved in 
some aspect of biotechnology regulation, such as that of GM foods for example, it 
would quickly find itself drawn into debates over the social and ethical implications of 
such regulatory practices.  Sharaput (2008, 259) stated, “[b]iotechnology policy’s wide 
application, transformative potential, and extensive links to innovative and competitive 
strategies meant that it became recognized  as a policy field for which ultimate 
responsibility was a reliability”.  This was due to the phases in the development of 
biotechnology policy.  While initially biotechnology policy was primarily concerned with 
the development of basic R&D capacity followed by the focus on adapting such 
developments to commercial and innovative applications, it was not until much later that 
the regulation of the sector in accordance with emerging social and ethical concerns 
was taken into consideration (Sharaput, 2008). 
The issues that were at the heart of the debate around biotechnology in Canada, 
and remain with us today, may be summarized in the following way: first has been the 
Government of Canada’s insistence on defining the terms of the debate around ‘sound 
science’ and a ‘science-based’ approach that included treating genetically engineered 
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products on the basis of the concepts of familiarity and substantial equivalence.  
Second has been the Government of Canada’s consistent ruling out and/or undermining 
of the social, economic, political, environmental, human health, and ethical dimensions 
of biotechnology.  Third has been the dual role that the Government of Canada 
adopted, on the one hand, as the assessor and regulator of all biological products 
developed and marketed for human and animal consumption and environmental 
release, and on the other hand, as the promoter and funder of agricultural biotechnology 
development and industry. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
My analysis brings into focus the interrelationship among Canada’s biotechnology 
strategy, policy implementation, and regulatory practices and the interventions by the 
state and civil society organizations in these processes.  Capitalist states embedded in 
transnational networks promote value accumulation through policy implementation and 
regulatory practices geared at capturing competitive opportunities while simultaneously 
seeking to mediate the partial interests of civil society organizations, individual capitals, 
and the general reproduction demands of capital as a whole.  The GM crops narrative is 
in part about the tension between compliant government structures and resistant civil 
society action seeking to partially counter the encroachment of the capitalist market. 
The development, adoption, and production of agricultural biotechnology in the 
Canadian context is not only the result of the efforts of individual capitals, but also those 
of the Canadian state.  This raises issues about the relationship of the state to, on the 
one hand, capitalist social relations, and on the other hand, science and technology.  
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Regarding the relationship of the state to capitalist social relations, an extensive debate 
exists in the Marxist literature (for reviews of this debate see, for example, Clarke, 
1991a; Jessop, 1982).  By virtue of its insertion into the structure of capitalist social 
relations, the state must promote value accumulation and reproduce the capitalist 
system.  The social relations of capitalism require a regularized set of behaviours as 
well as the assurance of particular interaction between classes.  The state continues to 
be the arbiter of that interaction and an entity which enforces an environment that is 
most amenable for the continuation of capitalist development.  However, the particular 
form (e.g., policies and regulatory practices) the state implements and the outcomes are 
contingent on specific historical, geographical, and material conditions prevalent under 
capitalist social relations.  Clarke (1991b, 168-169) noted, “The state does not constitute 
the social relations of production, it is essentially a regulative agency, whose analysis, 
therefore, presupposes the analysis of the social relations of which the state is 
regulative. The analysis of the capitalist state conceptually presupposes the analysis of 
capital and of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, despite the fact that 
in reality, of course, the state is itself a moment of the process of reproduction”.  The 
Government of Canada’s agricultural biotechnology policy, regulation, and funding 
regimes demonstrate the degree to which the economic is embedded in political 
structures of power as well as the reflexive nature of those political forms that depend in 
part on the economy for their continued existence. 
Regarding the relationship of the state to science and technology, the Canadian 
state has been a critical non-economic actor in the drive toward agricultural 
biotechnology R&D aimed at commodity production.  Interestingly, this is contrary to the 
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neo-liberal rhetoric advanced since the 1980s about the state withdrawing from active 
participation in the economic markets and political regulation and control of advanced 
industrial capital (Harvey, 2005).  In fact, the Government of Canada’s agricultural 
biotechnology science and technology policy implementation, regulatory practices, and 
funding structures have become part of the general and external guarantees of the 
social conditions of production directed toward specific capitals as well as the sector as 
a whole.  This demonstrates that in order for the state to ensure value accumulation and 
the reproduction of the capitalist system it must provide certain tangible, advantageous 
preconditions.  The pursuit of growth policies necessitates an infrastructure that requires 
significant capital outlays which cannot be realized by individual capitals.  Public policy 
is utilized to transfer social surplus value into particular sectors that not only give extra 
incentives to develop science and technology, but minimize the associated risks of 
venturing into such avenues (Hirsch, 1978; Loeppky, 2005).  This is orchestrated, as 
has been discussed, in different ways, such as funding projects, tax relief incentives, 
infrastructure development, and so on.  By accepting and promoting capitalist control 
over the development of biotechnology R&D, the Canadian state has been compelled to 
operate in ways that ensure the success of the industry for the greater goal of 
contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
The state’s involvement in science and technology represents a field in which 
particular groups can gain ascendancy while negotiating for the most advantageous 
policy.  Indeed, the state can, against the will of many capitals, force the procurement of 
scientific and technological advance.  Accordingly, state science and technology policy 
cannot be understood as the smooth reaction of the requirements of (re)production 
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(Hirsch, 1978), but by the partial interests of civil society, individual capitals, and the 
general reproduction demands of capital as a whole.  The theoretical understanding of 
the state in relation to technology must, like all state functions, be mediated through the 
course and results of political (class) struggle.  In this sense, not only is the examination 
of state policy an examination of fundamental social relations, but the specific case of 
agricultural biotechnology in Canada offers an illustration of its contradictory tendencies.  
In the face of the separation between the political and the economic, the state’s 
ostensible ‘neutral’ mobilization is systematically pressed into the service of the partial 
interests of capital (Leoppky, 2005). 
Moreover, civil society action has been effective, for example, by pressuring sub-
national and national levels of authority to implement moratoria on the production and/or 
importation of GM crops and foods, and by directly challenging multinational 
corporations, the institutionalization of systems of private regulation, and the creation of 
new market categories (Hall and Moran, 2006; Harsh, 2014; Heller, 2006; King and 
Pearce, 2010; Schurman and Munro, 2009).  In the Canadian case, the strong 
opposition to the adoption of GM wheat has illustrated the historical, political, and 
cultural significance of wheat farming, and its role in crop rotation, seed saving, and the 
economic viability of farmers.  Farmers and consumers voiced concerns about 
environmental implications, international market opposition, and the lack of 
transparency in the formulation of policies and regulation of GM crops (Eaton, 2009, 
2011, 2013; Magnan, 2007; Marcoux and Létourneau, 2013).  Indeed, as Prudham and 
Morris (2006, 168) noted “the culturally loaded and embedded character of food as a 
class of commodities throws these tensions into sharp relief, and biotechnology – as a 
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controversial suite of innovations with intersecting social, ethical, environmental, and 
health implications – provides rich opportunities for exploring how they work themselves 
out”. 
In this chapter I contribute to the academic literature by providing a different 
perspective on the role of the state in the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops in Canada and internationally.  Moving away from institutionalist perspectives that 
consider the state an autonomous actor and an institutional ensemble that is 
independent of society, I show that the basic orientations and policies of the state are 
determined by the pattern of capitalist accumulation, which in turn determine the role 
and policies of the state towards agricultural biotechnology development.  State-led 
development of agricultural biotechnology in service of the private sector implies a 
considerable socialization of the relevant costs, which is compatible with the class 
character of the state.  The class character of the state implies that technological 
development should contribute to the reproduction of the prevailing relations of 
production.  Moreover, and especially under the current conditions of agricultural 
restructuring, the state tends to follow a technological development policy that 
contributes to the improvement on the returns to capital.  This concerns the agricultural 
biotechnology industry as well as agriculture and the agro-food system, where the 
technology may be productively utilized.  Growing competition in high-tech industries 
and the need to improve on the returns to capital are shaping novel developments in 
agricultural biotechnology in such a way as to allow a flexible restructuring of production 
and the minimization of the private cost of production. 
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Other authors have brought into focus a framework for understanding the 
development of science and technology that emphasizes the interrelationship among 
agricultural production, biotechnology, and the interventions by the state and civil 
society organizations.  In terms of understanding the role of science and technology in 
these processes, some authors highlighted the advent of the knowledge economy and 
the increasing interchange between academic and industrial research, science-based 
regulation and global trade liberalization, and the relationship between scientists and 
the public (Kelly et al., 2011; Kinchy et al., 2008).  GMO regulatory efforts have been 
influenced by the scientific community, NGOs, the US and other OECD member 
countries, international organizations (e.g., Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the National Academy of Sciences, the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization) and the biotechnology 
industry.  At issue has been the role of governance and the implications of regulation in 
mediating the debates and managing the associated risks.  Various states operating at 
multiple scales are responding to the opportunities and threats presented by GMOs and 
the intersection of these dynamics with broader economic, social, and environmental 
agendas (Freeman et al., 2011; Twardowski and Małyska, 2015; Uchtmann and Nelson, 
2000).  Although these processes have been anything but linear, often incorporating the 
shifting positions of industry, the research community, environmental groups, regulators, 
among others, several authors contend that regulatory measures, often introduced as a 
response to public and interest group discontent, have generally reduced industrial 
uncertainty and promoted biotechnology development (Cocklin et al., 2008; Hansen, 
2001) by providing billions of dollars in state-provided financial incentives (e.g., tax 
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relief, funding) concentrated among private sector investors and designed to spur 
innovation (Moretti and Wilson, 2014). 
Given these developments, many governments around the world remain 
committed to a ‘biotechnology future’ that includes novel plants and foods; however, 
what exactly this future will hold is yet to be determined.  Governments that favor the 
development of biotechnology do so for the advancement of national science and a 
competitive edge in the knowledge economy, improving competitiveness in food and 
fiber production, and invoking issues surrounding global food security.  Countervailing 
arguments raise questions about risks to human health and the environment, the lack of 
democratic decision-making, and the sustainability of farming and rural communities.  
There can be little doubt, then, that social tensions surrounding GMOs will continue 
(Cocklin et al., 2008).  
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Chapter Five 
 
Science, Technology, and Agricultural Biotechnology Discourse 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A number of international and national reports have been published that promote the 
adoption of biotechnology as part of national economic growth and development 
strategies (see, for example, CGIAR, 2000; FAO, 2004; Government of Canada, 2003; 
Health Canada, 2005; UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 2007).  Apparent throughout these 
reports is the fostering of science and technology as powerful tools for human progress.  
People can use technology “to increase their incomes, live longer, be healthier, enjoy a 
better standard of living, participate more in their communities and lead more creative 
lives” (UNDP, 2001, 27).  The claim is made that scientific research and activities “bring 
modern science to bear on difficult productivity and institutional problems that have 
proven intractable in the past” (CGIAR, 2000, 2).  Participating in the forefront of 
scientific and technological development is regarded as an essential aspect for 
improving human well-being and competing on the global stage (World Bank, 2007).  
Similar claims are made in the Canadian context.  Recent scientific discoveries “have 
significantly increased our ability to develop new knowledge and innovative products 
and processes such as pest-resistant crops with higher yields, better disease diagnostic 
tools, and treatments that complement one’s genetic make-up.  The life sciences sector 
is research-based and capital-intensive and could yield positive benefits in such fields 
as health care, the environment, safety, agriculture, aquaculture, economic 
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development, food safety and sustainable development” (Health Canada, 2005) and “all 
aspects of the development and application of biotechnology are responsibly managed, 
striking a balance between the detection and management of risk, and the development 
of new discoveries, in order to capture the technology’s long-term health, environmental 
and economic benefits” (Government of Canada, 2003, 3). 
Embedded in the science and technology narrative is an emphasis on the 
importance of agricultural R&D and the socio-economic benefits that the adoption of GM 
crops will bring “when appropriate innovations are developed” (FAO, 2004, 6).  This 
includes capacity building at the technical, institutional, and management levels, the 
development of appropriate forms of public- and private-sector partnerships in 
agricultural and social science research and education that focus on development 
goals, and investment in farmers and other rural actors’ learning and capacity to 
critically assess, define, and engage in locally-directed development processes (FAO, 
2004).  In the Canadian context, extensive applications of biotechnology have been 
used to develop plants with enhanced or novel traits.  Novel plant traits include 
herbicide tolerance and pest, insect and virus resistance as introduced into crops like 
corn, soy, and canola.  New applications in food and agriculture promise to provide 
foods with enhanced nutritional benefits.  The results of these initiatives “will contribute 
to positioning Canada as a world leader in food safety, innovation and environmentally 
responsible production” (Government of Canada, 2003, 17). 
According to Herring (2007, 2), “Science is the fulcrum on which this contentious 
politics rests.  Science as agnostic method for adjudicating truth claims in applied 
genomics is overwhelmed by a politicised science constructed either as target or 
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legitimation in strategies of corporations, government agencies, evangelical politicians, 
social movements and NGOs”.  This debate has produced divergent claims.  At one end 
of the spectrum, proponents argue that there is a contest between science and 
Luddism.  The presumption is made that science answers questions in normative theory 
and risk preferences.  At the other end of the spectrum is the claim that science is 
transgressing into realms that belong only to God (Charles, 2006), and the depiction of 
GM crops as ‘Frankenfoods’ (Serageldin and Persley, 2000).  According to this view, 
the genomics revolution will unleash unimagined evils upon humanity from ecological 
disasters to bioterrorism.  Such “[d]ivergent claims to knowledge reflect and justify 
widely varying, socially conditioned distributions of risk aversion and risk acceptance” 
(Herring, 2007, 3). 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how discourses about 
biotechnology, GM crops, scientific progress, and economic development are employed 
to sustain and legitimate the use of GM crops.  For the purpose of this chapter, 
discourse refers to a “specific series of representations, practices and performances 
through which meanings are produced, connected into networks and legitimized” 
(Gregory, 2000, 180).  In particular, “discourses are not free-floating constructions but 
are materially implicated in the conduct of social life; they are embedded in institutions 
and subject positions but typically cut across and circulate through multiple institutions 
and subject positions” (Gregory, 2000, 180).  Moreover, discourses may be understood 
as an inherent aspect of ideology.  Following Eagleton (1991, 193-194), ideology is a 
term that categorizes different things that have to do with signs.  For example, 
‘bourgeois ideology’ refers to a wide range of discourses that have a common element, 
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not in the sense of some invariable structure of categories, but a network of overlapping 
features.  Ideology may be regarded as a discursive or semiotic phenomenon where 
materiality is emphasized and a sense of meanings is preserved.  Eagleton stated 
(1991, 194 italics in original), “Talk of signs and discourses is inherently social and 
practical…It may help to view ideology less as a particular set of discourses, than as a 
particular set of effects within discourses”.  Such discourses produce different kinds of 
effects where certain forms of signification are highlighted and others muted depending 
on the context of one communication to the next. 
Drawing on this conceptualization, I address the following questions: how has the 
federal government of Canada and industry constructed and sustained a pro-GM crops 
discourse?  In what ways has the pro-GM crops discourse been narrowly conceived?  
What are the purported benefits of GM crops for adopting countries in the Global North 
and South?  In what ways and how effective has been the dissemination of the pro-GM 
crops discourse?  I argue that the state and sections of civil society, government 
scientists and bureaucrats, corporations, and industry supported websites and NGOs 
have played an important role in the construction of a pro-GM crops discourse.  Such a 
discourse sustains and legitimizes the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops by positioning agricultural biotechnology as a panacea for perplexing socio-
economic problems such as (inter) national economic growth and development, a 
stagnating agricultural industry, health and environmental issues, population growth and 
poverty, and so on.  The manipulation of the pro-GM crops discourse serves to control 
the discursive norms and institutional contexts that surround agricultural biotechnology.  
This process seeks to represent the interest of capitalist accumulation and those of 
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individual capitals as the general interests of the Canadian public and farming 
communities therefore establishing and maintaining some of the conditions that ensure 
the success of the industry for the greater goal of contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
The analysis in the chapter primarily revolves around the fostering of science and 
technology in constructing a pro-GM crops discourse.  I conducted interviews with five 
Government of Canada scientists, three anti-GMO activists from Greenpeace Canada 
and the CBAN, two farmers from the Canadian NFU, and two government bureaucrats 
from Industry Canada.  A number of general questions were asked about attitudes 
toward biotechnology, how GM crops issues are best communicated to the public, the 
links between the government and industry, and other broader topics including the 
future of plant biotechnology and reasons for the negative public reactions to GM crops 
in Canada and different places around the world.  Select responses were gathered from 
the interviews that demonstrate the various ways a pro-GM crops discourse has been 
constructed.  In addition, I identified common words, phrases, and ideas which are 
routinely employed by government and industry in publications and websites which 
purport the great benefits that technological advancements in agricultural biotechnology 
and the development, adoption, and production of GM crops will reap for the Canadian 
public and farming communities.  Lastly, I scrutinize various public meeting reports, pro-
GMO websites, and media publications through which the pro-GM crops discourse has 
been disseminated. 
The chapter is organized in the following way.  In section 5.2 Constructing a 
Pro-GM Crops Discourse I examine the ways ‘sound science’, the ‘authority’ of 
scientists (section 5.2.1 ‘Sound Science’ and the ‘Authority’ of Scientists), and the 
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appeal to science (section 5.2.2 An Appeal to Science) are employed to sustain and 
legitimate the adoption and production of GM crops.  In section 5.3 Disseminating the 
Pro-GM Crops Discourse I scrutinize the various methods through which the pro-GM 
crops discourse is disseminated.  In section 5.4 Conclusion I provide a summary of the 
findings, draw out some conceptual implications, and situate the contribution of the 
chapter in the broader academic literature. 
 
5.2 Constructing a Pro-GM Crops Discourse 
 
5.2.1 ‘Sound Science’ and the ‘Authority’ of Scientists 
One of the ways that the Government of Canada and the Canadian industry have 
sustained and legitimized the adoption and production of GM crops is by constructing a 
pro-GM crops ‘science-based’ discourse.  This has occurred in part by drawing on and 
propagating opinions from ‘authoritative’ sources in the debate over the use of GM 
crops.  The Government of Canada scientists and bureaucrats have played an 
important role in this regard.  Comments from interviews with government scientists and 
bureaucrats illustrate how ideas about ‘proper’ science conceived by a narrowly defined 
scientific community, and an ill-informed, naive, and irrational public, that lacks an 
understanding of the notion of absolute versus relative risk, have been used to construct 
this discourse. 
A clear distinction was made by government scientists that I interviewed between 
what they considered ‘expert’ and ‘non-expert’ opinion in the debate over the use of GM 
crops.  The former was often associated with a narrowly defined scientific community 
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and the latter with those outside of that community.  The general assumption was that 
only opinions from ‘proper’ scientists were valid while opinions from people with some 
scientific training, social scientists, or scientists that are opposed to GM crops, are for 
the most part simply dismissed.  This may be illustrated by the following response from 
a government scientist when discussing the development of agricultural biotechnology. 
At the risk of sounding derogatory, there are very few scientists that really 
understand the technology.  I mean, let’s face it, for those scientists that 
reject the technology, the question I have is on what scientific basis are 
they doing this?  Most of the criticisms we hear are based on opinion and 
not on scientific facts.  The scientific community that supports this 
technology has based its opinion on scientific findings derived from proper 
scientific enquiry, and quite frankly, there are relatively few people in that 
community that do not support the development of this technology and for 
those that do not agree, well then I would question on what basis they are 
reaching their conclusion.  I would say that, as far as I am concerned, 
scientists who do not understand the technology should be more rational 
in their approach and listen to those who do because they are getting 
themselves worried about areas that they know very little about 
(Government of Canada Scientist 1). 
 
This perspective problematically makes the assumption that there is consensus among 
scientists regarding the development of agricultural biotechnology, when in fact the 
scientific debate has intensified both inside the Government of Canada’s scientific 
community and outside of it.  For example, 200 scientists from Health Canada's Health 
Protection Branch signed a petition that, among other things, raised alarm at the acute 
shortage of scientists for evaluation and risk assessment of GM foods.  Public-health 
critics also attacked the regulatory system for relying on data supplied by industry rather 
than original research (Tam, 1999).  In addition, many studies by world-renowned 
scientists that highlight some of the negative impacts of GM foods have been published 
in peer-reviewed scientific journals despite the claim that such studies are flawed.  One 
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of the most publicized cases that demonstrated the maligning of independent research 
was that of world-renowned expert on lectins Pusztai, whose research indicated that a 
GM potato diet weakened rats’ immune systems and adversely affected the animals’ 
internal organs.  Pusztai shared with the media his findings, following which he was 
sacked from his research post with Scotland's Rowett Research Institute, his research 
team was disbanded, his research papers were confiscated, and he was prohibited from 
speaking with the media (Verzola, 1999). 
An activist from Greenpeace Canada in an interview commented about the 
narrow aspect of the ‘science-based’ discourse that the Government of Canada 
scientists and corporations have generated.  The issue that was raised concerns the 
relationship between agricultural biotechnology research funding, which has 
predominantly come from the biotechnology industry, and the dissemination of 
information about research findings.  This raises concerns about the data generated 
from the biotechnology industry about GM products.  In addition, public awareness 
about which foods are made with genetic modification has been curtailed due to a lack 
of transparency from the biotechnology industry. 
Part of the strategy for corporations and the government has been to 
delegitimize the public’s opposition to a particular technology by narrowing 
the debate to very specific issues, like the importance of ‘scientific’ 
research, at the expense of socio-economic factors that go beyond the 
science-based discourse.  This is made possible, in part, because of the 
mass budgets and resources available from the corporations and the 
government to disseminate their own positions on biotechnology and 
genetic engineering.  Also, for the most part, the public is not even aware 
of how pervasive the use of genetic engineering has become.  We are all 
consumers of genetically engineered products, whether or not we are 
aware of it.  So, the silencing part of the discourse has been just as 
effective.  It is not only about what they tell you, it is also about what they 
do not tell you.  For this reason, among others, lay knowledge has been 
very limited (Greenpeace Canada Activist 3). 
222 
 
Additional interviews with government scientists demonstrate the undermining of 
public disquiet as ill-informed, naive, irrational, and lacking an understanding of the 
notion of absolute risk versus relative risk. 
Sometimes I think there is no point in discussing these things with the 
public or even researchers because I feel like I am talking to people that 
really do not understand enough of the technical aspects of the 
technology.  There’s no point just discussing GM because that’s in a 
vacuum.  To discuss GM you have to have people knowing what’s 
happening in genetics, what’s happening in biology, what’s happening 
with the food position, what does nutrition mean, and on and on.  Now, I 
am not saying that I am well versed in all these areas and can say 
something worthwhile about every aspect of this technology, no, but I am 
a geneticist and have had extensive training and experience in this 
particular area and can speak intelligently about certain issues regarding 
GM, however, this is a conversation that I can only have with other 
scientists and not the general public (Government of Canada Scientist 2). 
 
People outside of this scientific community were predominantly conceived as having no 
relevant expertise, any intermediate degree of scientific knowledge, or any general 
critical ability in assessing the arguments of ‘experts’ and ‘pressure’ groups.  This 
perception is then used to explain the vulnerability of those outside this scientific 
community to manipulation by opponents of GM crops, including anti-GMO groups, and 
consequently as something to be remedied by education.  Any concerns about the risks 
associated with GM crops and reassurances of risk-free GM crops were often viewed as 
the result of a lack of understanding of the notion of absolute versus relative risk.  These 
points may be illustrated by the following quotes from interviews with two government 
scientists. 
The rise in many of the anti-GMO groups, websites, farmers, and the rest 
of it, in my opinion, is because of the incredible amount of misinformation 
out there in the public.  It is relatively easy to sway people against GM 
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because there is a lack of education and understanding about the 
technology.  A lot of this has been driven by green parties, which I think 
play on the fears of the unknown.  A lot of the rather sensationalist press 
has got a lot to do with the very anti-feelings about GM in this country at 
the moment, because scare stories sell papers, and good news doesn’t.  
Once people become better informed than I think we will see a turn in 
terms of the support for the technology (Government of Canada Scientist 
3). 
 
The public in general is concerned about the risks involved with the 
adoption of GM crops.  This to me seems like one of the biggest issues.  
For this reason many people are absolutely against the adoption of GM 
crops.  Those that are against it because of the risks involved usually 
have a naive conception of risk.  They want to be told that there is 
absolutely no risk, and as a scientist I can’t tell them that.  I can’t say to 
the public that it is absolutely safe, and for the public to expect that any 
kind of technology has no risks attached to it is completely irrational.  All 
you can do is tell people that up to this point the technology has been 
reasonably safe.  Of course, mistakes have been made, and accidents 
have happened, but when you say this, then the response is, ‘aha, you 
mean it’s not safe’ and my response is, ‘no, I didn’t say that, I said it has 
been reasonably safe’.  This kind of reaction is generally the result of a 
lack of education about, one, the issues with the development of any 
technology, and two, an understanding of what risk entails (Government 
of Canada Scientist 4). 
 
The claim that the public lacks knowledge and can only engage on an emotional 
level with the issues was then key to a further argumentative twist, allowing public 
opposition to be explained as entirely created by the media and NGOs, rather than the 
possibility that such opposition was spontaneous, considered, or an autonomous 
response.  This characterization of public opinion appeared to free the government 
scientists that I interviewed from having to engage with public disquiet.  When asked 
directly, many of them spoke in favour of communicating with non-experts, although 
what seemed to be envisaged was a one-way communication in which members of the 
public would be educated.  The impression was as if there are no members of the public 
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or scientists who are also campaigning proponents.  Opposition to GM crops was seen 
as emanating from organizations acting upon a malleable and passive public, rather 
than from the public itself.  The two main sources of opposition were seen as 
campaigning NGOs and the media, all of whom were judged to be acting in their own 
interests and making decisions without authority on the public’s behalf.  Journalists were 
seen as fickle, unconcerned with truth, and motivated only by the need for a ‘good 
story’.  Anti-GMO protestors and activists were less frequently mentioned, though when 
they were, it was often in a condemnatory manner. 
The sentiment of scientists has also been supported by government bureaucrats 
who do not permit including ‘non-scientific’ issues into regulatory assessments of GM 
crops.  The Conference Board of Canada (2016), for example, is an “independent, 
evidence-based, not-for-profit applied research organization in Canada” that has been 
supportive of the biotechnology industry by opposing any efforts to introduce non-
scientific issues into regulatory reviews because of concerns over lengthening the 
review process and approval time-frames (see Munn-Venn and Mitchell, 2005).  This 
perspective was also voiced in an interview with an Industry Canada employee. 
What makes the whole thing so complicated is that the public does not 
know or understand the benefits from all the biotechnology applications.  
We take comfort that the decisions we make are made in conjunction with 
technical experts, who really know what they are talking about.  The anti-
GM people just hate the technology and for a lot of different reasons.  
Depending on who you speak to – some only want organic, others are just 
scared, and others have made it their life mission to just be anti-GMO.  
Well, how in the world do you take everyone’s ideas into consideration?  
People who are opposed want us to interweave political, societal, ethical, 
emotional issues and if you do that you will just delay everything, increase 
costs, have unnecessary testing and labeling, all these issues are really 
non-science based.  You just can’t respond to everything everyone has to 
say about GM.  Do these people really have any idea how beneficial this 
225 
technology has been for Canadians?  Look at the canola industry, this is 
one of Canada’s success stories (Industry Canada Employee 1). 
 
By disregarding public concerns about biotechnology, the Government of 
Canada has maintained the perspective that the public, for the most part, is ignorant of 
the purported benefits that the technology will reap for Canadians.  One farmer from the 
NFU in an interview stated, “By suggesting that the new ‘religion’ is science and its high 
priest is the ‘scientist’ the Government of Canada and industry have been successful at 
promoting that the ‘truth’ about biotechnology should be almost blindly accepted” (NFU 
Farmer 1).  This has been an effective strategy, on the one hand, the Government of 
Canada has been actively promoting and supporting the development of the 
biotechnology sector for more than twenty-five years, and on the other hand, the 
multinational corporations that dominate that sector have been aggressively marketing 
the technology.  Any attempts at questioning these processes and in any way hindering 
their development is met with obdurate resistance on the part of government scientists, 
bureaucrats, and the industry. 
In an interview with another NFU farmer, similar sentiments were expressed.  
The issue raised here is the relationship between regulatory approvals and the kind of 
information released about agricultural biotechnology.  While a ‘science-based’ 
approach to biotechnology regulation on the surface appears to be neutral, it becomes 
clear following some scrutiny that the primary objective of such an approach is the 
support and promotion of the industry, while all along the Canadian public and 
Canadian farmers have been told that this is in their best interest. 
The government and the industry have worked really closely together in 
constructing the regulatory process.  By doing this, what they have 
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essentially done is control the kind of information that they generate about 
GM.  This way only the type of information they want to be included in the 
regulatory reviews actually gets included and the information they do not 
want is simply left out.  We hear a lot about the science and we hear a lot 
about how this is going to help the farming industry and farmers but I am 
very wary about it all because it seems to me that it’s more about the GM 
people who are benefiting the most from all this, especially the big 
corporations selling us all the products, and somehow this is great for all 
Canadians and for farming?  I don’t really trust everything they say and I 
really wonder how much of it is true and how much is a big smoke screen 
for a bunch of executives and bureaucrats to make more money from the 
farming industry while telling all the public that this is going to help 
everyone and somehow GM is the answer to all the farming issues (NFU 
Farmer 2). 
 
In summary, the Government of Canada and the Canadian industry have 
constructed a pro-GM crops ‘science-based’ discourse.  The Government of Canada 
has distinguished between, on the one hand, ‘proper’ science and ‘expert’ opinion 
conceived by a narrowly defined scientific community, and on the other hand, the 
‘flawed’ studies and ‘non-expert’ opinion of those outside of that community.  This has 
occurred despite the fact that there has not been a clear concensus among government 
scientists in Canada and internationally as to the effectiveness of the scientific 
evaluation and risk assessment of GM crops, where in some cases studies that 
highlight the negative impacts of GM crops have been maligned. 
Also, some government scientists have undermined public disquiet as ill-
informed, naive, and irrational.  The public has been predominantly viewed as having no 
relevant expertise, any intermediate degree of scientific knowledge, or any general 
critical ability in assessing the arguments of ‘experts’ and ‘pressure’ groups.  As a result, 
the claim has been made that the public is malleable, often succumbing to manipulation 
by anti-GMO groups.  Any concerns about the risks associated with GM crops were 
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often viewed as the result of a lack of understanding of the notion of absolute versus 
relative risk.  
Lastly, the sentiment of government scientists has also been supported by 
government bureaucrats who do not permit including ‘non-scientific’ issues into 
regulatory assessments of GM crops.  Although incorporating a more rigorous 
regulatory practices may appease a generally distraught public, the claim is made that 
such practices would unnecessarily lengthen review processes and approval-times, and 
therefore deny the purported benefits that GM crops will bring to the Canadian public 
and farming communities. 
 
5.2.2 An Appeal to Science 
Given the authoritative role of scientists, perhaps the most deeply rooted premise in the 
pro-GM crops discourse is that the answers to all questions about the use of GM crops 
are to be found exclusively in the confines of science.  It is as though, once the scientific 
evidence can be agreed upon, then all the purported benefits from the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops will automatically follow.  This problematically 
implies that there are only two criteria surrounding the debate about the use of GM 
crops, ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’, and thus denies the validity of any other criteria 
(e.g., political, economic, cultural).  To say that there are dimensions of the debate 
which are not scientific, however, is neither to dismiss scientific evidence nor to 
succumb to irrationality and prejudice.  Although scientific findings are of critical 
importance, they do not encompass the entire debate over the use of GM crops.  The 
concern, in other words, has been much more with an appeal to science rather than 
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with science itself.  This reflects a common supposition that when a scientist speaks, in 
whatever forum, on whatever topic, and in whatever style, something of his or her 
authority carries over into other domains.  In this way, science has come to be seen less 
as a way of proceeding or as a mode of thought, and more as the property of a 
particular group of people (Cook, 2005, 77-80).  Government scientists that I 
interviewed subscribed either implicitly or explicitly to a causal relationship between 
scientific evidence and action regarding the use of GM crops with little to no 
consideration of any other issues. 
Those of us in the labs and with the right kind of training are the ones who 
are doing all the research.  That’s why we insist that this is proper 
scientific work, and that’s why we are convinced that the results we have 
are the right results.  We are engaged here in very serious business with 
very highly trained people.  When regulatory decisions are made it is 
because those decisions are made based on sound scientific facts.  
Obviously, the people that are against what we are doing do not 
understand the science, and maybe they have their own agendas.  I can’t 
really speak for them, all I can tell you is the Canadian public has nothing 
to worry about.  The bottom line though is that our experiments, and 
believe me millions and millions has been spent on this, at the end of the 
day show that there is nothing that we need to be worried about.  We, as 
scientists, are committed to the development of this technology.  This is 
not something which we do independently; we work as part of a group 
under strict science-based regulations.  A lot of this is carried out in 
partnership with other federal government organizations, as well as 
industry people, university academics, and even people from NGOs 
(Government of Canada Scientist 5). 
 
We have to put our trust in scientific facts and not what people’s opinions 
are about this or that technology.  Also, I think that the Government of 
Canada is relying on scientific-based evidence to make decisions about 
whether or not to continue with the development of biotechnology in 
agriculture or any other field.  Once we know the facts then we can make 
the right decisions.  It is really just as simple as that (Government of 
Canada Scientist 3). 
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The appeal to science may also be illustrated by some of the common words, 
phrases, and ideas which are routinely employed by government and industry that 
sustain and legitimize the pro-GM crops discourse and the use of GM crops.  The 
following are some examples of the various claims made by Government of Canada 
websites and reports.  Scientists, technicians, and staff work “to create better 
opportunities for farmers and all Canadians through agricultural research and 
innovation” (AAFC, 2016).  Agricultural biotechnology research activities are aimed at 
“the development of new food products through a variety of scientific tools and 
techniques” (Health Canada, 2014).  Canadian producers and processors “are free to 
adopt technologies that have undergone science-based safety assessments under 
Canada’s rigorous regulatory system.  Some Canadian producers have determined that 
new technologies, including GM crops, provide important benefits, and have adopted 
them” (Government of Canada, 2014).  Canada’s participation in “international 
knowledge networks on biotechnology and sustainable development…improve the 
quality of life of people in developing countries” (Government of Canada, 2007, 7).  
AAFC “works to improve Canadians’ quality of life by undertaking research and 
development programs that support the production of safe and nutritious food, maintain 
a healthy environment and develop innovative technologies.  Biotechnology is an 
important tool in helping AAFC’s scientists secure this goal” (Government of Canada, 
2003, 16). 
Similar claims are made by industry-supported and corporate websites.  
According to BIOTECanada (2009), “With increased knowledge of plants through 
genome sequencing projects we will see continued improvements in yield and quality of 
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food crops…In the future, consumers will be able to choose fruits and vegetables that 
stay fresh longer and grains that contain essential micronutrients or healthier oils”.  
According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications 
“biotech crops can be used collectively for ‘speeding the breeding’…range of traits 
include those for improved drought and salinity tolerance, yield enhancement, efficient 
nitrogen utilization, increased nutrition and food quality, resistance to pests and 
diseases, including resistance to viruses” (James, 2013).  Monsanto (2014b) pledges to 
“share knowledge and technology to advance scientific understanding, to improve 
agriculture and the environment, to improve crops, and to help farmers in developing 
countries”.  DuPont (2016) claims to be “the premier specialty food ingredient and safety 
leader [bringing] together a wide range of sustainable food ingredients to increase the 
quality of food products, while improving their health profile and shelf life”.  Syngenta 
(2016) claims to be a “business that helps humanity face its toughest challenge: how to 
feed a rising population, sustainably. Our world class science and innovative crop 
solutions transform how crops are grown to enable millions of growers to make better 
use of available resources”.  In general, the message behind these statements is that 
technological advancements in agricultural biotechnology and the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops will reap great benefits for humanity.  Such 
statements, however, prejudge the issues which are supposed to be under discussion: 
whether or not the use of GM crops will result in all the purported benefits.  Also, there 
is a virtual absence of reference to the political and economic implications of the use of 
GM crops (e.g., how policy decisions are made about it, the nature and speed of its 
implementation, or accusations of improper influence being exerted by governments, 
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corporations, or scientific bodies) even though some of these issues feature prominently 
in the anti-GMO literature and in reactions of the public to GM crops. 
In addition, there is a blurring of the distinction between genetic modification and 
natural processes, where the former is normalized as part of the latter, further 
legitimatizing the development of biotechnology as part of the history of the genetic 
manipulation of plants (Stone, 2010).  For example, the Canadian National Research 
Council’s Institute for Nutritional Biosciences and Health maintained that its R&D focus 
is “on developing bioactive compounds from natural products” (Government of Canada, 
2003, 67) and that the Canadian Institute for National Research Council Plant 
Biotechnology research programs are regarded as part of the development of high-
quality crops that enhance “naturally derived plant compounds” (Government of 
Canada, 2003, 70).  Moreover, according to the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory 
Committee, the boundaries between genetic modification and natural processes are 
expected to be pushed even further “challenging old categories around which we have 
constructed our worldview and our institutions – “agriculture vs. medicine”, “natural vs. 
artificial”, “animal vs. human”, “machine vs. living being”, “person vs. object”, etc.” 
(CBAC, 2006, 4).  Similar claims were made in some of the international literature.  
According to an OECD (2009) document, biotechnology has become so pervasive in 
global crop improvement programs that it is no longer useful to delimit categories such 
as ‘conventional’ and ‘modern’ when discussing crop breeding.  Also, according to a 
FAO (2011, 6) document, the “sharp category distinction between non-transgenic and 
transgenic approaches might be somewhat contrived in breeding terms, and may not be 
recognized by all crop scientists”. 
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This framing uncritically sustains “The “plant manipulation as progress” 
narrative”, where “domestication is genetic modification”, and is often combined with 
“the Malthusian specter of famine…casting hunger as a condition of nature” (Stone, 
2010, 384).  This may be illustrated by various statements on corporate websites: “[w]ith 
global population expected to grow by 40 percent in the next few decades, agriculture 
will need to become more productive and more sustainable in order to keep pace with 
rapidly increasing demands.  Many experts agree we will need to grow as much food in 
the next 50 years as we did in the past 10,000 years combined if we are to sustain our 
planet” (Monsanto, 2014c); and “More than 2.5 billion people depend on agriculture for 
their livelihoods. Improving the income of these people would be a great leap towards 
advancing the UN Millennium Development Goal of eradicating hunger and poverty.  As 
a company, we can help the farming community to prosper by providing tools that make 
agriculture more productive, efficient and profitable” (Syngenta, 2013a, 15).  According 
to former DuPont Chair and Chief Executive Officer Ellen Kullman, “DuPont has a 
unique vantage point on food security because we have innovations across the full 
value chain, allowing us to holistically address the challenge of feeding the growing 
global population.  Improving agricultural productivity, providing food and nutrition 
solutions and finding ways to protect food and reduce waste are all part of our strategy” 
(DuPont, 2014b).  Industry-supported websites make similar claims: “[a] growing 
population signals a global challenge requiring we grow food more efficiently and with 
greater nutritional value…A strong agricultural sector coupled with biotech innovation 
will position Canada and Canadian farmers to take advantage of the global 
opportunity…Feeding the world's growing population, projected to surpass 9 billion by 
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2050, requires farmers to produce 70% more food on less land than ever before” 
(BIOTECanada, 2016); and “[f]ood, feed, fiber, and fuel for the world’s 800 million 
people who suffer from hunger and poverty – this is the formidable task for many 
countries, development agencies, and other interest groups.  Of the many strategies 
that have been forwarded to address the issues of global poverty and environmental 
degradation, crop biotechnology is seen as a viable contribution to the solution” (ISAAA, 
2015).  This sentiment is also acknowledged by the Government of Canada.  According 
to the Chair of the Report of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food Larry 
Miller (2012, 48), biotechnology in farm production “is needed in order to increase farm 
productivity around the world and meet such challenges as a growing population, the 
need for water and climate change”; and “Canada’s food producers will increasingly 
depend on biotechnology.  With most of its potentially arable land already in production, 
Canada’s capacity to meet the ever-expanding demand for more and better food 
products by a growing world population will depend on such innovations” (Government 
of Canada, 2003, 17). 
Much of the rhetoric about the benefits of GM crops for growing populations and 
feeding the poor is predicated on a form of neo-Malthusianism, which is a combination 
of Malthusianism and technological determinism (see Das, 2002, 60-65 for a related 
discussion on the Green Revolution technology).  Some authors claim that GM crops 
technology is beneficial for the poor because of the physical properties of the 
technology: the technology will benefit small-scale resource-poor farmers because it is 
scale neutral (Lele, 2003); insect resistant GM crops alleviate financial vulnerabilities of 
farmers because the plants’ own biological processes substitute for cash-intensive 
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inputs such as insecticides (James, 2014); the poor will gain significant opportunities to 
improve their lives because GM crop technology addresses issues such as population 
growth, scarce land resources, environmental degradation, and climactic change 
(UNDP, 2001).  Moreover, they claim that the technology can be and ought to be more 
beneficial for the poor: GM crops developed and released for production ought to target 
the key food crops (rice, wheat, cassava, plantain, millet, sorghum, and legumes) and 
traits (resistance to drought, insects, diseases, and low yield and soil fertility) required 
by small-scale resource-poor farmers in developing countries (Fukuda-Parr, 2007).  
These points suggest that there is a necessary relationship between GM crop 
technology and poverty reduction; however, the effect of the technology on poverty 
reduction is contingent.  The only necessary effects of GM crop technology are 
technical or physical (e.g., greater yield), but the social effects (e.g., poverty reduction) 
are contingent.  To make the claim that GM crop technology is beneficial for the poor is 
to grant technology much more power than it can possibly have. 
Underlying the technological determinism is the looming threat of population 
growth.  Borlaug, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 1970 for the Green Revolution 
technology claimed, “Feeding 10 billion people” is “our twenty-first century challenge” 
(quoted in FAO, 2004, 26).  International authorities on food and hunger and the 
winners of the World Food Prize in 2001 Pinstrup-Andersen and Schiøler (2000) argued 
that food production must increase at a rate faster than population growth.  Leading 
scientist on biotechnology and the winner of the 2007 National Medal of Science 
Federoff noted, “molecular modification is the safest and most powerful technology 
we’ve ever developed for the daunting task of continuing to increase the amount of food 
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for a growing population and doing it more sustainably” (quoted in Navarro, 2015, 3).  
The main point these authors were making was that a growing population can be fed 
from constant land only through the application of GM crop technology; however, a 
population’s relation to poverty directly or its relation to GM crop technology’s impacts 
on poverty is also contingent.  Indeed the application of GM crop technology may 
increase food production, but whether or not this will result in reducing hunger in 
developing countries depends on a number of other factors.  What is underemphasized 
are the multiple determinations of population growth and poverty such as unequal 
power structures at multiple scales that affect the way food and other goods and 
services are produced and distributed, pauperization and proletarianization, income 
levels, social provisions, and so on.  As Altieri and Rosset (1999) argued, both densely 
populated countries such as Bangladesh and Haiti and sparsely populated countries 
such as Brazil and Indonesia go hungry despite the fact that the growth of the global 
agricultural productive potential has been more than sufficient to exceed population 
growth.  Also, global per capita food availability has risen from approximately 2220 
kcal/person/day in the early 1960s to 2790 kcal/person/day in 2006-08, while 
developing countries recorded a leap from 1850 kcal/person/day to over 2640 
kcal/person/day (FAO, 2012).  Most innovations in agricultural biotechnology, however, 
have been profit-driven rather than need-driven.  The real thrust of the agricultural 
biotechnology industry is not to make agriculture in developing countries more 
productive so as to address population growth and poverty, but rather to generate 
profits. 
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Such statements and ideas have been given further legitimacy by asserting they 
are based on ‘sound science’.  This phrase routinely appeared in corporate and 
government websites and documents: Monsanto advocates “for supportive policies, 
regulations and laws based on principles of sound science” (Monsanto, 2015b).  
Syngenta’s best management practices “were developed through sound science, 
common sense, and public outreach” (Syngenta, 2013b).  Bayer’s product stewardship 
principles include developing “quality varieties which will offer greater choice and 
improvements in crop production.  Through sound scientific techniques new seed 
technologies will further advance this offering providing useful and improved seed 
products to customers” (Bayer CropScience, 2009, 7).  The CFIA asserts that the “key 
to reliable regulation for consumer protection is sound science.  The CFIA has 
undertaken numerous research initiatives to enhance its detection and identification 
capacity for various biotechnology-derived products, including plants with novel traits 
(PNTs) and novel livestock feeds” (Government of Canada, 2003, 22).  Health Canada 
(2006) stated, “The increasing complexity and pace of advancement of new knowledge, 
together with the increasing impact of scientific and technological change on our lives, 
have intensified the demand for sound science advice in governance.  But science is 
not the sole domain of governments.  Sound science advice rests on a foundation of 
excellent science that has been widely sought and subjected to rigorous evaluation of 
its quality”.  These issues are addressed through a variety of different programs and 
activities that promote awareness about ‘sound science’ and research including the 
Health Canada Science Forums and the Omyot Lectures.  The annual Health Canada 
Science Forum was inaugurated in 2002 in order to give researchers and scientists the 
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opportunity to present and discuss their work and showcase major achievements.  One 
of the event's goals is to encourage a better understanding of Health Canada's scientific 
programs and activities.  The Omyot Lectures are a series of presentations given by 
distinguished Canadians in the health field to recognize excellence and to foster 
innovation and debate on leading health policy issues. 
The phrase ‘sound science’ implies that there is another type of science that is 
‘unsound’.  Science may be unsound in the sense that, while genuinely trying to follow 
scientific principles, it is full of mistakes: the methods are flawed, the evidence is wrong, 
or the calculations and inductions are incorrect.  This is the kind of allegation which is 
often levelled by proponents of GM crops against the work of those scientists who are 
opponents of GM crops.  Cook (2005, 95) noted, “The phrase ‘sound science’ is not in 
itself very sound.  When used by scientists it can become self-congratulatory (rather like 
Monsanto’s ‘thoughtful dialogue’) and circular: an epithet awarded by those on one side 
of a scientific dispute to themselves, and denied to their opponents”. 
In summary, the appeal to science rather than science itself may be illustrated by 
common words, phrases, and ideas which are routinely employed by government and 
industry in publications and websites.  In general, the message behind these statements 
is that technological advancements in agricultural biotechnology and the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops will reap great benefits for humanity, including 
addressing perplexing problems such as (inter) national economic growth and 
development, a stagnating agricultural industry, health and environmental issues, 
population growth and poverty, and so on.  Also, there is a blurring of the distinction 
between genetic modification and natural processes, where the former is normalized as 
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part of the latter, therefore legitimatizing the development of biotechnology as part of the 
history of the genetic manipulation of plants.  This framing is often combined with a form 
of neo-Malthusianism where the suggestion is made that there is a necessary 
relationship between GM crop technology and poverty reduction and that a growing 
population can be fed from constant land only through the application of GM crop 
technology.  Lastly, these ideas are given further legitimacy by the assertion that they 
are based on ‘sound science’.  This phrase routinely appeared in corporate and 
government websites and documents and implies that there is another type of science 
that is ‘unsound’.  Science may be unsound in the sense that it is full of errors: the 
methods are flawed, the evidence is wrong, or the calculations and inductions are 
incorrect.  This is the type of allegation which is often levelled by proponents of GM 
crops against the work of those scientists who are opponents of GM crops. 
 
5.3 Disseminating the Pro-GM Crops Discourse 
The Government of Canada has been actively engaged in the promotion of agricultural 
biotechnology since the late 1990s using various methods.  This, in part, was due to the 
increase of consumer and activist groups that were apprehensive about the number of 
genetically engineered food products that began appearing in the market.  Also, in the 
European context, Greenpeace along with Friends of the Earth played an instrumental 
role in challenging the European Union’s relatively permissive and supportive 
biotechnology strategy resulting in significant policy changes between 1996 and 1999 
which ended with the European Union turning against the adoption of GM products 
(Tiberghien, 2007).  Accordingly, then federal minister for the AAFC Lyle Vanclief held a 
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meeting that included: government bureaucrats; industry insiders (Byron Beeler, then 
president of Novartis and Ray Mowling, then president of Monsanto); industry lobbyists 
(Joyce Groote, then communication expert with BIOTECanada and Diane Weatherall 
then communication expert with the Food Biotechnology Communications Network); 
and media personnel (Anna Hobbs, then associate editor of Canadian Living 
magazine).  The purpose of the meeting was for government and industry to partner 
together along with other third party members in order to sway public opinion in favour 
of the development of agricultural biotechnology (Peekhaus, 2013, 202).  An activist 
from the CBAN explained, 
I think what was happening in Europe was key.  You have to keep in mind 
that at first Europeans really embraced the idea of introducing GMOs into 
the food supply.  What was happening there was similar to what was 
happening in the US, if you can believe that, everyone was on board; 
scientists, the public, the industry, farmers, you name it, there was even 
approval of products for import as well as production inside some 
countries, but things really started to change after the mid-90s.  It was 
actually our organization that was active raising awareness about the 
reality of GM foods.  We were also joined by other NGOs, green parties, 
and even anti-globalization groups.  You know, this wasn’t easy, it was a 
struggle and there was a lot of divisions at first even inside many 
European governments, but eventually some very restrictive policies were 
implemented in different countries and by the end of the 90s there were 
severe limits on the production and implementation of GM products.  Now, 
with all of this taking place, you can bet that other governments, including 
Canada, as well as the major industry players were watching and 
wondering if the same thing can happen elsewhere.  I mean, really, the 
entire industry was at stake if what happened in Europe spread.  There 
was a concerted effort that was made to promote GMOs in Canada 
beginning in the late-90s.  This was a proactive move on the part of 
government and industry, because there was resistance in Europe and 
already people were starting to question GMOs in Canada.  Millions and 
millions had already been spent developing products, both inside the 
government and industry.  Canada is a major producer of canola, and 
policy makers saw Canada as having strategic national interest for 
expanding and maintaining export competiveness, with farmers hopefully 
benefitting financially.  Of course, all of this supposedly depended on 
adopting GM varieties, which brings in the interests of huge corporations, 
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like Monsanto, that were aggressively marketing and selling their products 
not only in Canada but a lot of other countries.  It was a kind of case 
where big business and government came together for their own benefits 
with little concern about what the hell the rest of us thought (CBAN Activist 
3). 
 
The promotion of agricultural biotechnology has not been a small affair.  Between 
1997 and 2003, more than $13 million dollars was spent by the Government of Canada 
on various communications.  For example, the CFIA spent $2.5 million producing and 
distributing to all Canadian households a pamphlet entitled Food Safety and You.  This 
document focused on ensuring the public about Canada’s high standards of food safety 
and regulation.  $1.3 million went to the Consumers’ Association of Canada.  Founded 
in 1947, the association is Canada’s longest serving and most respected consumer 
organization whose mandate is “to inform and educate consumers on marketplace 
issues, to advocate for consumers with government and industry, and to work with 
government and industry to solve marketplace problems” (Consumers’ Association of 
Canada, 2016).  The Consumers’ Association of Canada and the Food Biotechnology 
Communications Network (FCBN) spent $300,000 producing a supplement for the 
Canadian Living magazine entitled A Growing Appetite for Information: Food 
Biotechnology in Canada.  The supplement stated, among other things, that the intent of 
its publication was to provide a “bias-free zone ... [and] a basic introduction to food 
biotechnology in Canada.  We look at products already on the market and those being 
developed, how products are approved in Canada, a dash of science, and a listing of 
Canadian government ministries, organizations, and associations interested in food 
biotechnology” (see CBAN, 2016a).  The target audience was women, the primary 
readers of the magazine and the main decision-makers regarding food purchases in 
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Canadian households.  $750,000 went to the FBCN.  Although disbanded in 2002, the 
FBCN provided science-based facts about agricultural biotechnology that targeted 
different stakeholders including farmers and consumers.  Dissemination of information 
included information kits, resource sheets on a variety of topics, a referral network of 
experts (150 corporate members from the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry), 
and a toll free information line.  $5.7 million went to the national industry association 
BIOTECanada.  This association represents Canada’s health, industrial, and agricultural 
biotechnology sectors.  The Industrial & Agricultural Committee is focused on the 
development of policy, advocacy, and investment that enable the biotechnology industry 
to penetrate traditional agricultural and industrial domestic and global markets with 
biotechnology products and seek solutions to environmental challenges.  BIOTECanada 
has been directly involved in eliminating ‘zero-tolerance’ policies to ensure the 
continued adoption of agricultural biotechnology globally and to continue to have 
products of agricultural biotechnology bring value to the marketplace (Peekhaus, 2013).  
In general, the primary purpose of these efforts were threefold: first, the Canadian 
government wanted to ensure the public of its high standards in food safety and 
stringent food regulatory system.  Second, there was an effort to bring government and 
industry together under the common banner of promoting agricultural biotechnology, 
raising public awareness, and reducing public concerns.  Third, the underlying premise 
behind much of the campaign was a ‘balanced’, ‘science-based’, ‘bias-free’, and 
‘credible’ approach to agricultural biotechnology that includes major stakeholders from 
scientists, to farmers, to consumers.  An activist from Greenpeace Canada explained. 
I just like to think of the whole thing as a great marketing campaign which 
the Canadian public fitted the bill for.  A lot of it is propaganda; there is no 
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effort made to show any kind of perspectives that go against that of 
geneticists and the biotechnology industry.  The government and the 
industry are going to shove this stuff down our throats no matter what.  I 
remember listening to a CBC radio program way back when there was a 
lot of controversy over the fact that the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
refused to publish anything negative about GMOs.  There were even 
scientists, like David Suzuki for example as well as plenty of people in the 
US, who were genuinely concerned, but somehow their opinions never 
made it into any official documents.  Any critical assessments always 
seem to be pushed under the carpet and receive little to no coverage in 
the media.  When you read anything that has been written on any pro-
biotech government website or some of the published documents you 
begin to realize that it is the same message everywhere.  They basically 
promote all of their perspectives on every issue from labelling to 
regulation.  You can’t underestimate this kind of manipulation and 
misrepresentation to convince the Canadian public that somehow, all of a 
sudden, life can’t continue without GMOs and that somehow their 
introduction is going to make us all better off.  When do we hear about 
alternatives?  Well, never; what we do hear about over and over is the 
reproduction of all the assertions and assumptions made by scientists and 
supposed experts that portray new technologies in a positive manner 
(Greenpeace Canada Activist 4). 
 
When discussing the issue of promoting agricultural biotechnology in an interview, an 
Industry Canada employee stated,  
Look, the Government of Canada is obviously committed to the economic 
development of different industries including biotechnology, not just in 
agriculture, but other areas as well.  This is a big part of building the 
Canadian economy.  Of course we work with industry people, scientists, 
academics, media; in particular, the biotech industry, especially in 
agriculture, has taken a real hit.  There are a lot of opinions out there 
about GMOs and quite frankly most of these are not accurate.  This sort of 
thing has an impact on the industry, I mean, in Canada we have not had 
as much opposition as they have had in Europe, for example, but 
nevertheless it has not exactly been smooth sailing either, especially 
when you take into consideration how opposed some people were, and 
still are, to introducing RR wheat.  This sort of thing is not good for 
anyone, not for Canadians, not for the industry, and certainly not for 
farmers.  Take a look at the success of the canola industry where there 
has been a great deal of acceptance of biotechnology products.  So we 
have to do whatever we can to inform the public, and having a lot of 
NGOs that hate GMOs makes it much more difficult.  We work with some 
of the best scientists in the world and we take what they say very 
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seriously.  It’s not by accident that Canada is second only to the US in the 
number of biotechnology companies in this country, this has happened 
because we support these industries, and this is not something we do with 
blindfolds; this is based on hard evidence from highly trained scientists, 
academics, economists about what the future of this industry can mean 
for Canadians in terms of making an impact with this technology both 
economically and being world leaders in one of the most important areas 
of scientific development (Industry Canada Employee 2). 
 
In summary, given the increasing tensions surrounding the development, 
adoption, and production of GM crops both in the Canadian context and globally, a 
concerted effort has been made by the government and industry at swaying public 
opinion in favour of the development of agricultural biotechnology using public 
meetings, publications, pro-GMO websites, and the media.  This has been 
accomplished under the guise of ensuring the public of the Government of Canada’s 
commitment to high standards in food safety and regulation and a ‘science-based’ 
approach to agricultural biotechnology that includes major stakeholders from scientists, 
to farmers, to consumers. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The pro-GM crops discourse serves to, at best assuage and at worst sever, any 
meaningful debates and active participation of the public in determining the outcomes of 
the development of agricultural biotechnology.  In particular, government and industry 
have been successful in narrowing the debate so that social, political, environmental, 
and ethical concerns (i.e., so-called ‘non-scientific’ concerns) have been to a great 
degree elided.  This has been accomplished by constructing a discourse that, on the 
one hand, disarms any opposition to the development of agricultural biotechnology, and 
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on the other hand, ensures the economic viability of the industry.  By manipulating the 
pro-GM crops discourse, government and industry are actively engaging in strategies 
designed to control the discursive norms and institutional contexts that encompass 
agricultural biotechnology.  This obscures the interest of capitalist accumulation more 
generally and those of individual capitals more specifically as the general interests of 
the Canadian public and farming communities and in part establishes and maintains the 
conditions conducive to capitalist accumulation.  Since class struggle is inherent to 
capitalist relations of production, capital is compelled to engage in different strategies 
that provide the basis for accumulation in order to safeguard its existence.  Any threat to 
the balance of power between classes that impedes capitalist accumulation is 
susceptible to such strategies (Peekhaus, 2013).  This may be illustrated, as discussed, 
by the efforts of the industry with support from government scientific and financial 
capacities to engage in public relations campaigns, attacks on opponents, the maligning 
of unsympathetic scientific findings, intense lobbying, and the ability to disseminate 
information that is primarily sympathetic to the agricultural biotechnology industry.  
These strategies serve to constrain the discourse surrounding biotechnology in ways 
that ensure the success of the industry for the greater goal of contributing to capitalist 
accumulation. 
In addition, the pro-GM crops discourse raises the issue about the relationship 
between the development of science and technology and capitalist social relations of 
production.  One of the arguments posited by the government and industry in the 
construction of the discourse is the ostensibly ‘neutral’ development of science and 
technology under capitalist social relations of production and its corresponding specious 
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and teleological claims about the putative capacity of science and technology to 
guarantee socio-economic progress.  This perspective undermines the distinction 
between the development of science and technology in general and the development of 
science and technology under capitalist social relations of production, where the latter 
reflects the social relations under which it occurs.  The appeal to science has provided 
government and industry a convenient strategy around which to circumscribe the social 
relations that underlie the pro-GM crops discourse and the adoption and production of 
GM crops.  The development of science and (bio) technology is not a neutral affair.  The 
conception of science and technology as asocial catalysts for progress independent of 
purposive human agency that benefits one group of people over another serves to 
obscure the social relations underlying the development of science and technology from 
the design and development stages of technological innovation.  Such a conception not 
only relegates the social relations underlying new technologies to the instances of their 
application, but also casts their social effects on society as secondary and contingent.  
This suggests that scientists and technologists are the discoverers of laws and 
processes immanent in an exogenous natural realm.  Progress is putatively rooted in 
the natural order of a world that triumphs over historical and social peculiarities.  This 
discursive framing easily explains away social relations as unavoidable by-products of 
history’s teleological march of progress that can be mitigated through the perspicacious 
applications of new technologies (Leoppky, 2005). 
In this chapter I contribute to the academic literature by providing a different 
perspective from analyses that sever the relationship between the discursive and 
material in the construction of a pro-GM crops discourse.  The pro-GM crops discourse 
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is not a free-floating construction, but is materially implicated in the social relations of 
capitalism.  Accordingly, the pro-GM crops discourse is embedded in and circulates 
among different institutions and subject positions.  Such discursive struggles have 
material consequences for the development of agricultural biotechnology, the adoption 
and production of GM crops, multinational corporations, Canadian farming, the public, 
and the agro-food system in general. 
Other authors contend that policy coordination, technical assistance, and training 
programs have helped produce, internationalize, and enforce a capitalist approach to 
the regulation of biotechnology, GM crops, and food safety, through the reductionist 
discourse of sound science.  The internationalization of US standards has formed a 
major component of US agro-food trade strategies.  Relying on appeals to sound 
science that posit US-based regulations as scientific and objective has been a critical 
component of rolling out neoliberal institutions in the US, Canada, and other developed 
and developing countries to harmonize biotechnology and food safety standards in line 
with US-led neoliberal and capitalist internationalization (Essex, 2008). 
These developments have led some to question whether or not research and 
innovations are being compromised to protect IP interests (Glenna et al., 2015) and the 
role that a politicized science plays in the development of biotechnology (Herring, 2007; 
Stehr, 2004).  Such perspectives stress that all research is partisan in one way or 
another because it involves questions about who controls, manipulates, and establishes 
decisions, facts, and knowledge.  Scholarship is characterized by differences in the 
motives underlying epistemological choices of research topic and method, personal 
commitments to the fields studied, use of research findings in controversies, and 
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positioning of results in wider debates (Galis and Hansson, 2012).  Partisanship has 
also been associated with the composition of a government, its programmatic 
orientation, and the allocation of cabinet offices that affect agricultural biotechnology 
policy.  Some authors argued that the regulation of GMOs is determined by the 
ideological orientation of governments and the presence of parties with a specific 
ideological background in the cabinet (Bäck et al., 2015).  These studies raise concerns 
regarding the role political ideology plays in influencing views about science.  While the 
generalization is often made that some sectors of society mobilize to defend the 
industrial capitalist order from the claims of environmentalists and some environmental 
scientists that the current economic system causes serious ecological and public health 
problems, some authors argued that such claims may oversimplify the issues in ways 
that lead to empirical inaccuracies.  Further work is required that increases the accuracy 
and depth of our understanding of the relationship between political ideology and views 
about science which is crucial for addressing politicized science-based issues (McCright 
et al., 2013). 
Other authors, while acknowledging the changes in government, industry, and 
the university system since the 1980s that have increasingly pressured academic and 
industrial scientists to align their research with the goals of national competitiveness, 
regional economic development, and marketplace opportunities, argued that a new 
framework for the study of science is needed that seeks to provide a balanced 
understanding of both the new restrictions associated with the increasing influence of 
the private sector on the scientific field and the new forms of citizen participation and 
public-interest science that are emerging in response.  This perspective assumes that 
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science is a partially autonomous field of power that is subject to influence from other 
fields but also possesses a degree of self-governance.  This in part is due to the internal 
logic of the field and to the degrees of freedom that emerge from the unevenly 
countervailing powers exerted by economic, political, and civil society dynamics (Moore 
et al., 2011).  Moreover, these tensions depend on various discourses that establish 
knowledge claims which simultaneously undermine the case for GM technologies as 
potential contributors to development and motivate opposition to GMOs.  The diffusion 
of such claims has been made possible at the junctures of transnational networks, 
enabling the screening, weighting, theorizing, and diffusion of contentious empirical 
accounts (Herring, 2008; Suarez-Villa, 2003).  The academic literature on the topic is 
vast and includes opposing narratives.  Some authors attribute opposition to ignorance 
including problems of symbolism, quaint attitudes, and pagan beliefs (Bond, 1999; 
Braun, 2002; Gusterson, 2005; Herring, 2009) while other authors challenge such 
perspectives (Bonny, 2003; Bryan, 2001; Jasanoff, 2005; Priest, 2001).  Other authors 
have traced such debates in the media coverage.  These studies focus on the way 
varying attitudes play out in public perception, consumer choice, and discourse and 
language about GM crops (Cook, 2004; Gusterson, 2005; Kalaitzandonakes et al., 
2004; Nelson, 2005; Pearson, 2006; Priest, 2001; Raby, 2014).  
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Chapter Six 
 
Economic Implications of the Production of GM Crops for Farmers 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The last 25 years have seen the increasing adoption and production of GM crops such 
as canola, corn, soybean, and sugar beet in Canadian farming.  This has been 
associated with the rise of multinational corporations, such as Monsanto, that invested 
heavily in private R&D to improve crop productivity through genetic modification.  
Patented GM seeds are sold to farmers in seed markets that have become highly 
consolidated.  This has raised questions about whether or not biotechnology seed 
companies could exercise market power and price their seeds in a way that would 
reduce farm profit and bring agricultural biotechnology firmly within the purview of 
corporate control. 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the economic implications of the 
production of GM crops for farmers.  I address the following questions: to what extent 
has agricultural restructuring affected farmers in Canada?  Why has the federal 
government of Canada and the industry aggressively promoted the adoption and 
production of GM crops?  What effect has the adoption of GM seeds and associated 
technology use agreements had on farming practices?  Does the production of GM 
crops result in higher income for farmers?  How are the economic implications 
manifested over time, in terms of production, subsidies, and trade export?   I argue that 
the restructuring of the agricultural sector has encompassed a wide range of forces and 
250 
conditions among which has been the dramatic increase of the adoption and production 
of GM crops.  This has been associated with the rise and consolidation of a handful of 
multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations aimed at economic growth in the 
agricultural sector in an era of competitive innovation in high-technology industries.  The 
serious consequences for Canadian farmers have included stagnant net farm income 
despite increasing yields and gross income, higher farm expenses and debt, and 
stringent patent laws that limit farmers’ autonomy. 
To support the argument, I incorporate select responses from 19 interviews 
conducted between January and August 2015 with GM crop farmers (10 GM canola 
farmers, 5 GM corn farmers, and 4 GM soybean farmers), eight were members of the 
Canadian NFU and the remainder were independent farmers.  The interviews with 
farmers allowed me to gain insights concerning the performance and economic impact 
of cultivating GM crops in the Canadian context.  The analysis presented here is based 
on the average performance and economic impact recorded during interviews with 
farmers cultivating GM canola, corn, and soybean.  Average performance and economic 
impact refers to the most common way that farmers reported these aspects based on 
their accounting records and partial budgets.  A caveat is worth noting concerning this 
approach.  Here, farmers are regarded as an undifferentiated category despite the fact 
that their individual economic positions vary: some own more land than others; some 
invest more capital than others; some employ more or less labour than others; some are 
economically more profitable than others; and so on (Lenin, 1967).  My purpose is to 
make a general assessment of the net income for adopters, considering changes in 
yields, amounts and costs of inputs, and benefits that vary.  The findings from my 
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research are then compared with the findings of other relevant research from sources 
such as the NFU, the CBAN, Statistics Canada, PG Economics, and scientists 
conducting similar research.  The NFU “is a direct-membership organization made up of 
Canadian farm families … [that] work together to achieve agricultural policies which will 
ensure dignity and security of income for farm families while enhancing the land for 
future generations” (NFU, 2015).  The CBAN promotes food sovereignty and democratic 
decision-making regarding science and technology issues in order to protect the 
integrity of the environment, health, food, and the livelihoods of people in Canada.  This 
is accomplished by facilitating, informing, and organizing civil society action, 
researching, and providing information to government for policy development (CBAN, 
2016a).  PG Economics “is a specialist provider of advisory and consultancy services to 
agriculture and other natural resource-based industries…areas of specialisation are 
plant biotechnology, agricultural production systems, agricultural markets and policy” 
(PG Economics, 2016). 
The chapter is organized in the following way.  In section 6.2 Agricultural 
Restructuring in Canada I provide an overview of agricultural restructuring and the 
effects on Canadian farmers (section 6.2.1 Effects of Agricultural Restructuring on 
Canadian Farmers).  In section 6.3 Biotech Farming in Canada I examine the R&D 
investment in agricultural biotechnology, the impact of multinational agribusiness 
corporations; the introduction of GM canola, GM corn, and GM soybean into Canadian 
agriculture; and the implications for farmers.  In section 6.4 Farm Level Economic 
Impact of GM Crops Production I examine the effects of GM seed contractual 
agreements on farmers (section 6.4.1 Commercial Seeds and Technology Use 
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Agreements), the claims regarding GM crops and higher yields (section 6.4.2 GM 
Crops and Yields) and the impact on farm level income (section 6.4.3 GM Crops and 
Farm Level Income).  In section 6.5 Conclusion I draw out some conceptual 
implications and the contribution of the chapter to the academic literature. 
 
6.2 Agricultural Restructuring in Canada 
The agricultural sectors of developed economies have experienced significant changes 
over the last four decades as farm size, intensity, capitalization, and specialization have 
dramatically moved from conventional configurations to what has been referred to 
variously as the third agricultural revolution, the modernization of farming, the 
industrialization of farming, and the restructuring of farming (Bowler, 2014).  At the farm 
level, the general model is one of a shift from small-scale (less than 50 hectares) or 
medium-scale (51 to 150 hectares), generally mixed-enterprise (including two or more 
crops), to large-scale farms (151 or more hectares) (FAO, 2014).  This is characterized 
by increased labour substitution, capital investments in land, and an increase in off-farm 
inputs such as mechanical (energy intensive machinery) and biological (GM seeds and 
associated agrochemicals).  At the agro-food system level, the process involves 
integration between fewer and fewer industrialized farms, and between agribusiness 
and government.  The latter two ‘beyond the farm gate’ elements are the most important 
aspects, influencing and controlling the restructuring process (Troughton, 1986). 
In the 1980s, trade wars, high debt, and drought brought significant structural 
changes to Canadian farming.  The ‘grain trade war’ in the mid- and late-1980s between 
the US and the European Community caused Canadian grain prices to plummet.  The 
prairie farming community, strapped by large debt and unprecedentedly high interest 
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rates, sank into a depression whose scale paralleled that of the 1930s.  Payments from 
the Western Grain Stabilization Act were low and continued to decline.  The 
Government of Canada rallied to assist prairie grain farmers with the billion-dollar 
Special Canada Grains program in 1986-87 and it absorbed $400 million of the Farm 
Credit Corporation's debt.  The Agricultural Credit Corporation of Saskatchewan also 
went heavily into debt in an effort not to force farmers off the land (Oleson, 1987).In 
addition, there was a marked shift since the mid-1980s in the policies of AAFC from 
practices that benefit Canadian farmers, such as developing new publicly funded 
varieties that are resistant to drought, disease, and pests, in favour of contracts and 
partnerships with private clients to meet exclusively private-sector needs such as 
patented agronomic inputs (Moore, 2002).  AAFC policy objectives have become 
increasingly market oriented, ensuring supply of diverse food products, making the 
marketing system more effective, and increasing the economic viability of the industry in 
a context of free trade (Dakers and Forge, 2000). 
In 1989, Canada and the US signed the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSTA) which agreed to remove all tariffs and import restrictions over a 
ten-year period.  In the case of wheat and barley it was agreed that border restrictions 
would be removed when subsidies were equivalent in both countries.  End use 
certificates were used to prevent mixing of Canadian and US grains.  The CUSTA also 
meant the end of the two-price wheat policy and eliminated the subsidy paid on grain 
shipped to the US through Vancouver.  In order to counter massive grain subsidies in 
the world market, the Government of Canada implemented two new generations of farm 
income safety nets, the Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (GRIP) and the Net Income 
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Stabilization Account (NISA).  The GRIP and NISA were financially supported by 
contributions from the federal and provincial governments and the farmer.  The GRIP 
insured individual farmers' gross revenues from particular commodities in the short run.  
Also, it offered protection from natural hazards or from market risks beyond the control 
of producers.  The NISA enabled a farmer to build up a fund to draw upon when his or 
her income fell below a specified figure.  It marked a shift away from programs designed 
to stabilize farmers' returns for individual agricultural commodities to stabilizing the 
farmer's income from the whole farm enterprise (Turvey et al., 1997). 
In 1993, the CUSTA was broadened to include Mexico in the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Agriculture is the only section that was not negotiated 
trilaterally in the NAFTA; instead, three separate agreements were signed between 
each pair of parties. The Canada-US agreement contains significant restrictions and 
tariff quotas on agricultural products (mainly sugar, dairy, and poultry products), 
whereas the Mexico-US pact allows for a wider liberalization within a framework of 
phase-out periods.  The NAFTA significantly increased Canada-US interdependence in 
agro-food trade.  In 1984, 30% of Canadian agro-food exports went to the US; by 1993, 
the figure was 55% owing to increased exports of live animals, beef, and beverages.  
US imports into Canada rose from 55% of total Canadian agro-food imports in 1984 to 
61% in 1993.  Also, the creation of AAFC’s Market and Industry Services Branch in 1993 
was geared at strengthening the industry’s competitiveness by obtaining a larger share 
of domestic and international markets (Dakers and Forge, 2000). 
In the mid-1990s, the Cairns Group of Fair Trade Nations successfully forced 
agriculture onto the agenda of the Uruguay Round of negotiations on the General 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which eventually led to the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture.  All contracting parties agreed to 
reduce export subsidies by 21% in volume and by 36% in dollar terms, and to reduce 
domestic support by 20% over a six-year period beginning in 1995.  The objective was 
to liberalize agricultural trade and open domestic agricultural markets to foreign 
competition.  These multilateral negotiations posed significant challenges for Canada.  
On the one hand, Canada sought to open foreign markets to Canadian grains and 
oilseeds by new rules prohibiting export subsidies.  The European Community and the 
US had successfully subsidized their grain exports to undercut Canada in grain-
importing nations.  On the other hand, Canadian negotiators were anxious to retain 
protection for domestic poultry, egg, and dairy producers by maintaining the right to 
restrict the volume of imports when supplies were managed domestically.  Canada 
failed in its endeavour to maintain volume controls on supply-managed products and 
was forced to accept more imported dairy and poultry products; however, high tariffs on 
dairy and poultry imports in the medium term gave the sectors time to adjust to the 
future reality of lower tariffs and more competition from imported products.  For 
Canada's grain and oilseeds sectors, the modest reduction in permissible export 
subsidies offered the prospect of better access to foreign markets even while it 
imperiled their own freight subsidies under the Western Grain Transportation Act.  The 
1995 federal Liberal budget announced an end to export grain subsidies, a decision 
dictated as much by budgetary restraint as by the new GATT requirements (Skogstad, 
2008). 
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In addition was the negotiation of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at the end of the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 
1994.  Its inclusion was the culmination of a program of intense lobbying by the US, 
supported by the EU, Japan, and other developed nations.  TRIPS essentially linked 
trade policy to IP standards therefore maximizing IP privileges.  After the Uruguay 
Round, the GATT became the basis for the establishment of the WTO on 1 January 
1995.  The WTO superseded the GATT as the umbrella organization for international 
trade.  Since ratification of TRIPS is a compulsory requirement of WTO membership, 
any country seeking to obtain access to the numerous international markets opened by 
the WTO must enact the strict IP laws mandated by TRIPS (Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000). 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) entered into force with the establishment of the WTO.  Under the SPS agreement, 
the WTO set constraints on member-states’ policies relating to food safety (bacterial 
contaminants, pesticides, inspection, and labelling) as well as animal and plant health 
(phytosanitation) with respect to imported pests and diseases.  There are three 
standards organizations who set standards that WTO members should base their SPS 
methodologies on: the Codex Alimentarius Commission, World Organization for Animal 
Health, and the Secreatariat of the International Plant Protection Convention.  The SPS 
agreement attempted to deal with non-tariffs barriers arising from cross-national 
differences in technical standards without diminishing governments’ prerogative to 
implement measures to guard against diseases and pests (Buthe, 2008).   
257 
By the mid-1990s, budgetary constraints and new international trading rules had 
caused a significant reform of agricultural policies and altered the role of federal and 
provincial governments in Canada's agro-food sector.  In the grains and oilseeds sector, 
the 1995 federal Liberal budget announced not only the termination of export freight 
assistance but also a 30% reduction in federal support for safety nets.  A cut of the 
same magnitude was made in dairy price supports and their phasing out by the year 
2000 announced.  Earlier, cattle and hog producers fearing a backlash in the important 
US market, had opted for termination of their stabilization programs.  The Government 
of Canada's share of total agro-food spending in 1994-95 was 55%, down from 64.5% in 
1988-89.  Provincial spending, especially in provinces like Quebec and Saskatchewan, 
had risen to make up the shortfall.  Expenditure cuts to agricultural research, cost 
recovery initiatives in food inspection, and the elimination of duplication and overlap in 
federal and provincial programs and regulations cumulatively undermined the federal 
government's leadership role and the AAFC’s capacity to devise national programs.  By 
1996, in place of one national farm ‘safety net’ for the grains and oilseeds sector, the 
decision was taken to allow provincial variations in crop insurance, whole farm 
stabilization, and provincial companion program coverage (Skogstad, 2008).  
Despite various efforts at improving the economic viability of farming in Canada, 
the collapse of world commodity prices in 1997 resulted in a significant drop in net farm 
income.  In response to this crisis, in December 1998 the Minister of Agriculture and 
Agri-Food announced a comprehensive federal program to provide $900 million in 
financial assistance to producers over two years through the Agricultural Income 
Disaster Assistance Program (AIDA Program), 40% of which was jointly funded by the 
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provinces, and brought total assistance to $1.5 billion.  The AIDA Program was linked to 
other income security programs, and AAFC’s 1999-2000 Estimates noted the possibility 
of making the AIDA Program an element of long-term income protection (Dakers and 
Forge, 2000).  In Canada and the US, multi-billion-dollar farm support programs have 
become the norm.  In Canada, approximately $3 billion to $4 billion per annum in 
support payments is spent to cover large losses in farming.  Large tax-funded transfers 
have become a structural element of agriculture in Canada, the US, the EU, Japan, and 
other countries (NFU, 2010). 
More recently, corporations and investors have been seeking greater control over 
Canada’s agriculture and a bigger share of the wealth that farmers produce.  Farmer 
autonomy and local control of land and production are threatened by excessive farm 
debt, input financing, the conversion of farmland to non-farm uses such as industrial 
use, resource extraction and urbanization, and by the trend of state and private investor 
acquisition of large tracts of farmland for speculative or political purposes.  This has 
been accomplished through significant changes since 2010 to Canada’s agricultural-
related laws, policies and institutions.  Such changes benefit agribusiness corporations, 
weaken farmers’ market power, and increase farmer costs.  This may be illustrated by 
the corporate control over commercial seeds as a result of Canada adopting the Plant 
Breeders Rights regime and related changes to seed regulation and cutbacks to 
conventional plant breeding programs.  International trade deals such as CETA 
(Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement), TPP 
(Trans-Pacific Partnership) and FIPPA (Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act) entrench these threats through investor protection clauses enforced by 
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investor-state dispute settlement provisions which allow corporations to sue 
governments if their ability to profit is diminished by changes in government regulations, 
laws, and policies (NFU, 2015). 
Issues of export trade promotion, market development, and international 
competitiveness continue to be at the fore in Canadian agricultural policy.  The 
traditional producer-centred focus has shifted to one which emphasizes partnerships 
between governments and all segments of the agro-food industry, with each assuming 
its share of financial responsibility for research, food inspection, and trade and market 
development.  Such shifts in agricultural policy have not been effective at ensuring the 
survival of the family farm and rural communities.  Many in the farm community fear that 
the Government of Canada’s preoccupation with trade competitiveness and efficiency 
will necessitate even further consolidation and capitalization in the farm production 
sector, and further imperil the family farmer. 
 
6.2.1 Effects of Agricultural Restructuring on Canadian Farmers 
The effects of agricultural restructuring on Canadian farmers may be illustrated by the 
following data.  According to Statistics Canada (2016c), the total number of census 
farms (any operation that produces agricultural products with the intention of selling 
them) began to decline after 1941.  The largest five-year decline on record was from 
1956 to 1961 when the number of farms fell by 16.4% or approximately 94,000 farms.  
Since 1991, the total number of farms decreased by 36.2% or 74,439 farms to reach 
205,730 in 2011.  While the number of farms has decreased, total farm area has 
remained stable (see Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1: Number of Farms and Farm Area from 1921 to 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
In 2011, the total number of farms represented a total farm area of 160.2 million acres 
(see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Farms by Farm Area in 2011 
Farm area 
Number of 
farms 
Number of farms 
as percent 
Farm area 
(millions of acres) 
Farms under 10 acres 12,991 6.3 10.1 
Farms 10 to 69 acres 32,705 15.9 25.5 
Farms 70 to 129 acres 24,205 11.8 18.8 
Farms 130 to 179 acres 21,705 10.6 16.9 
Farms 180 to 239 acres 11,719 5.7 9.1 
Farms 240 to 399 acres 24,974 12.1 19.4 
Farms 400 to 559 acres 15,053 7.3 11.7 
Farms 560 to 759 acres 11,781 5.7 9.2 
Farms 760 to 1,119 acres 13,413 6.5 10.4 
Farms 1,120 to 1,599 acres 10,831 5.3 8.4 
Farms 1,600 to 2,239 acres 9,222 4.5 7.2 
Farms 2,240 to 2,879 acres 5,230 2.5 4.1 
Farms 2,880 to 3,519 acres 3,482 1.7 2.7 
Farms 3,520 acres and over 8,419 4.1 6.6 
Total 205,730 100.0 160.2 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014a 
261 
The Canadian agricultural sector continues to restructure as many farms expand 
in scale of operation, consolidate, draw on technological innovations to enhance 
productivity, and augment their sales.  This trend, consistent with the economies of 
scale characterizing parts of Canadian agriculture, is evident when examining farm 
numbers by gross farm receipts.  From 1981 to 2011, the number of farms with gross 
farm receipts of $500,000 and over increased while the number of farms with gross farm 
receipts of $99,999 and less decreased (see Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.2: Number of Farms by Gross Farm Receipts at 2010 Constant Prices from 
1981 to 2011
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
According to Statistics Canada (2016c), Canada had 9,602 farms with $1 million or 
more in gross farm receipts reported in 2010.  While these farms are still a relatively 
small proportion of all farms, they increased significantly, from 3.2% of the total number 
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of farms and 42.8% of gross farm receipts in 2005 to 4.7% of the total number of farms 
and 49.1% of gross farm receipts in 2010 (at 2010 constant prices).  The number of 
farms reporting $1 million and more (at 2010 constant prices) in gross farm receipts 
increased by 31.2%, while the number of farms reporting less than $1 million decreased 
by 11.7%.  Lastly, the number of farms with gross farm receipts reporting $2 million and 
over (at 2010 constant prices) increased by 22%.  Although this category has only 3,298 
farms representing 1.6% of the total number of farms, they reported approximately one-
third of all gross farm receipts (see Table 6.2). 
Table 6.2: Number of Farms by Gross Farm Receipts at 2010 Constant Prices in 2006 
and 2011 
Gross farm receipts Number of farms Percent change, 2006 to 2011 
 2011 2006  
Less than $10,000 43,954 45,749 -3.9 
$10,000-$24,999 32,853 36,971 -11.1 
$25,000-$49,999 25,764 30,227 -14.8 
$50,000-$99,999 25,455 31,119 -18.2 
$100,000-$249,999 31,670 40,382 -21.6 
$250,000-$499,999 22,455 25,108 -10.6 
$500,000-$999,999 13,977 12,499 11.8 
$1,000,000-$1,999,999 6,304 4,614 36.6 
$2,000,000 and over 3,298 2,704 22 
Total 205,730 229,373 10.3 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
Farms with $500,000 and over in gross farm receipts accounted for 11.5% of farms in 
2011 and 67.9% of the total gross farm receipts (see Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3: Proportion of Gross Farm Receipts and Farm Numbers by Receipts Class 
in 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
From 1981 to 2011, there has been an increase from 3.8% to 19.8% in the 
proportion of farms that were incorporated, and a decrease from 86.6% to 55.4% in the 
proportion of farms that were sole proprietorships (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4: Operating Arrangements of Farms from 1981 to 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
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There is a tendency for the proportion of farms operating as sole proprietorships as well 
as those operating as partnerships or other to decline as gross farm receipts increase.  
Also, farms in the higher gross farm receipts category are more likely to be incorporated 
(see Figure 6.5).  In addition, 77.2% of million-dollar farms were incorporated compared 
with 19.8% of all farms.  Family corporations represented 66.3% of million-dollar farms 
compared with 17.4% of all farms, and non-family corporations represented 10.9% of 
million-dollar farms compared with 2.4% of all farms. 
Figure 6.5: Operating Arrangements by Gross Farm Receipts in 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
From 1976 to 2011, there has been a decrease from 70% to 59.7% in the 
proportion of land owned by farmers, and an increase from 30% to 40.3% in the 
proportion of land rented and other tenure arrangements (see Figure 6.6).  
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Figure 6.6: Land Tenure as a Proportion of Total Farm Area from 1976 to 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
In 2011, 61.5% of the total land in agriculture was owned by those who operated it (see 
Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6.7: Tenure Composition of Total Agricultural Land in 2011 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016c 
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Gross farm receipts in Canada were $51.1 billion in 2010, up 3.9% from $49.2 billion (at 
2010 constant prices) in 2005.  Gross farm receipts come from the sale of farm 
commodities and include payments from government-sponsored programs.  Farmers 
contribute to these programs by paying premiums.  In general, there has been a 
decrease in direct program payments to farmers from a peak of 16% of gross farm 
receipts in 1992 to 3.6% in 2015.  The value of direct program payments in 2015 was 
$2.1 billion (see Figure 6.8). 
Figure 6.8: Receipts from Direct Program Payments in Percent from 1992 to 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016f 
Three farmers from the NFU commented on the restructuring of farming that 
generations of farmers in Canada have faced during different periods from the 1950s to 
the 1990s.  These comments highlighted a shift in policies that favour Canadian farmers 
to policies that favour the viability of the industry amidst funding cuts and difficult market 
conditions. 
My father was involved in different organizations in the 50s and 60s that 
really tried to secure the future of farming.  There were lots of institutions 
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that came out of this, like the Canada Grain Act, the Canadian Wheat 
Board, Agriculture Canada [renamed Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada], 
that were very much committed to the financial well-being of farming and 
farmers.  This goes back several generations, you know, Canadian 
government wanted to establish an agricultural economy in western 
Canada and farmers were a big part of that and previous generations 
needed a kind of minimum income to secure their livelihood.  Even when it 
came to things like technology, different institutions, even Agriculture 
Canada was dedicated to doing research on breeding, on pests, and other 
agronomic concerns that farmers had to enhance their economic 
livelihood and provide protection from big business.  But those days are 
gone now, there is less support for farming and so many have just gone 
under or gave up all together.  Farming is really a tough business and the 
support is not there like it used to be (NFU Farmer 3). 
Well, there were many changes in farming especially after the 
Conservatives came into power in the 1980s.  For one thing, we were 
being told by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, that free trade was 
coming and we had to be more competitive.  There were a lot of farmers 
that were planting new crops and trying to diversify their production and 
there were others that were taking on work outside of farming all together.  
In some cases farmers sold their farms to bigger operations that had the 
kind of money you need to improve equipment and become more efficient.  
You know, the whole industry was changing, farming was less and less 
about what farming is supposed to be about, which is producing good 
crops, and more and more about big business and doing whatever it takes 
to stay competitive (NFU Farmer 4). 
 
The late 1990s was a really awful time for many farmers especially out 
here in the west.  I personally knew quite a few farmers that simply went 
out of business.  I mean you just couldn’t make ends meet unless you 
were well established.  Despite everything that was happening the 
government had no real solutions other than providing some kind of 
assistance, but basically it was business as usual.  Regardless of the fact 
that the changes that they wanted us to make in the 1980s, this whole 
thing about free trade and being more competitive, did not help the 
situation much, things became even worse by the end of the 1990s, but 
the emphasis remained the same as before: do more with less because 
the government does not have the money it used to for farming, be more 
competitive because of globalization, you know, the same thing they said 
in the 1980s except we were in much worse shape now than we were 
back then (NFU Farmer 5). 
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In summary, the analysis in this section provides an overview of the structural 
changes in Canadian farming and the effects this has had on farmers.  Agricultural 
restructuring has resulted in changing and demanding economic, technological, and 
market environments for farmers in Canada.  In response, the Government of Canada 
has placed greater emphasis on making the sector more market-responsive, less 
dependent on subsidies, and able to compete internationally. 
 
6.3 Biotech Farming in Canada  
Given the restructuring of the Canadian agricultural sector, the development, adoption, 
and production of GM crops has been in part a critical component of the drive towards 
international competitiveness, productivity, economic growth, and innovation.  This has 
been substantiated by significant expenditures on biotechnology R&D (see Table 6.3) 
and science and technology R&D by the Canadian federal government (see Table 6.4). 
Table 6.3: Annual Federal Government Science and Technology R&D on 
Biotechnology Expenditures 
Year Amount (thousands of dollars) 
2003/2004 756,239 
2004/2005 804,161 
2005/2006 864,830 
2006/2007 880,087 
2007/2008 920,548 
2008/2009 936,827 
Notes and sources: this table contains the most current data available from Statistics 
Canada on biotechnology R&D expenditures.  Disaggregated data following 2008/2009 
is not available, (Statistics Canada, 2010, 2012b).  
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Table 6.4: Annual Federal Government Science and Technology R&D and Related 
Activities Expenditures 
Year Amount (millions of dollars) 
2003/2004 8,765 
2004/2005 8,934 
2005/2006 9,449 
2006/2007 9,633 
2007/2008 10,176 
2008/2009 10,573 
2009/2010 11,614 
2010/2011 12,014 
2011/2012 11,395 
2012/2013 11,166 
2013/2014 10,868 
2014/2015 10,281 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014b 
In addition has been the important role of a handful of multinational corporations that 
have captured the global proprietary GM seed and agrochemical (herbicides, 
insecticides, and fungicides) markets.  The world’s top 11 GM seed companies: 
Monsanto (US), DuPont (US), Syngenta (Switzerland), Groupe Limagrain (France), 
Land O’Lakes (US), KWS SAAT SE (Germany), Bayer (Germany), Dow (US), Sakata 
(Japan), DLF-Trifolium (Denmark), and Takii (Japan), accounted for approximately 37% 
of the global proprietary seed market in 1996, which increased to 55% in 2007, and 
62% in 2009.  In 2009, the top three companies (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta) 
controlled 45% of the global proprietary seed market.  Monsanto, which is the largest 
player in the industry, controlled 23% of the global proprietary seed market.  Also, an 
estimated 87% of the total GM seeds cropland area was planted with Monsanto 
products either directly or indirectly through licences to other companies.  In terms of 
proprietary seed revenues, in 2009 sales for the top 11 companies were: US$19.7 
billion (62%) of the US$32 billion global proprietary seed market, and the top three 
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companies controlled US$14.5 billion (45%).  Monsanto controlled US$7.3 billion (23%) 
of the US$32 billion global proprietary seed market (Peekhaus, 2013, 42-44).  As of 
2013, the world’s top three seed companies, Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta 
accounted for 26%, 21%, and 8% respectively or 55% collectively of the global 
proprietary seed market, while the top three agrochemical companies, Syngenta, Bayer, 
and BASF accounted for 20%, 18%, and 13% respectively or 51% collectively of the 
global agrochemical market.  Collectively, the top six companies: Monsanto, DuPont, 
Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF accounted for 65% of the global proprietary seed 
market, and 75% of the global agrochemical market with sales of seeds, agrochemicals, 
and GM traits exceeding $65 billion per annum (see Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10). 
Figure 6.9: Global GM Seed Market Share 
 
Source: ETC Group, 2015  
Syngenta (Switzerland), 8%
Bayer (Germany), 3%
Dow (US), 4%
Monsanto (US), 26%
DuPont (US), 21%
Other, 38%
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Figure 6.10: Global GM Agrochemical Market Share 
 
Source: ETC Group, 2015 
The use of patented GM traits has helped facilitate corporate consolidation in the 
seed market.  This has resulted in an oligopolistic market structure in which the largest 
actors are able to increase prices, narrow genetic diversity in crops, and stagnate 
innovation.  A related consequence of consolidation is that the major corporations that 
control the global seed and agrochemical markets now also largely determine the 
priorities and future direction of agricultural research.  For example, the top six 
companies account for 75% of all private sector seed and agrochemical research (ETC 
Group, 2015). 
Following vigorous marketing of GM canola, soybean, and corn (the three largest 
GM crops cultivated in Canada), Monsanto received regulatory approval from Health 
Canada to market glyphosate tolerant canola for food use in 1994.  Glyphosate tolerant 
canola was developed through a specific genetic modification of Brassica napus to be 
resistant to the activity of glyphosate herbicides (Health Canada, 1999).  Monsanto’s 
glyphosate tolerant soybean received regulatory approval from Health Canada to 
Syngenta (Switzerland), 20%
Bayer (Germany), 18%
BASF (Germany), 13%
Dow (US), 
10%
Monsanto (US), 8%
DuPont (US), 6%
Other, 25%
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market for food use in 1996.  The glyphosate tolerant seeds, marketed as ‘Roundup 
Ready’, are genetically engineered to produce crops capable of surviving post-emergent 
applications of ‘Roundup’, a broad-spectrum non selective systemic herbicide that is 
sprayed and absorbed through the leaves of the plants (Health Canada, 2000).  
Monsanto’s insect resistant corn received regulatory approval from Health Canada to 
market for food use in 1997.  Insect resistant corn is genetically engineered to contain a 
gene derived from the naturally occurring soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (crops 
containing this gene are commonly referred to with the prefix Bt, for example, Bt-corn).  
The bacterium produces a crystal protein that destroys the digestive tract of certain 
insects when ingested and mixed with stomach acids (Health Canada, 1997). 
GM canola is grown by 43,000 farmers in Canada, accounting for more than 98% 
of all canola, mostly in the western provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. 
Also, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec grow a substantial amount of the crop.  
This is the result of new GM varieties that are pushing the boundaries of where the crop 
may be cultivated.  The biological and agronomic characteristics of canola make it a 
weed- and disease-prone crop, which has made canola farmers more inclined to accept 
GM varieties and associated agrochemicals.  Innovations in canola, through the 
introduction of herbicide tolerance, has reduced farmers’ costs and the use of natural 
resources in its production.  In addition, GM varieties have allowed farmers to substitute 
conventional tillage with no-till seeding techniques or conservation tillage. No-till is less 
ecologically disruptive as specialized machinery is used to slice a thin slit into the soil to 
deposit seeds.  Conservation tillage is also less disturbing of soil ecology as the depth 
of furrows is between that of no-till and conventional tillage.  Both production methods 
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reduce overall machinery investment, labour needs, and energy requirements and have 
comparable or better yields and net returns than conventional tillage methods.  
Approximately 15% of the GM canola crop is consumed in Canada in various forms 
(e.g., approximately 50% of the vegetable oil consumed by Canadians is canola oil).  
The remainder 85% of canola seed, oil, and meal are exported to destinations such as 
the US, Japan, Mexico, and China.  Annually, Canadian-grown GM canola contributes 
$19.3 billion to the economy, including more than 249,000 Canadian jobs and $12.5 
billion in wages (CCC, 2016). 
GM corn plantings have been steadily increasing, accounting for 83% of all corn 
planted in Canada.  Quebec and Ontario are the primary corn-growing regions, 
accounting for 90% of total Canadian corn areas.  Also, Monsanto announced its 
intention to invest $100 million over the next ten years to produce corn hybrids that 
could be widely grown across an estimated 10.5 million hectares in western Canada.  
The corn hybrids will have relative maturities in the 70 to 85 day interval, making them 
suitable for cultivation in the colder climate of the Canadian prairies.  GM soybean 
accounted for more than 90% of total soybean acreage in 2007.  Ontario and Quebec 
accounted for approximately 69% of total soybean acreage, while Manitoba's share has 
risen from 8% in 2007 to 23% in 2013 (Dessureault and Lepescu, 2014). 
The increasing demand for patented GM seeds has resulted in the deregistering 
and removal from the market of conventional varieties and the virtual cessation of public 
breeding of the major crops that have GM varieties in Canada (corn, canola, and 
soybean).  For example, in 2000 96 out of the 120 (80%) of the registered varieties of 
canola were conventional seeds.  By 2007, only five of the registered varieties of canola 
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were conventional seeds.  Also, since 2005 the federal government has shut down or 
decreased the funding of a number of public breeding institutions in Canada.  Research 
stations that have been shut down include: the Delhi Research Station in Ontario, the 
Herve J. Michaud Experimental Farm in New Brunswick, the Kamloops research centre 
in British Columbia, and the Cereal Research Centre in Manitoba (CBAN, 2015). 
As plant breeding increasingly shifted into the private sector, farmers payed more 
for GM seeds that are less adapted to their regions and less resilient to environmental 
change (NFU, 2013).  As conventional varieties are phased out, and because GM traits 
are bred into conventional varieties that already have the best performance 
characteristics, buying GM seeds is often the only way that farmers can access modern, 
high-yielding varieties.  This has diminished the choices available to farmers, while 
strengthening the control of major corporations (ETC Group, 2015).  In addition, the 
profits generated from private breeding return to shareholders instead of farming 
communities and public breeding programs that developed the conventional crops 
which have genetic sequences.  The most profound example in Canada is the 
development of rapeseed/canola (see Phillips and Khachatourians, 2001). 
The Canadian farmers that participated in this research entered contracts with 
Monsanto to cultivate GM canola, soybean, and corn.  The contract between the farmer 
and Monsanto significantly limits the farmer’s rights to the purchased seeds through a 
‘no saved seed’ provision which prohibits saving seeds and/or reusing seeds from GM 
crops and requires farmers to purchase GM seeds on an annual basis (Fernandez-
Cornejo and McBride, 2002).  This significantly alters the practices of generations of 
farmers who have selected, saved, exchanged, sold, and reused seeds.  The value of a 
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seed is realized not just in one harvest, but in the seeds it produces for future crops and 
the material it provides for future breeding.  Patent protection over new genetic 
sequences is one legal mechanism that takes ownership of seeds out of the hands of 
farmers and allows corporations to capture value from them.  In practice, this means 
that patents allow the corporation that developed a GM trait to forbid farmers from 
saving and replanting seeds with that trait, and public breeders from further selecting or 
developing.  Multinational GM seed companies with spend billions of dollars on patents 
and patent lawyers, and on policing farmers (CBAN, 2015). 
One of the most widely publicized patent infringement cases stemming from the 
unauthorized saving of GM canola seeds was tried in the Canadian courts.  In the case 
of Percy Schmeiser and Schmeiser Enterprises Limited v Monsanto Canada 
Incorporated and Monsanto Company, canola farmer Schmeiser was sued by Monsanto 
for saving and planting GM seeds produced from pollen that had blown onto his fields 
from a neighbouring farm.  Schmeiser did not have contract with Monsanto.  The court 
found that Schmeiser planted seeds saved from a field onto which pollen from GM 
canola had blown and engaged in these activities knowingly.  This violated the patent 
Monsanto held on the GM canola seeds.  Schmeiser was required to deliver to 
Monsanto any remaining saved seeds and pay Monsanto the profits earned from the 
crops plus interest (CBC News Online, 2004). 
Also, the contract between the farmer and Monsanto contains a binding 
arbitration clause that requires all conflicts arising from the performance of the seed or 
technological traits in the seed to be resolved through arbitration.  This binding 
arbitration clause precludes farmers from filing lawsuits.  In addition, the farmer is 
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constrained in terms of the time frame within which s/he must raise a dispute.  Under 
the contract, the farmer is typically given as little as 15 days from the day that the 
problem is first observed to file a complaint with Monsanto.  Lastly, the contract contains 
a clause that limits the liability of Monsanto for any losses, injury or damages resulting 
from the use of their GM product.  Under such a clause, if the use of GM seeds has a 
negative impact on another aspect of the farmer's operations, the farmer is precluded 
from recovering any damages from the company in the event the use of the product 
causes harm (Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002).  A farmer in an interview 
commented on the economic costs and breeder restraints associated with entering a 
contract with Monsanto. 
The contract binds you to Monsanto and once you make that commitment 
you don’t realize what exactly you’re getting yourself into.  It’s not as 
simple as just buying a bag of seeds, there are other costs as well.  There 
is a kind of learning curve that takes place and you don’t make money if 
you don’t know how to use the technology.  There’s no ‘money-back 
guarantee’; you are basically on your own.  There were some years that I 
was using GM corn and quite frankly did not make much money.  Also, if 
you want to keep using the GM seeds you are basically committed to 
buying seeds every year, and if you reuse seeds you can get sued.  
Monsanto wants to make money so they are always trying to sell you 
something better, new seeds and new varieties, for more money of 
course.  So, you have to be careful because you are in a contract with a 
big corporation and there’s a sense that you have a new partner in your 
business and there are rules that you have to go by, well their rules, if you 
want to make money in farming.  The old days of saving and trading 
seeds are gone; things are more complicated now (Independent Farmer 
1). 
 
In summary, significant investments from the Government of Canada in the 
development of biotechnology and science and technology R&D as well as the 
regulatory approval of various GM crop varieties has spurred the development of the 
agricultural biotechnology industry in Canada.  This has been associated with the rise 
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and consolidation of a handful of multinational corporations that have effectively 
marketed GM crop varieties.  The outcome has been the significant adoption and 
production of GM canola, corn, soybean, and sugar beet in Canadian agriculture and 
related stringent contractual agreements that protect corporate IP rights and limit 
farmers’ abilities to select, save, exchange, sell, and reuse seeds. 
 
6.4 Farm Level Economic Impact of GM Crops Production 
 
6.4.1 Commercial Seeds and Technology Use Agreements 
In Canada, there has been an exponential rise in the cost of commercial seed 
compared to other farm expenses.  For example, the annual rate of increase of 
commercial seed cost from 1986 to 2015 was 15% compared to 9.6% for fertilizer and 
lime (see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5: Annual Rate of Increase in Farm Expenses from 1986 to 2015 
Farm Expenses Annual Rate of Increase in Percent 
Property taxes 2.8 
Wages including room and board 7.2 
Interest 2.0 
Electricity 5.1 
Heating 5.7 
Machinery fuel 3.5 
Fertilizer and lime 9.6 
Pesticide 9.5 
Commercial seed 15.0 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016a 
In 2015, commercial seed cost accounted for 5.4% of total farm expenses.  In absolute 
terms, commercial seed cost for increased from approximately $430 million in 1986 to 
approximately $2.4 billion in 2015, with a marked escalation in cost following the 
introduction of GM seeds in the mid-1990s (see Figure 6.11). 
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Figure 6.11: Canadian Farmer Commercial Seed Cost from 1981 to 2014 in Thousands 
of Dollars 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016a 
More specifically, the per-acre seeding cost of GM canola has been rising at a 
faster rate than the per-acre seeding cost of conventional canola.  For example, in 
Alberta the per-acre seeding cost of GM canola increased from approximately $20/acre 
in January 2002 to approximately $45/acre in January 2011 compared with the per-acre 
seeding cost of conventional canola which increased from approximately $15/acre in 
January 2002 to approximately $26/acre in January 2011 (NFU, 2013).  More recent 
data from the Government of Alberta confirm the continuing rise in the cost of GM 
canola since 2012.  For example, the cost of Bayer GM canola per 22.7 kg bag 
increased from $492.83 in January 2012 to $597.11 in January 2016 and the cost of 
Monsanto GM canola per 22.7 kg bag increased from $389.12 in January 2012 to 
$469.33 in January 2016 (see Figure 6.12). 
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Figure 6.12: Seeding Cost for a 22.7 kg Bag of GM Canola from 2012-2016 
 
Source: Government of Alberta, 2016 
In addition to seed cost, farmers were required to sign and pay for a Technology 
Use Agreement (TUA) fee.  For example, in 2011 Monsanto charged GM canola 
farmers a $15/acre TUA fee, which amounted to approximately $261 million in Canada 
over and above seed cost (NFU, 2013).  As of the 2013 crop year, however, Monsanto 
announced details of its plans to change the way farmers purchase Roundup Ready 
canola to a seamless ‘in-the-bag’ model with one price that combines the cost of the 
seed and the technology fee.  This model has also been used for other crops such as 
GM soybean and GM corn (Monsanto, 2012).  Although there will no longer be a 
separate TUA fee, farmers will still be required to sign an agreement that stipulates 
stringent ‘stewardship responsibilities’ that accompany all of Monsanto’s seed varieties 
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and are outlined in the Technology Use Guide (TUG).  Some of the stewardship 
responsibilities include: 
Bt crop farmers implement an insect resistant management program; 
farmers use purchased seeds for a single commercial crop; farmers are 
prohibited from giving another person or entity seeds for planting; farmers 
are not allowed to plant seeds resulting from the crop in subsequent 
years; seeds are not to be used for crop breeding, research, generation of 
herbicide registration data or seed production; Monsanto limits its liability 
for any loss incurred from using the product and dictates how farmers 
must proceed if they launch a claim; farmers are required to provide full 
access rights to their fields and records to conduct a technology protection 
audit; and Monsanto reserves the right to enjoin farmers found in breach 
of contract from using or selling its seeds (Monsanto, 2016a). 
 
Moreover, the TUG recommends using Roundup Ready seeds in conjunction 
with Roundup glyphosate herbicide products sold by Monsanto.  Although Monsanto 
allows farmers to use another Canadian approved glyphosate herbicide, this practice is 
discouraged in the TUG wherein it is noted, 
MONSANTO DOES NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATIONS, 
WARRANTIES OR RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF 
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED OR MARKETED BY OTHER 
COMPANIES WHICH ARE LABELED FOR USE ON CROPS 
CONTAINING ROUNDUP READY® TECHNOLOGIES. MONSANTO 
SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE USE OF 
THESE PRODUCTS IN CROPS CONTAINING ROUNDUP READY 
TECHNOLOGIES. ALL QUESTIONS AND COMPLAINTS ARISING 
FROM THE USE OF PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED OR MARKETED 
BY OTHER COMPANIES SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THOSE 
COMPANIES (Monsanto, 2016, 9, caps in original). 
 
Since technology fees comprise a significant portion of the overall cost of GM seeds, 
there is pressure on farmers to purchase and apply only Roundup formulations on their 
glyphosate-resistant crops. 
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6.4.2 GM Crops and Yields 
One of the common claims to justify the adoption and production of GM crops is that 
they produce higher yields than conventional crops.  This claim is then linked to the 
assumption that higher yields result in higher incomes for farmers.  In this section I 
show that despite the positive impact derived from a combination of enhanced 
productivity and efficiency gains associated with the adoption and production of GM 
crops, farmer expenses and debt have increased while farmer income has remained 
stagnant.   
The 19 Canadian farmers that participated in this research reported that on 
average there has been a general increase in yields as a result of producing GM 
canola, corn, and soybean.  The nine farmers that adopted herbicide-tolerant canola 
reported higher yield increases for the initial years of production followed by lower yield 
increases for the later years of production compared with conventional canola.  These 
results are consistent with other studies (see, for example, Brookes and Barfoot, 2015; 
Carew and Devadoss, 2003; CBAN, 2015b; Gusta et al., 2011; Malla and Brewin, 
2015).  According to Brookes and Barfoot (2015), from 1996 to 2003 there was an 
average yield increase of 10.7% for herbicide-tolerant canola compared to conventional 
canola.  This was followed by no difference in yields for 2004, 2005, 2008, and 2010, 
and increases in yields of 4% for 2006 and 2007, 1.67% for 2009, 1.6% for 2011, 1.5% 
for 2012, and 3.1% for 2013.  Also, according to the CBAN (2015), from 1996 to 2014 
there was an average yield increase of 2.4% for herbicide-tolerant canola compared to 
conventional canola.  Lastly, aggregate data for GM and conventional canola following 
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the adoption of GM canola demonstrated an average increase in yields from 1996 to 
2015 of 2% (see Figure 6.13). 
Figure 6.13: Average Canola Yield in Kilograms per Hectare from 1996 to 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015b 
The five farmers that adopted insect-resistant corn reported a general increase in 
yields compared to conventional corn.  These results are consistent with other studies 
(see, for example, Brookes and Barfoot, 2015; CBAN, 2015; Hutchinson et al., 2010; 
Johnson and Strom, 2008; Saha et al., 2014).  According to Brookes and Barfoot 
(2015), from 1996 to 2013 there was an average yield increase of 7% for insect-
resistant corn (resistant to corn boring pests) and an average yield increase of 5% for 
insect-resistant corn (resistant to corn rootworm).  Also, according to the CBAN (2015), 
from 1997 to 2014 there was an average yield increase of 1.9% for insect-resistant corn 
compared to conventional corn.  Lastly, aggregate data for GM and conventional corn 
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
2400
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A
ve
ra
ge
 Y
ie
ld
 (
kg
s/
h
ec
ta
re
)
Year
283 
following the adoption of GM corn demonstrated an average increase in yields from 
1997 to 2015 of 3.1% (see Figure 6.14). 
Figure 6.14: Average Corn Yield in Kilograms per Hectare from 1997 to 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015b 
The five farmers that adopted herbicide-tolerant soybean reported no increase in 
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aggregate data for GM and conventional soybean following the adoption of GM soybean 
demonstrated an average increase in yields from 1996 to 2015 of 0.8% (see Figure 
6.15). 
Figure 6.15: Average Soybean Yield in Kilograms per Hectare from 1996 to 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2015b 
While there has been an increase in yields following the production of GM corn, 
canola, and soybean, increase in yields of the same crops also occurred prior to the 
introduction of GM traits.  For example, according to Statistics Canada (2015b), the 
annual average increase in yields of conventional canola, corn, and soybean from 1966 
to 1995 were 1.3%, 0.9%, and 1.4% respectively.  Also, the annual average increase in 
yields of other major conventional crops in Canada, such as wheat, barley, and oats, 
from 1996 to 2015 were 1%, 0.4%, and 1.3% respectively. 
The yield traits of a plant are determined by the pre-existing genetic 
characteristics of the conventional variety into which the genetic sequence is inserted.  
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GM crops are high-yielding conventional crops that have genetic sequences inserted to 
predominantly tolerate herbicides or resist insects.  GM crops are engineered to 
decrease crop losses and may or may not result in higher yields.  In some cases, yield 
may decrease if the varieties used to carry the herbicide-tolerant or insect-resistant 
genes are not the highest yielding cultivars.  However, by protecting the plant from 
certain pests, GM crops can prevent yield losses compared with conventional varieties, 
especially when infestation of susceptible pests occurs.  This effect is particularly 
important in Bt crops.  For example, before the commercial introduction of Bt corn in 
1996, the European corn borer was only partially controlled using chemical insecticides.  
The economics of chemical use were not always favorable and timely application was 
difficult, so farmers often accepted yield losses of 3% to 6% per one corn borer per 
plant depending on the stage of plant development rather than incur the expense 
(Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002).  Increases in yields as well as yearly 
fluctuations are attributed to many factors including: improvements in conventional 
breeding, geographical location, environmental changes, fertilizer and pesticide use, 
agronomic practices, farm machinery, and farm management (Veeman and Gray, 
2009). 
 
6.4.3 GM Crops and Farm Level Income 
The 19 Canadian farmers that participated in this research reported a general increase 
in gross farm income following the adoption of GM canola, corn, and soybean.  This is 
consistent with other studies that examine farm level impact (see, for example, Beckie 
et al., 2006; Beckie et al., 2011; Brookes and Barfoot, 2015).  For example, according to 
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Brookes and Barfoot (2015), national gross income for Canadian farmers that planted 
herbicide-tolerant canola increased from $6 million in 1996 to a peak of $546 million in 
2013 (see Figure 6.16). 
Figure 6.16: Gross Farm Income for Canadian GM Canola from 1996 to 2013 
 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2015b 
Also, national gross income for Canadian farmers that planted insect-resistant corn 
increased from $3.2 million in 1997 to a peak of $143 million in 2012 and down to $107 
million in 2013 (see Figure 6.17).  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
G
ro
ss
 I
n
co
m
e 
(m
ill
io
n
s 
o
f 
d
o
lla
rs
)
Year
287 
Figure 6.17: Gross Farm Income for Canadian GM Corn from 1997 to 2013 
 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2015 
Lastly, national gross income for Canadian farmers that planted herbicide-tolerant 
soybean increased from $41,000 in 1997 to a peak in 2006 of $18 million and down to 
$7 million in 2013 (see Figure 6.18). 
Figure 6.18: Gross Farm Income for Canadian GM Soybean from 1997 to 2013 
 
Source: Brookes and Barfoot, 2015 
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Despite a general increase in gross farm income, farmers also reported a general 
stagnation in net farm income prior to and following the adoption of GM canola, corn, 
and soybean.  Two GM crop farmers in interviews commented about these factors.  
“I mean we are bringing in more money overall, but when you look at 
what’s left over I don’t think I am making much more than my father used 
to.  Perhaps I might even be making less, even though I have a lot of 
advantages with all the new equipment available to farmers these days; 
but the income has not changed much at all before or after we started 
using GM” (Independent Farmer 2). 
 
“Farming has changed a lot over the years, and I really don’t think it has 
been easy for any generation of farmers.  I think overall though, my father 
worked a lot harder than we do these days mostly because of the new 
equipment available to those of us farming now, but you know the 
incomes that we earn have not changed much.  I mean it goes up and 
down depending on the year but it has been basically the same” 
(Independent Farmer 3). 
 
The sentiment expressed by these farmers is consistent with Canadian farm 
income data.  Although Statistics Canada does not disaggregate data on farm income 
according to crop type, available data confirms a stagnant total net farm income from 
1976 to 2015 despite an increase in gross income or farm cash receipts (See Figure 
6.19).  
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Figure 6.19: Annual Average Farm Income from 1976 to 2015 
Notes and sources: total net farm income measures the financial flows, both monetary (cash 
income) and non-monetary (depreciation and income-in-kind), and stock changes of farm 
businesses.  Total net income values agriculture economic production during the year that the 
agricultural goods were produced.  It represents the return to owner’s equity, unpaid labour, 
management, and risk, (AAFC and Statistics Canada, 2000; Statistics Canada, 2016b).  Also, 
total farm cash receipts or gross farm income include revenues from the sale of agricultural 
commodities, program payments from government agencies, and payments from private crop 
and livestock insurance programs.  Receipts are recorded in the calendar year when the money 
is paid to the farmer, (AAFC and Statistics Canada, 2000; Statistics Canada, 2016b). 
 
Moreover, while net farm income has remained stagnant, farm expenses and 
farm debt have increased (see Figure 6.20).  
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Figure 6.20: Total Canadian Farm Expenses and Debt from 1976 to 2015 
 
Sources: Statistics Canada, 2016a, 2016d 
Two GM crop farmers in interviews commented about these factors. 
The cost of running a farm is going up.  I mean, sure, the cost of the GM 
products like seeds and chemicals has gone through the roof but so have 
other costs.  I’m looking at my numbers here for the last few years, and 
quite seriously everything is costing me more: taxes, wages, machinery 
fuel, repairs, insurance, and on and on (Independent Farmer 4). 
 
One of the things that has changed though, is that farmers borrow a lot 
more money than they used to, which is becoming a big part of running a 
farm these days.  Cost of leasing equipment is high, also GM products are 
very expensive.  My father had very little debt, but almost everyone I know 
in farming these days seems to be getting more and more in debt 
(Independent Farmer 5). 
 
The more recent exponential rise in farm debt has been fueled by higher farm 
expenses, low farm operator income, the availability of credit at low interest rates, and 
rising farm land values.  According to the Farm Credit Corporation (FCC), Canadian 
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farm land values have risen dramatically since 2008.  Average values of land and 
buildings range from $881 per acre in Saskatchewan to $8,417 per acre in Ontario, up 
from $453 per acre in Saskatchewan and $4,593 per acre in Ontario.  The weighted-
average price of Canadian farmland and buildings was $2,227 in 2013 compared to 
$1,394 in 2008.  In 2013, the average value of Canadian farm land increased 22.1%, 
the highest national increase since the FCC began reporting on farm land values in 
1985 (FCC, 2014).  The federal government of Canada has been supportive of farmers 
borrowing from the FCC.  This allows cash-strapped farmers easier access to operating 
loans particularly when farm land can be used as collateral.  The FCC benefits from, on 
the one hand, rising farm land values that allow for larger loans, and on the other hand, 
the cost-price squeeze that induces farmers to borrow to increase production in hope 
that higher volume will compensate for narrower margins.  The outcome has been an 
increase in the total dollars lent out to farmers and the average annual amount of 
interest farmers are paying (NFU, 2010). 
In addition to loans from the FCC, are loans from supply companies and private 
investors.  Supply companies are increasingly financing farmers’ input purchases such 
as seeds, chemicals, and fertilizers.  Farmers turn to supply companies to access credit 
for working capital.  The credit is tied to the purchase of inputs and both the credit and 
the purchased inputs are tied to crop delivery contracts back to the supply company.  
Through this arrangement, the supply company not only profits from selling farming 
inputs, but also from the interest on the credit to farmers and the crops that the farmers 
produce.  Also, private investors ‘participate’ with the farmer by providing operating 
capital and taking part of the crop at the end of the year.  This type of financing is a 
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vehicle to sell investors what amounts to a financial derivative based on crop prices and 
a virtually unregulated type of private high-risk financing that is marketed to farmers as 
a source of money for inputs and other operational purchases.  Farmers lose autonomy 
when the loan payments and loan conditions constrain choices about how the farm is 
run and how willing the farmer is to try different production methods that incur financial 
risk.  For example, farmers who access credit from a supply company must purchase 
inputs from the same company and not necessarily where the inputs are cheapest.  
Also, in cases where farmers want to make a transition from, for example, conventional 
to organic agriculture or from one crop to another, such transitions are difficult because 
high loan payments prevents farmers from costly transitions and nervous investors may 
not invest in farmers who may want to change direction without assurance of quick 
success (NFU, 2010). 
The impact of adopting GM crops on farm income is attributed to additional factors such 
as: global and domestic commodity prices, currency exchange fluctuations, and trade decisions; 
the profitability of a crop in terms of how much any benefits outweigh the cost of inputs such as 
seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, fuel, and land; farm management and agronomic practices; and 
geographical location and environmental attributes affect profitability directly through increased 
fertility and indirectly through its influence on pests. 
Lastly, despite stagnant net farm income, increasing farm expenses, and 
increasing farm debt, the net income of multinational GM seed and agrochemical 
corporations continue to rise at unprecedented rates.  For example, Monsanto’s 
average annual net income from 2005 to 2015 has increased a remarkable 80.7% from 
a net income of US$255 million in 2006 to US$2.3 billion in 2015 (see Figure 6.21). 
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Figure 6.21: Monsanto Net Income from 2005 to 2015 
 
Sources: Monsanto, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016b 
During the same period, average annual net farm income increased 16.2% from $2.6 
billion in 2005 to $6.8 billion in 2015 (see Figure 6.22). 
Figure 6.22: Farmer Net Income from 2005 to 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016b 
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An index comparing the net income of Monsanto to that of farm operators in Canada 
using the 2005 net incomes as a base demonstrates the dramatic increase in the net 
income of Monsanto compared to that of farm operators (see Figure 6.23). 
Figure 6.23: Net Income Index of Monsanto and Farm Operators 
 
Sources: Monsanto, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016b; Statistics Canada, 2016b 
The average annual income per farm operator in 2005 was $21,178 which increased to 
$48,523 (most recent year that data is available) (see Figure 6.24).  To put this in 
perspective, Monsanto’s (2014a) and DuPont’s (2014a) net income in 2013 exceeded 
the net income of approximately 205,000 farmers in Canada.  
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Figure 6.24: Annual Income per Farm Operator from 2005 to 2013 
 
Source: Statistics Canada, 2016e 
Multinational agribusiness corporations, such as Monsanto, use their increased 
market share to expand their reach through mergers and acquisitions, resulting in fewer 
and larger companies involved in selling inputs to farmers.  The imbalance of 
profitability between multinational agribusiness corporations and farmers is severe as 
corporations pursue ‘competitiveness’ with other companies on the world stage by 
taming governments and using their market power to enforce conditions on producers 
that ensure continued increases in corporate profitability. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Agricultural restructuring has brought significant changes to Canadian farming.  This 
has included an increase in off-farm mechanical (e.g., machinery) and biological (e.g., 
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focused on fewer and larger farms in the most productive regions, large capital-
intensive farms that focus on fewer farm products as resources are devoted to those 
items giving the best comparative advantage, a decrease in farm subsidies, government 
agricultural policy shifts that favour the private sector, and unfavourable environmental 
and market conditions.  Among the purported solutions to these perplexing issues has 
been intense innovation in the agricultural sector, funded by the Government of Canada 
and multinational corporations, aimed at economic growth and the expansion of value 
accumulation in an era of competitive innovation in high-technology industries.  This is 
manifested in the rise and consolidation of a handful of multinational GM seed and 
agrochemical corporations, vigorous marketing and government regulatory approval of 
GM products, the appropriation of germplasm, rapid expansion of IP rights, and the high 
adoption and production of GM crops.  Farmers are increasingly dependent on 
commodified (GM) seeds, which have been rapidly converted from public goods and 
means of production controlled by direct producers, into commodities controlled by 
multinational corporations, sold and purchased in transnational markets.  The serious 
consequences for farmers have included a significant increase in the cost of inputs such 
as GM seeds and associated agrochemicals relative to other operational costs; GM 
seeds that are less adapted to their regions and less resilient to environmental change; 
fewer choices for farmers as conventional seeds are phased out; and less farmer 
autonomy due to stringent contracts that prevent farmers from selecting, saving, 
exchanging, selling, and reusing seeds.  Although there has been a rise in yields and 
gross farm income as a result of adopting GM crops, net farm income has remained 
stagnant due to an increase in farm expenses and debt while the net income of leading 
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GM seed and agrochemical corporations has increased sharply as farmers become 
more dependent on commodified off-farm inputs that are increasingly controlled by 
multinational agribusiness corporations. 
Moving away from positivist and empiricist approaches to understanding the 
economic effects of the adoption and production of GM crops, my analysis provides a 
different perspective by highlighting the dynamics of intra-class competition in capitalist 
society and the ensuing drive toward technological innovation in the agricultural sector.  
Agricultural biotechnology innovations have been predominantly driven by the profit 
imperative as multinational agribusiness corporations compete with each other in order 
to produce new technologies such as GM seeds and associated agrochemicals for sale 
in the agricultural sector.  This is illustrated by reviewing the principal technologies on 
the market today: herbicide resistant crops, such as Monsanto’s Roundup Ready seeds, 
which are tolerant to Monsanto’s herbicide Roundup, and Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) 
crops, which are engineered to produce their own insecticide.  In the first instance, the 
goal is to win a greater herbicide market share for a proprietary product, and in the 
second, to boost seed sales at the cost of damaging the usefulness of a naturally 
occurring pest management bacterium (the Bacillus thuringiensis based microbial 
insecticide) relied upon by many farmers for centuries as a powerful alternative to 
insecticides (Altieri and Rosset, 1999).  These technologies respond to the imperative 
by GM seed corporations to intensify farmers’ dependence on seeds protected by IP 
rights, which conflict directly with the rights of farmers to reproduce, share or store 
seeds (Kloppenburg, 2004).  Whenever possible corporations require farmers to buy a 
company’s brand of inputs and forbid farmers from keeping or selling seeds.  By 
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controlling germplasm from seed to sale, and by forcing farmers to pay for seeds and 
related agrochemicals, companies are determined to extract the greatest profits from 
their investment.  Also, agricultural restructuring in the Canadian context more 
specifically and the global context more generally has resulted in the ongoing stagnant 
net farm income for millions of farmers.  Accordingly, farmers have sought various 
technologies, including GM seeds and associated agrochemicals that promise to deliver 
enhanced productivity and efficiency gains in order to increase their net income.  The 
outcome, however, has been the continued stagnation of net farm income while the net 
income of multinational GM seed and agrochemical corporations continue to rise.  
These processes constitute a major driving force behind the restructuring and 
transformation of the Canadian agriculture and agro-food system.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The development of agricultural biotechnology is a function of capitalist development 
where the interests of individual and interrelated capitals in the biotechnology sector 
coalesce around agricultural and food production and the re-orientation of production 
systems.  Although many exceptional innovations in the agricultural biotechnology 
sector have emerged, these cannot be taken as simply the outcome of scientific and 
technological practices, but the result of social agents exercising political and economic 
influence in the general parameters of capitalist development and the need for particular 
capitals to enhance their potential for increasing (monopolistic) profit and to strengthen 
their market position in an era of competitive innovation in high-technology industries. 
 
7.2 Research Findings 
The history and geography of the development of agricultural biotechnology in Canada 
may be traced to many important events beginning with the technological innovations 
that occurred in the rapeseed oil industry.  During the Second World War, blocked oil 
imports led policy-makers to perceive Canada’s dependence on foreign oil for industrial 
and dietary purposes as a national weakness.  This prompted the development of the 
Canadian rapeseed oil industry (Busch and Juska, 1997).  During the following three 
decades, significant investment by government agencies and innovations by public 
300 
sector scientists in germplasm and other technologies transformed industrial rapeseed 
oil into an edible oil with superior nutritional properties trademarked as canola (CCC, 
2014). 
Following this period, important developments occurred in the 1980s inside the 
canola industry and outside of it.  In 1980 the Rapeseed Association of Canada 
changed its name to the CCC as well as its focus from improving the nutritional 
properties of canola to improving the production characteristics and marketing of the 
product.  Accordingly, private companies began to take interest in the Canadian canola 
industry and increased their contribution to the CCC’s R&D efforts.  This resulted in 
greater emphasis on the requirements of agribusiness corporations, especially those 
associated with agricultural inputs and processing.  The outcome was a tightly 
coordinated R&D program between the private industry, public institutions, and the CCC 
(Gray et al., 2001). 
In addition, the high debt, drought, and trade wars of the 1980s brought 
significant structural changes to Canadian farming.  Farm numbers in Canada continued 
a 50-year decline while farm annual revenue and farm size increased.  The Government 
of Canada responded to the financial difficulties facing many farmers through various 
subsidy programs (Dakers and Forge, 2000).  Also, AAFC changed its focus in the mid-
1980s from improving and maintaining productivity in farming to fostering 
competitiveness and economic growth.  This resulted in a shift from practices that 
benefit Canadian farmers in favour of contracts and partnerships that meet private-
sector needs (Moore, 2002). 
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Lastly, GM crops were created in the early 1980s by four groups of researchers 
working independently at Monsanto and Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri; 
University of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin; and the University of Groningen in 
Ghent, Belgium (Werhane et al., 2004).  Throughout the 1980s, there was a surge of 
investment in the development of agricultural biotechnology, initially by start-up 
companies financed by venture capital followed by multinational corporations. The 
decision by the US Patents and Trademarks Office to grant patents for whole plants in 
1985, and the introduction of canola hybrid technologies and the first hybrid variety in 
1989, prompted the Government of Canada to pass the Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) 
act in 1990 (CFIA, 2015). 
Several developments occurred in the 1990s which further consolidated the 
biotechnology industry in Canada.  The PBR strengthened private control over IP in the 
seed and breeding business.  This resulted in significantly greater use of contracts, 
often involving a web of relationships that link research units with seed companies, 
other input providers, farming communities, processors, and marketers.  The private 
growth in the seed and breeding business was increasingly encouraged by the 
Canadian federal and provincial governments.  Public sector research agencies 
refocused their efforts to complement private sector interests (Gray et al., 2001). 
Moreover, a concerted campaign based on aggressive corporate mergers and 
acquisitions as well as partnerships among the largest multinational corporations in 
agricultural biotechnology was taking place with Monsanto emerging as the largest 
player in the industry (Peekhaus, 2013).  Monsanto received regulatory approval from 
Health Canada to market glyphosate tolerant canola for food use in 1994, glyphosate 
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tolerant soybean in 1996, and insect resistant corn in 1997 (Health Canada, 2015).  
With the R&D structure and IP laws well established, the Canadian Biotechnology 
Strategy Task Force (CBS) was inaugurated in 1997.  The CBS consulted with 
provincial officials, industry, non-government organizations (NGOs), scientists, 
academics, and other relevant stakeholders about the visions, goals, and principles of 
renewed national biotechnology strategy as well as its impact on biotechnology R&D.  
The CBS’s broader range of issues included social, ethical, health, economic, 
environmental, and regulation; however, it was explicitly clear that commercial interests 
continued to play an important role.  The formation of the CBS was followed by the 
establishment of the CBAC in 1999.  The CBAC identified five research areas: the 
regulation of GM foods, IP related issues in biotechnology, novel uses of biotechnology 
such as stem cells, the integration of ethical and social issues into biotechnology, and 
the consequences for privacy that emerges surrounding biotechnology (CBAC, 2006). 
Heading into the 2000s, the Government of Canada had clearly positioned itself 
as a world leader in biotechnology R&D and commercialization.  The Canadian Crop 
Genomic Initiative developed Canadian GM crops, such as corn, soybean, canola and 
wheat, to improve disease and insect resistance, cold and drought tolerance, and yield 
and quality attributes (Government of Canada, 2003).  Also, further consolidation had 
been occurring among GM seed and agrochemical corporations.  According to 
Peekhaus (2013, 42-44), the world’s top 11 GM seed companies: Monsanto (US), 
DuPont (US), Syngenta (Switzerland), Groupe Limagrain (France), Land O’Lakes (US), 
KWS SAAT SE (Germany), Bayer (Germany), Dow (US), Sakata (Japan), DLF-Trifolium 
(Denmark), and Takii (Japan), accounted for approximately 37% of the global 
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proprietary seed market in 1996, which increased to 55% in 2007, and 62% in 2009.  In 
2009, the top three companies (Monsanto, DuPont, and Syngenta) controlled 45% of 
the global proprietary seed market.  Monsanto controlled 23% of the global proprietary 
seed market, and an estimated 87% of the total land area planted with GM seeds was 
planted with Monsanto products either directly or indirectly through licences to other 
companies.  As of 2013, the world’s top three seed companies, Monsanto, DuPont, and 
Syngenta accounted for 26%, 21%, and 8% respectively or 55% collectively of the 
global proprietary seed market, while the top three agrochemical companies, Syngenta, 
Bayer, and BASF accounted for 20%, 18%, and 13% respectively or 51% collectively of 
the global agrochemical market.  Collectively, the top six companies: Monsanto, 
DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF accounted for 65% of the global proprietary 
seed market, and 75% of the global agrochemical market with sales exceeding $65 
billion per annum (ETC Group, 2015). 
In Canada, GM canola is grown by 43,000 farmers, accounting for more than 
98% of all canola, mostly in the western provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and 
Manitoba.  Annually, the GM canola industry contributes $19.3 billion to the economy, 
including more than 249,000 Canadian jobs and $12.5 billion in wages (CCC, 2016).  
GM corn plantings have been steadily increasing, accounting for 83% of all corn planted 
in Canada.  Quebec and Ontario are the primary corn-growing regions, accounting for 
90% of total Canadian corn areas.  GM soybean accounted for more than 90% of total 
soybean acreage in 2007.  Ontario and Quebec accounted for approximately 69% of 
total soybean acreage, while Manitoba's share has risen from 8% in 2007 to 23% in 
2013 (Dessureault and Lepescu, 2014).  GM sugar beet has been planted in Canada 
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since 2008.  Production is concentrated in Taber, Alberta where Canada’s only sugar 
beet processing plant is located.  In 2010, 96% of the sugar beet crop (approximately 
13,000 ha) was GM sugar beet (Evans and Lupescu, 2012). 
Despite the high rate of adoption and production of GM crops, not only in Canada 
but also globally, the genetic modification of agriculture has resulted in dramatic 
conflicts.  By the late 1990s, countries in Western Europe outright rejected the adoption 
of GM crops, and opposition emerged in many regions around the world (Herring, 
2007).  Moreover, in Canada there has been widespread disagreement among 
scientists, activists, regulators, and the general public about how to understand genetic 
modification in agriculture and what the possible positive or negative outcomes may be 
from the production of GM crops.  Variously positioned social movement groups in a 
wide diversity of geographical locations have emphasized different concerns including 
the moral imperatives of ‘playing god’ or patenting life forms, the safety of foods derived 
from genetic modification, the ecological impacts of introducing novel plants into the 
environment, the loss of the ability of farmers to save seeds, ‘biopiracy’ through patent 
laws, and the control that multinational corporations are gaining over agriculture, 
science, and regulatory apparatuses (Eaton, 2013).  Despite this extremely wide-
ranging set of issues, public and academic debate tends to coalesce around either pro- 
or anti-GM crops discourses.  Such controversies have given rise to a globally 
contentious politics and unprecedented policy dilemmas (Herring, 2007). 
The emergence of agricultural biotechnology in the Canadian context is not only 
the result of the efforts of individual capitals, but also those of the Canadian state.  This 
raises issues about the relationship of the state to, on the one hand, capitalist social 
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relations, and on the other hand, science and technology.  By virtue of its insertion into 
the structure of capitalist social relations, the state must promote value accumulation 
and reproduce the capitalist system.  The social relations of capitalism require a 
regularized set of behaviours as well as the assurance of particular interaction between 
classes.  The state continues to be the arbiter of that interaction and an entity which 
enforces an environment that is most amenable for the continuation of capitalist 
development.  However, the particular form (e.g., policies that the state implements) the 
state takes and the outcomes are contingent on specific historical, geographical, and 
material conditions prevalent under capitalist social relations.  The Government of 
Canada’s agricultural biotechnology policy, regulation, and funding regimes 
demonstrate the degree to which the economic is embedded in political structures of 
power as well as the reflexive nature of those political forms that depend in part on the 
economy for their continued existence. 
Regarding the relationship of the state to science and technology, the Canadian 
state has been a critical non-economic actor in the drive toward agricultural 
biotechnology R&D aimed at commodity production.  Interestingly, this is contrary to the 
neo-liberal rhetoric advanced since the 1980s about the state withdrawing from active 
participation in the economic markets and political regulation and control of advanced 
industrial capital (Harvey, 2005).  In fact, the Government of Canada’s agricultural 
biotechnology science and technology policy implementation, regulatory practices, and 
funding structures have become part of the general and external guarantees of the 
social conditions of production directed toward specific capitals as well as the sector as 
a whole.  This demonstrates that in order for the state to ensure value accumulation and 
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the reproduction of the capitalist system it must provide certain tangible, advantageous 
preconditions.  The pursuit of growth policies necessitates an infrastructure that requires 
significant capital outlays which cannot be realized by individual capitals.  Public policy 
is utilized to transfer social surplus value into particular sectors that not only give extra 
incentives to develop science and technology, but minimize the associated risks of 
venturing into such avenues (Hirsch, 1978; Loeppky, 2005).  This is orchestrated in 
different ways, such as funding projects, tax relief incentives, infrastructure 
development, and so on.  By accepting and promoting capitalist control over the 
development of biotechnology R&D, the Canadian state has been compelled to operate 
in ways that ensure the success of the industry for the greater goal of contributing to 
capitalist accumulation. 
The state’s involvement in science and technology represents a field in which 
particular groups can gain ascendancy while negotiating for the most advantageous 
policy.  Indeed, the state can, against the will of many capitals, force the procurement of 
scientific and technological advance.  Accordingly, state science and technology policy 
cannot be understood as the smooth reaction of the requirements of (re)production 
(Hirsch, 1978), but by the partial interests of civil society, individual capitals, and the 
general reproduction demands of capital as a whole.  The theoretical understanding of 
the state in relation to technology must, like all state functions, be mediated through the 
course and results of political (class) struggle.  In this sense, not only is the examination 
of state policy an examination of fundamental social relations, but the specific case of 
agricultural biotechnology in Canada offers an illustration of its contradictory tendencies.  
In the face of the separation between the political and the economic, the state’s 
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ostensible ‘neutral’ mobilization is systematically pressed into the service of partial 
interests within capital (Leoppky, 2005). 
Since class struggle is inherent to capitalist relations of production, capital is 
compelled to engage in ideological strategies that provide the basis for accumulation in 
order to safeguard its existence.  Any threat to the balance of power between classes 
that impedes capitalist accumulation is susceptible to such strategies.  This may be 
illustrated by the efforts of the agricultural biotechnology industry with support from 
government scientific and financial capacities to engage in public relations campaigns, 
attacks on opponents, the maligning of unsympathetic scientific findings, intense 
lobbying, and the ability to disseminate information that is primarily sympathetic to the 
agricultural biotechnology sector.  These strategies serve to constrain the discourse 
surrounding GM crops in ways that ensure the success of the industry for the greater 
goal of contributing to capitalist accumulation. 
The pro-GM crops discourse raises the issue about the relationship between the 
development of science and technology and capitalist social relations of production.  
One of the arguments posited by the government and industry in the construction of the 
pro-GM crops discourse is the ostensibly ‘neutral’ development of science and 
technology under capitalist social relations of production and its corresponding specious 
and teleological claims about the putative capacity of science and technology to 
guarantee socio-economic progress.  This perspective undermines the distinction 
between the development of science and technology in general and the development of 
science and technology under capitalist social relations of production, where the latter 
reflects the social relations under which it occurs.  The appeal to science has provided 
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government and industry a convenient strategy around which to circumscribe the social 
relations that underlie the pro-GM crops discourse.  The development of science and 
(bio) technology is not a neutral affair.  The conception of science and technology as 
asocial catalysts for progress independent of purposive human agency that benefits one 
group of people over another serves to obscure the social relations underlying the 
development of science and technology from the design and development stages of 
technological innovation.  Such a conception not only relegates the social relations 
underlying new technologies to the instances of their application, but also casts their 
social effects on society as secondary and contingent.  This suggests that scientists and 
technologists are the discoverers of laws and processes immanent in an exogenous 
natural realm.  Progress is putatively rooted in the natural order of a world that triumphs 
over historical and social peculiarities.  This discursive framing easily explains away 
social relations as unavoidable by-products of history’s teleological march of progress 
that can be mitigated through the perspicacious applications of new technologies. 
Moreover, the pro-GM crops discourse obscures some fundamental aspects of 
the role of the development of GM technology in agriculture.  The development of 
science and technology in agriculture has allowed for the reduction in the cost of 
agricultural production by increasing labour productivity, decreasing the reproduction 
cost of labour-power, and increasing surplus production at the societal level.  The 
combination of labour with GM technology results in more output (farmers plant GM 
crops and get a higher yield than if they plant conventional crops).  The increased 
output or the higher yield must be understood not only in terms of its use-value (more 
food to be consumed), but also in terms of its surplus-value (a given input of labour in a 
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given time produces more output).  Moreover, GM seeds producers, such as Monsanto, 
are driven by the capitalist profit motive.  Billions of dollars have been invested in the 
R&D of GM seeds.  GM seeds producers, like any other commodity producers, rely on 
being the first to market so as to capture the largest market share and reap the gains 
from their investment.  The immediate objective of GM seeds production is not human 
sustenance and well-being but increase in profits. 
Lastly, the pro-GM crops discourse serves to, at best assuage and at worst 
sever, any meaningful debates and active participation of the public in determining the 
outcomes of the development of agricultural biotechnology.  In particular, government 
and industry have been successful in narrowing the debate so that social, political, 
environmental, and ethical concerns (i.e., the so-called ‘non-scientific’ concerns) have 
been to a great degree elided.  This has been accomplished by constructing a pro-GM 
crops discourse that, on the one hand, disarms any opposition to the development of 
agricultural biotechnology, and on the other hand, ensures the economic viability of the 
industry.  Accordingly, such discursive struggles have material consequences for the 
development, adoption, and production of GM crops, seed saving and production, 
multinational corporations, Canadian farming, the public, and food production in 
general. 
The Canadian farmers that participated in this research entered contracts with 
Monsanto to cultivate GM canola, soybean, and corn.  The contract between the farmer 
and Monsanto significantly limits the farmer’s rights to the purchased seeds through a 
‘no saved seed’ provision which prohibits farmers from saving seeds and/or reusing 
seeds from GM crops therefore requiring farmers to purchase GM seeds on an annual 
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basis.  The increasing demand for patented GM seeds has resulted in the deregistering 
and removal from the market of conventional varieties and the virtual cessation of public 
breeding of the major crops (corn, canola, and soybean) that have GM varieties in 
Canada.  Also, since 2005 the federal government has shut down or decreased the 
funding to a number of public breeding institutions in Canada.  As plant breeding 
increasingly shifted into the private sector, farmers payed more for GM seeds that are 
less adapted to their regions and less resilient to change (NFU, 2013).  As conventional 
varieties are phased out, and because GM traits are bred into conventional varieties 
that have the best performance characteristics, buying GM seeds is often the only way 
that farmers can access modern, high-yielding varieties.  This has diminished the 
choices available to farmers, while strengthening the control of major corporations (ETC 
Group, 2015).  In addition, the profits generated from private breeding return to 
shareholders instead of farming communities and public breeding programs that initially 
developed the conventional crops which have genetic sequences.  The most profound 
example in Canada is the development of rapeseed/canola (see Phillips and 
Khachatourians, 2001). 
The passing of the Canadian Plant Breeders Rights legislation in 1990 provided 
legal control over seeds in the form of patents on genetic sequences and facilitated the 
use of end-point royalties.  Patent protection over new genetic sequences is a legal 
mechanism that takes the ownership of seeds out of the hands of farmers.  Although 
Canada does not permit the patenting of plants, new genetic sequences in plants can 
be patented, and patent-holders can stipulate the conditions under which the patented 
genetic material can be used.  In practice, this means that patents allow the company 
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that developed a GM trait to forbid farmers from saving and replanting seeds with that 
trait and public breeders from further selecting or developing it and require farmers to 
purchase GM seeds and associated products on an annual basis.  Multinational GM 
seed companies spend billions of dollars on patents and patent lawyers, and on policing 
farmers (CBAN, 2015b). 
Although there has been an increase in yields and gross farm income following 
the adoption of GM canola, corn, and soybean, there has also been a general.  This has 
been fueled by higher farm expenses, low farm operator income, the availability of credit 
at low interest rates, and rising farm land values that provide farmers with secure 
collateral on debt.  Simultaneously, the net income of multinational GM seed and 
agrochemical corporations continue to rise at unprecedented rates. 
Multinational agribusiness corporations, such as Monsanto, use their increased 
market share to expand their reach through mergers and acquisitions, resulting in fewer 
and larger companies involved in selling inputs to farmers.  The imbalance of 
profitability between multinational agribusiness corporations and farmers is severe as 
corporations pursue ‘competitiveness’ with other companies on the global stage by 
taming governments and using their market power to enforce conditions on producers 
that ensure continued increases in corporate profitability.  This has resulted in an 
oligopolistic market structure in which the largest actors are able to increase prices, 
narrow genetic diversity in crops, and stagnate innovation.  A related consequence of 
this consolidation is that the major corporations that control the global seed and 
agrochemical markets now also largely determine the priorities and future direction of 
agricultural research. 
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7.3 Contribution to the Academic Literature 
My study of the development, adoption, and production of GM crops in the Canadian 
context brings into focus the social relations among a wide range of actors including: 
farmers, farmers’ union, scientists, government bureaucrats and agencies, activists, civil 
society organizations, GM seed and agrochemical corporations, legislative bodies, and 
universities.  The framework is grounded in a political-economic analysis that situates 
the intense scientific and technological advance in agricultural biotechnology in the 
context of the more general (albeit temporally and spatially uneven) tendency by 
advanced capitalism towards monopoly-protected technological innovation in its various 
forms (Mandel, 1978).  I contribute to the academic literature that encompasses the 
political-economy, development, and civil society aspects of the development of 
agricultural biotechnology and the adoption and production of GM crops (see section 
2.2.2 Agricultural Biotechnology).  I provide a novel perspective by focusing on the intra-
class relations of competition as they relate to the technological aspect of the productive 
forces while abstracting from the capital-labour relation as a contributor to technical 
change.  Competition impels capitalism towards perpetual revolutions in the productive 
forces.  This occurs in different sectors of the capitalist economy, including the 
agricultural sector.  Since farmers’ income is remaining stagnant and in order for them 
to be competitive both nationally and internationally and produce crops at a low price, 
farmers seek new technologies such as GM seeds and associated agrochemicals 
(technological fix) since they cannot move their production sight to areas with lower 
production costs (spatial fix).  Also, agribusiness corporations compete with each other 
in order to meet this demand by producing new technologies such as GM seeds and 
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associated agrochemicals.  Both of these commercial producers compete in their 
respective industries by either using a new technology (e.g., farmers producing GM 
crops) or producing a new technology (e.g., corporations producing GM seeds).  The 
result is unequal class outcomes when we compare how farmers have fared relative to 
agribusiness corporations.  In addition, I emphasize the capitalist character of the state.  
The capitalist state, which generally operates in the interests of capitalists, creates 
conditions for capitalist accumulation.  The state does things which capitalists left to 
themselves are not able to do, for example, the procurement of costly R&D 
infrastructure that requires significant capital outlays.  Lastly, I demonstrate the 
relationship between the discursive and the material in the construction of a pro-GM 
crops discourse and highlight the importance of civil society struggles, not only in 
opposition to the development of GM crops but also in support of the development of 
GM crops.  Accordingly, the pro-GM crops discourse is employed to sustain and 
legitimate the sale and use of GM crops.1 
                                                          
1 While every effort was made to access statistical data on GM crops from a variety of sources, this has been 
challenging.  Global data on the adoption and production of GM crops, including country specific information, has 
largely come from one source, the ISAAA, with little to no comprehensive data from any other sources.  According 
to Peekhaus (2013), the accuracy of the ISAAA data has been questioned by NGOs and academics.  For example, 
LobbyWatch claimed that in the 1998 Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops “a figure of 12% was 
given by American farmers for GM soy yield improvements.  However, a review of the results of over 8,200 
university-based controlled varietal trials in 1998 showed an almost 7% average yield reduction in the case of the 
GM soy” (LobbyWatch, 2015).  In the Canadian case, Peekhaus (2013) claimed that the 2011 Global Status of 
Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops reported that 10.4 million hectares of land were planted with GM crops, but 
according to Statistics Canada data approximately 9.2 million hectares of GM crops were planted in 2011. 
Moreover, tracking data on GM crops in Canada from a variety of sources has also been challenging.  I contacted 
AAFC, the CFIA, and Statistics Canada and discovered that comprehensive disaggregate data according to 
conventional and GM crops are not available.  Canadian agricultural statistics, for the most part, do not 
differentiate between conventional and GM crops and in cases where this is done the information is not 
comprehensive.  For example, although GM corn and GM soybean have been cultivated since 1996 and 1997 
respectively, initially in Ontario and Quebec and later in Manitoba, Statistics Canada began disaggregating statistics 
according to conventional and GM crops in 2006 for corn and soybean in Ontario and Quebec, but not in 
Manitoba.  In the case of GM canola, the only comprehensive data comes from the CCC, while data on GM sugar 
beet is very limited (Peekhaus, 2013).  In order to maintain consistency, I have drawn primarily on data from 
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7.4 Further Research 
In this section I make three recommendations for further research.  First, one of the 
most debated issues in the controversies surrounding GM crops pertains to whether or 
not or how to label GM food products.  Food labels are an important source of 
information about the attributes of food that consumers can use in their decision-making 
processes, however, there are both economic and political implications involved in 
deciding what can and should be included on food labels.  Various divergent 
perspectives have been advanced by academics (see, for example, Dieterle, 2016; 
Huffman, 2016; Huffman and McCluskey, 2014; Sorqvist et al., 2016; Zilberman et al., 
2013), activists (CBAN, 2016b; Centre for Food Safety, 2016; Just Label It Campaign, 
2016) and the general public (see, for example, Campbell, 2014; Steinhauer and 
Strommarch, 2016) regarding the labelling of GM food products. 
Currently, the policy options for labelling include voluntary labelling, mandatory 
labelling, and a ban on labeling (Huffman and McCluskey, 2014).  Proponents of 
voluntary labelling claim that the ‘need-to-know’ perspective is sufficient.  The ‘need-to-
know’ perspective is concerned with information about potential allergens balanced with 
information overload on consumers and possible misinterpretation of scientific 
information where technology is judged to be safe (Qaim, 2009).  A number of 
companies and initiatives already voluntarily provide labelling of food products regarding 
their avoidance of GMOs.  Voluntary labelling does not require further regulatory 
measures.  The costs associated with verification that the food product does or does not 
                                                          
Statistics Canada, and in cases where Statistics Canada does not have relevant data, I have drawn on other sources 
including the ISSAA. 
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contain GMOs are only incurred by those consumers who choose to purchase the 
labelled product (Byrne et al., 2014). 
Proponents of mandatory labeling claim the ‘right-to-know’ perspective is a first 
priority of consumer sovereignty.  The ‘right-to-know’ perspective is part of the 
precautionary principle which imposes more ‘conservative’ safety standards with 
respect to certain kinds of risks (see CBAC, 2002, 15).  Mandatory labelling would 
extend much further than voluntary labelling and would require, at a minimum, to 
identify all food products containing GMOs.  Also, mandatory labelling would require 
further regulatory interventions including monitoring and enforcement.  Effective 
monitoring and enforcement places greater burden on the production, transportation, 
marketing, and processing chain for crops.  In cases where there is a mixing of GM with 
non-GM products a testing verification system is required to measure the concentration 
levels of GMOs and determine the maximum tolerance level in a product that still carries 
the non-GMO label.  Given that tolerance levels differ from one country to another and 
between government regulatory agencies and the private sector the risks and costs of 
enforcement become very high.  This affects the market for a particular commodity in 
the same way as an excise tax (Huffman and McCluskey, 2014; Sorqvist et al., 2016).  
For example, a recent study demonstrated that labelling would increase the cost of food 
to California households by $400 per annum (Zilberman et al., 2013). 
The policy adopted in Canada and the US is voluntary labelling (see Government 
of Canada, 2016; USFDA, 2016).  In Canada, Health Canada and the CFIA carry joint 
responsibility for federal food labelling policies under the Food and Drugs Act.  There 
have been three major consultations since 1993 in Canada on the labelling of novel 
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foods derived from genetic engineering.  Based on these consultations, a set of 
guidelines were developed: mandatory labelling is required if there is a health or safety 
concern from allergens or a significant nutrient or compositional change; ensure 
labelling is understandable, truthful and not misleading; and permit voluntary positive or 
negative labelling on the condition that the claim is not misleading or deceptive and the 
claim itself is factual.  In cases where the methods used to produce new plant varieties 
(such as hybridization or genetic engineering) do not present significant differences in 
nutritional or compositional properties or safety concerns compared to standard 
methods of traditional plant breeding, the method of development is not considered 
material information required to be disclosed in the labelling of foods.  In 1999, the 
Canadian General Standards Board established a multi-stakeholder committee to 
undertake the development of the voluntary labelling standard.  In 2004, the Voluntary 
Labelling and Advertising of Foods That Are and Are Not Products of Genetic 
Engineering was adopted as a national standard in Canada which provided guidelines 
for: model voluntary label declarations that are understandable and not misleading; 
positive and negative claims (e.g., ‘products of genetic engineering’ or ‘not products of 
genetic engineering’); and labelling for single and multi-ingredient foods (CFIA, 2015b).  
Further research is required into the issue of labelling GM food products as GMOs 
become have become more pervasive in the food system. 
Second, recent amendments to agricultural laws in Canada and the US that 
further strengthen federal agricultural legislation, support innovation in the agricultural 
industry, and enhance global market opportunities, facilitate the social reorganization of 
the agricultural industry (see, CFIA, 2015a; USDA, 2016).  This has raised concerns 
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about the increasing power that such laws render multinational agribusiness 
corporations and the possibility of bringing the agricultural biotechnology industry firmly 
within the purview of corporate control (Baines, 2013; CBAN, 2016c; Pechlaner, 2012).  
In the Canadian context, Bill C-18, the Agricultural Growth Act omnibus bill, was 
introduced in Parliament on 9 December 2013 and became law on 25 February 2015 
(see CFIA, 2015).  Among other things, Bill C-18 amends Canada’s Plant Breeders’ 
Rights Act (PBR) by: extending the duration of plant breeders’ rights to 20 years for 
seeds; giving plant breeders power to authorize all reproduction, conditioning (cleaning 
and treating), importing and exporting of PBR protected varieties of seed or other 
propagating material; enabling end-point royalties on the whole crop following harvest 
instead of on purchased seed alone; and provide millions of dollars in additional 
revenues annually to multinational seed and agrochemical corporations that hold PBRs 
in Canada such as Monsanto, Bayer, Dow, DuPont, Cargill, Glencore International, 
Syngenta, Bunge, Limagrain, and BASF (NFU, 2016). 
Bill C-18 has serious consequences for Canadian farmers: it converts farmers’ 
right to save PBR protected seed into a government-given privilege which may be easily 
taken away; farmers are allowed to save and condition seeds, but not to stock them for 
subsequent years as farmers have done for millennia to safeguard against crop failure 
or disease; it enables government to pass regulations to remove class of farmers from 
the ‘Farmers Privilege’ and to restrict, prohibit or put conditions on the use of harvested 
material.  In terms of the development of new varieties, restrictions on farmers’ seed 
saving are not necessary for the development of new varieties.  Also, if farmers are 
compelled to buy seed every year, seed companies can simply offer a mass market 
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product and will have no incentive to develop varieties for specific local and regional 
conditions or avoid developing varieties that are not linked to other products (NFU, 
2016).  The development of new varieties by seed companies has undermined 
Canadian public breeding programs that have made immeasurable contributions to 
Canadian agriculture.  Public breeding programs have worked with farming communities 
to develop varieties that are regionally adapted, less input-dependent, and can help 
farmers and the food system adapt to changing climates.  Since 2005, the federal 
government has shut down or decreased the funding of a number of public breeding 
institutions in Canada (CBAN, 2015b).  In summary, what we are witnessing is a further 
shift in the policies of the Canadian government from a supporter of national agriculture 
to a promoter of multinational agribusiness corporations as the primary economic 
agents.  This is predicated on the global economic integration of the agricultural sector 
that is being facilitated by governments through regulation with agricultural 
biotechnology as a technical driver of production.  Further study is required into these 
developments as livelihoods of farming communities and the food system are at stake.  
Emancipatory social transformation depends on popular democratic forces that 
challenge such outcomes. 
Third, the present work on the development, adoption, and production of GM 
crops may be examined in light of the academic literature on the production of nature 
(see, for example, Burkett, 2015; Castree, 2014; Foster, 2000; Foster and Burkett, 
2016; Smith, 2010).  The development of biotechnology, not only in agriculture and the 
agro-food system, but also in industrial production, health care, and the environment, is 
the outcome of both natural-material conditions and social conditions.  More specifically, 
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this is reflected in the fact that the appropriation of germplasm and the subsequent 
protection of IP rights in agricultural biotechnology is not simply the result of scientific 
and legal practices, but an endogenously induced requirement, determined and 
intertwined with the material aspects of nature, (bio) technology, and social production 
in capitalist accumulation. 
This raises questions about the interrelationship between nature, materialism, 
and science: “one that links social transformation with the transformation of the human 
relation with nature” (Foster, 2000, 1).  The tendency in capitalism to degrade the 
natural conditions of human existence may be understood by drawing on Marx’s labour 
theory of value and various ecological perspectives that have followed (Burkett, 2015).  
This is “tied to the dynamics of capitalist production and the exploitative nature of 
work… Here, the market mediates the collective interaction and metabolism with nature 
that occurs with capitalist production” (Albo and Yap, 2016).  GM crops may be viewed 
as not only material things but also as the embodiment of interacting relations (social, 
ecological, cultural, academic, and technical) (Yapa, 1993).  Given the complexity of 
these issues, further investigation is required that explores the extent that the present 
work on the development, adoption, and production of GM crops exemplifies the 
research on the production of nature.  
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Appendix B: Sample Interview Questions 
 
Research Questions: Data Sources: Sample Interview Questions: 
 
What are the economic 
implications of the production 
of GM crops for farmers in 
different localities? 
 
 
Primary sources: farmers, and 
union members. 
 
Name, address? 
How long have you been 
working in farming? 
How many of your family 
members work with you? 
Is this a first or second 
generation farm? 
How long have you been using 
GM seeds? 
Why did you switch from using 
traditional seeds to using GM 
seeds? 
 
Do you produce more with GM 
seeds than traditional seeds?  
Has your income increased or 
decreased after using GM 
seeds? 
Why do you think your income 
increased or decreased after 
using GM seeds? 
How many people do you 
support in your family? 
Is this your only source of 
income? 
 
What is the role of state 
institutions and civil society at 
local and national scales in the 
Primary sources: political 
parties, government officials, 
Why have many Canadian state 
institutions promoted the use of 
GM crops? 
362 
development of biotechnology 
and GM crops? 
 
company officials, NGOs, and 
intellectuals. 
Why has GM canola been 
adopted at such a high rate?  
How has GM canola production 
fared for farmers? 
What measures have Canadian 
state institutions, both at the 
federal and provincial levels, 
taken for promoting GM 
canola? 
Does the government provide 
any incentive for people that 
adopt GM seeds? 
What role do Canadian state 
institutions play in increasing 
international collaboration in 
the GM sector through financial 
support or technological 
support? 
Why have many NGOs 
supported the adoption of GM 
technology in general and GM 
wheat in particular? 
Why has this resistance been 
successful in terms of blocking 
the adoption of GM wheat but 
bot GM canola? 
 
How are constructed meanings 
about biotechnology, GM crops, 
progress, development, and 
economic growth serve to 
sustain and legitimate pro-GM 
and anti-GM discourses at local 
and national scales? 
 
Primary sources: farmers, union 
members, political parties, 
government officials, company 
officials, NGOs, and 
intellectuals. 
Secondary sources: images, 
newspaper clippings, websites, 
and films. 
How did you learn about GM 
seeds? 
What was your perception of 
GM seeds? 
What kind of information did 
you have about GM seeds? 
Where did you get information 
about GM seeds? 
Why did you adopt or not adopt 
GM seeds?  
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Do you think adopting or not 
adopting GM seeds will benefit 
farmers? 
What advantages or 
disadvantages did you think 
adopting GM seeds would 
bring? 
Do you think adopting GM 
seeds is the way of the future of 
agriculture? 
 
 
